Kollsman v. City of Los Angeles

• Decision Date: 17 July 1984
• Docket Number: No. 83-5798,83-5798
• Citation: 737 F.2d 830
• Parties: Eva KOLLSMAN, City National Bank, Tashi Land Corporation, a New York corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a municipal corporation, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

Page 830

737 F.2d 830

Eva KOLLSMAN, City National Bank, Tashi Land Corporation, a New York corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a municipal corporation, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 83-5798.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted Jan. 4, 1984.

Decided July 17, 1984.

Michael M. Berger, Fadem, Berger, McIntire & Norton, Los Angeles, Cal., for plaintiffs-appellees.

William L. Waterhouse, Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant-appellant.

Joseph Barbieri, Deputy Atty. Gen., San Francisco, Cal., for amicus Cal. Coastal Comm. et al.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California.

Before SNEED and REINHARDT, Circuit Judges, and SOLOMON ^*, District Judge.

SNEED, Circuit Judge:

Paul Kollsman sought approval from the City of Los Angeles to develop an eighty-five acre subdivision. The City denied the application on the ground that Kollsman had failed to submit requested information. Kollsman filed an action in federal district court alleging that the City's land use regulations violate the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and provisions of state law. Without addressing the federal constitutional claims, the district court held that Kollsman's subdivision application must be deemed approved under California law. We conclude that the district court, 565 F.Supp. 1081, should have abstained and allowed state courts to decide the questions of land use planning. We therefore vacate the judgment of the district court and remand.

I. FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Paul Kollsman proposed to develop a seventy lot subdivision on an eighty-five acre tract of land located in the Santa Monica Mountains. On January 12, 1977, Kollsman submitted to the City of Los Angeles a proposed tract map and an "Environmental Assessment Form." The City notified Kollsman on February 16, 1977, that it would not accept his subdivision application before he submitted a draft Environmental Impact Report (EIR). Kollsman submitted a first draft EIR on July 28, 1977.

By a memorandum dated August 16, 1977, the City informed Kollsman that two additional sections should be added to the EIR. Kollsman submitted a second draft EIR on September 13, 1977. The City circulated this draft for comment among concerned homeowner groups. On November 30, 1977, the City sent Kollsman a memorandum requesting further environmental information. The City sought information on development alternatives that would conform to the City's "slope density formula" and utilize "cluster development" as The City informed Kollsman in a letter dated May 11, 1978, that the draft EIR could not be completed until he submitted information on alternative development plans and the slope density formula. On advice of counsel, Kollsman did not provide the additional information. The City mailed Kollsman a form notice of "Determination of Incompleteness of Application" on November 22, 1978. Two months later, on January 12, 1979, the City informed Kollsman that a public hearing could not be held on his application without completion of the EIR. On November 14, 1979, the City sent Kollsman a "Notice of Intent to Disapprove without Prejudice" for the reason that he had not submitted requested information. The City denied Kollsman's subdivision application on November 26, 1979. ²

                opposed to individual units. 1   Four months later, on March 3, 1978, Kollsman submitted certain information requested by the City.  He did not, however, submit information on alternative development plans
                

Concurrent with the City's processing of the subdivision application, Kollsman contested the land use regulations in federal district court. Kollsman filed a six-count complaint on March 1, 1977. Counts I and III sought to invalidate the slope density formula on constitutional theories of inverse condemnation and equal protection. Count II requested $6.3 million in damages for inverse condemnation. Counts IV, V, and VI involved state law claims. The district court granted the City's motion to dismiss Count V on April 25, 1977, and granted summary judgment in favor of the City on Counts IV and VI on March 28, 1978. In March and April of 1979, a seven-day bench trial was held on the constitutional claims.

On March 21, 1980, Kollsman filed a motion to submit additional evