Kolb v. Landes
Decision Date | 05 April 1917 |
Docket Number | No. 11017.,11017. |
Citation | 277 Ill. 440,115 N.E. 539 |
Parties | KOLB v. LANDES et al. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from Circuit Court, Wabash County; J. C. Eagleton Judge.
Bill by Peter J. Kolb, administrator de bonis non with the will annexed of Silas Z. Landes, deceased, against Bertie A. Landes and others. Decree dismissing the bill, and complainant appeals. Decree affirmed.Fred B. Merrills, of Belleville, for appellant.
E. B. Green, of Mt. Carmel, and Thomas H. Creighton, of Fairfield, for appellees.
Silas Z. Landes died testate in Wabash county May 23, 1910. His son, Bernard S. Landes, was named as executor, accepted the trust, qualified and acted as such executor until July 4, 1914, when he resigned, and appellant, Peter J. Kolb, was appointed administrator de bonis non with the will annexed. On October 5, 1914, appellant filed his bill in the circuit court of Wabash county for a construction of the will and the appointment of a trustee. Upon a hearing the bill was dismissed for want of equity. This appeal followed.
The right of the administrator to file a bill to construe the will is questioned. An administrator with the will annexed, under which the executor is required to convert land into money and make distribution, is so connected with the trust that he may apply to a court of equity for a construction of the will and the appointment of a trustee to sell and to carry out the provisions of the will which do not strictly devolve upon him as such administrator. Wenner v. Thornton, 98 Ill. 156;Stoff v. McGinn, 178 Ill. 46, 52 N. E. 1048;Penn v. Fogler, 182 Ill. 76, 55 N. E. 192;Frackelton v. Masters, 249 Ill. 30, 94 N. E. 124. The residuary clause of the will was contained in the codicil, and was in part as follows:
‘I hereby direct that the remainder of my estate not otherwise provided for and that does not pass by this will shall be converted into money by my executor, and that such money, less the costs of administration, shall be equally divided between my said son, B. S. Landes, and my said daughter, Pauline S. L. Eichhorn, share and share alike.’
The bill alleges that the testator died seised of real estate not otherwise provided for in his will, and which falls into the residuary estate, and prays for the appointment of a trustee to carry out the provisions of the residuary clause. Appellant had the right to file his bill to have the will construed for the purpose of determining whether there was any real estate to be disposed of under the residuary clause, and, if so, for the appointment of a trustee to carry out that provision of the will.
The only trust imposed upon the executor by the will, and which is involved in this litigation, is that imposed in that part of the residuary clause above set out. It is the contention of appellant: (1) That paragraph 7 of the will leaves a reversion in the testator which is not disposed of by that paragraph, and which falls into the residuary estate; (2) that by paragraphs 7 to 10, inclusive, the fee of the real estate was not devised, but remains in the heir at law, and therefore falls into the residuary estate; (3) that paragraphs 7 to 11, inclusive, violate the rule against perpetuities, and are void, and that the real estate therein attempted to be devised falls into the residuary estate; and (4) that paragraphs 7 to 11, inclusive, of the will are void because they violate the act restraining trusts and directions for accumulations in deeds and wills. Laws of 1907, p. 1. Other questions are raised which will be noted, but which, in the view we have taken as to the contentions set out, it will not be necessary to determine.
The testator left surviving him his widow, to whom he had recently been married, his two children, Bernard S. Landes and Pauline S. L. Eichhorn, and a grandson, Silas B. Eichhorn. He left personal estate of the value of between $45,000 and $50,000 and real estate of the value of $81,000. The income from all the real estate and from the greater portion of the personal property was devised in trust, in various portions, to his son, daughter, and grandson, respectively, during the period of their natural lives, and in each instance for a period of 21 years thereafter to various other persons, with remainders in some instances to the children of Bernard S. Landes should he die leaving issue, and in other instances to the brothers and sisters of the testator then living or to the children of such brothers and sisters who might then be deceased. The will is a very lengthy and involved instrument, but paragraph 7 will serve to illustrate practically all the points raised. That paragraph is as follows:
It is first contended that the gift over to the brothers and sisters in paragraph 7 is a substitutionary devise, to take effect only in the event of the death of Silas during the lifetime of the testator without legitimate child or children surviving him; that, the condition upon which the devise to the brothers and sisters should take effect having failed, and there being no devise in fee over to the child or children of Silas should he die leaving a child or children surviving him, the remainder in the real estate described in paragraph 7, after the termination of the life estate given to Silas and 21 years thereafter, falls into the residuary estate, and is to be disposed of under the provisions of the residuary clause. In support of this contention it is urged that the provision, ‘if he [Silas] should die without legitimate child or children surviving,’ then the ultimate remainder in fee to the brothers and sisters of the testator, refers to the death of Silas before fore the death of the testator, and in this connection the case of Kohtz v. Eldred, 208 Ill. 60, 69 N. E. 900, is cited. The rule of construction applied in the Kohtz Case that, ‘where there is a devise or bequest simpliciter to...
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Drager v. McIntosh
...of the will showing a different intention, citing Carpenter v. Sangamon Loan & Trust Co., 229 Ill. 486, 82 N. E. 418, and Kolb v. Landes, 277 Ill. 440, 115 N. E. 539. There is no pretense that any rule of law or of public policy would be violated if the testator intended in the will here un......
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... ... on account of the devisee for life surviving the ... testator." ... Kolb v ... Landes, 277 Ill. 440, 115 N.E. 539 ... The ... phrase 'in the event of the death of' may mean death ... at any time, and ... ...
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...creation must vest in someone within the life or lives of those in being and twenty-one years and nine months thereafter. Kolb v. Landes, 277 Ill. 440, 115 N.E. 539. When lives form no part of the postponed period the limit of time within which an estate must vest is twenty-one years. Reid ......