Schultz v. Chicago City Bank & Trust Co.

• Decision Date: 11 November 1943
• Docket Number: No. 27129.,27129.
• Citation: 384 Ill. 148,51 N.E.2d 140
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: SCHULTZ et al. v. CHICAGO CITY BANK & TRUST CO. et al.

384 Ill. 148

51 N.E.2d 140

SCHULTZ et al.

v.CHICAGO CITY BANK & TRUST CO. et al.

No. 27129.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 24, 1943.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 11, 1943.

Proceedings by Herbert C. Schultz and others opposed by the Chicago City Bank & Trust Company, executor, and others. From judgment of Appellate Court reversing a judgment of the Circuit Court in favor of defendants, 316 Ill.App. 540, 45 N.E.2d 577, defendants appeal.

Judgment of Appellate Court reversed and judgment of Circuit Court affirmed.Appeal from Third Division of Appellate Court, First District, on Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; Philip J. Finnegan, Judge.

Rathje, Hinckley, Barnard & Kulp, of Chicago (Franklin J. Stransky, Francis E. Hinckley, and Herbert C. Strauschild, all of Chicago, of counsel), for appellants.

Hummer, Van Ness & Yowell, of Chicago (John J. Yowell and Elbert A. Wagner, Jr., both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.

THOMPSON, Justice.

William R. Schultz died testate in Los Angeles, California, on December 12, 1939, leaving an estate consisting entirely of personal property located in Chicago. His will was admitted to probate in Cook county, Illinois, and letters testamentary issued thereon to the Chicago City Bank and Trust Company, named in the will as executor. By his will the testator bequeathed his entire estate, after the payment of debts, to said bank as trustee and directed that out of the net income therefrom his sister-in-law, Pauline Schultz, should be paid the sum of $400 a year for and during her lifetime. Upon her death the trustee was to divide the entire trust estate then in its possession, together with any accumulations thereon, equally between the Addison Manual Training School for Boys and the Addison Industrial School for Girls. These legatees are Illinois corporations not for profit.

Appellees are the children and only heirs-at-law of the testator from whom he had long been estranged and he specifically stated in his will they were not to participate in the distribution of his estate.

On June 17, 1941, appellees filed their petition in the probate court of Cook county alleging that at the time testator made his will on July 16, 1937, he was a resident of Chicago, Illinois, but that shortly thereafter he moved to the State of California, with the intention of making said State his permanent and only domicile; that he became a resident of said State and domiciled therein and so continued until his death. The petition sets forth the provisions of the California statute prohibiting charitable bequests in excess of one third of the estate of a testator who leaves descendants and providing that all property bequeathed contrary to the provisions of such statute shall go to the descendants of such testator to the extent they would have taken but for such bequests. The relief prayed was that the State of California be declared to be the legal domicile of the testator at the time of his death; that the bequests to the two schools be so reduced that the aggregate thereof shall not exceed one third of the entire estate; and that two thirds of the estate descend and be distributed as intestate estate. The executor and the schools answered, denying that the State of California was the permanent residence and domicile of the decedent. After a hearing on the petition and answer the probate court found that the State of Illinois, and not the State of California, was the legal domicile of the testator at the time of his death, decreed that no part of his estate be distributed as intestate estate, and dismissed the petition. Upon an appeal to and trial de novo in the circuit court the same finding was made. The judgment of the probate court was affirmed and appellees' petition denied. Appellees then prosecuted a further appeal to the Appellate Court. That court reversed the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the cause with directions to enter a judgment that the testator, William R. Schultz, was domiciled in California at the time of his death, that the trustee pay to Pauline Schultz, during her lifetime, out of the net income of the trust estate the sum of $400 a year; that two thirds of the estate, less an amount sufficient to provide for the payment of the annuity to Pauline Schultz without reducing the one third to be paid to the schools, shall descend and be distributed as intestate estate in accordance with the laws of California and that the bequests to the schools be so reduced that each school will receive one sixth of the estate without reduction because of the annuity to Pauline Schultz. A petition for leave to appeal to this court has been allowed.

The contentions of appellants are that the judgment of the Appellate Court should be reversed because: (1) said court, by its judgment, erroneously assumed jurisdiction which it did not possess to construe the last will and testament of William R. Schultz, deceased, and to construe, modify, and supervise the trust created by said will; (2) the record does not show that the bequests to the Illinois charities will exceed one third of the estate contrary to the provisions of the California statute in appellees' petition mentioned; (3) the interest of Pauline Schultz, who was not a party to the litigation, was vitally affected; (4) the entire estate of the deceased, being located in Illinois, the laws of this State must govern its administration and control construction of the will and the trust created thereby; (5) the California statute relied upon, being arbitrarily discriminatory against charitable and benevolent societies and corporations of other States and against the public policy of this State, should not, as a matter of public policy, be enforced by the courts of this State. Briefly stated, appellants' position is that the probate court, and consequently also the circuit and Appellate courts, had no jurisdiction to order decedent's estate distributed in accordance with the laws of California; that these courts had jurisdiction to determine the question of domicile, the finding of the Appellate Court thereon being final and conclusive; and that irrespective of the decision on the question of domicile, the only proper judgment that could be made would have been to direct distribution according to the law of Illinois. Lastly,-and this the appellants urge upon us only in the event we should hold the Appellate Court had jurisdiction to construe testator's will by applying thereto the California statute and interpreting and construing the provisions of the will in the light of such California law to determine their validity, force and effect-that this court consider and determine the question of fact whether or not William R. Schultz was domiciled at the time of his death in the State of California. This dispute as to domicile was the sole issue on which the case was submitted to the probate and circuit courts.

The probate court is not a court of general jurisdiction. Its jurisdiction is defined and restricted by the constitution and limited to the subjects therein enumerated. Gordon v. Bauer, 373 Ill. 357, 26 N.E.2d 110;Howard v. Swift, 356 Ill. 80, 190 N.E. 102. By section 20 of article VI of the constitution, Smith-Hurd Stats., original jurisdiction of the settlement of estates of deceased persons and of all probate matters is vested solely in the probate courts. Upon an appeal to the circuit court from any order, judgment or decree of the probate court, the cause is tried de novo. Ill.Rev.Stat.1941, chap. 3, par. 487. The trial de novo, however, must be limited to the issues tried in the probate court from which the appeal is taken. It cannot extend to other issues not before, or passed upon by, the probate court wherein the original trial was had. Bley v. Luebeck, 377 Ill. 50, 35 N.E.2d 334. While it is true the probate court has no general equitable jurisdiction, it is well established that it exercises equitable powers in connection with probate matters. In re Estate of Blyman, 382 Ill. 520, 47 N.E.2d 710;London & Lancashire Indemnity Co. v. Tindall, 377 Ill. 308, 36 N.E.2d 334. The probate court has jurisdiction to construe a will insofar as is necessary to determine the rights of legatees thereunder. Kerner v. Peterson, 368 Ill. 59, 12 N.E.2d 884;Strawn v. Trustees of Jacksonville Female Academy, 240 Ill. 111, 88 N.E. 460;Kolb v. Landes, 277 Ill. 440, 115 N.E. 539. Section 291 of the Probate Act, Ill.Rev.Stat.1941, chap. 3, par. 445, gives the probate court power to enforce the settlement of estates and to order the executor or administrator to distribute the estate to the persons entitled thereto. There can be no doubt that the probate court possessed jurisdiction to order distribution of the estate of William R. Schultz, deceased, and to construe his will as a prerequisite thereto.

We are next to consider whether the question of domicile involved in this case is open to review in this court, or whether the decision of the Appellate Court is final and conclusive as to such question of fact.

We have held that the probate court was exercising equitable jurisdiction and therefore, upon appeal to this court, we were not bound by the findings of fact of the Appellate Court in proceedings for the final settlement of the accounts of guardians (Cheney v. Roodhouse, 135 Ill. 257, 25 N.E. 1019), for the adjustment and allowance of claims against the estates...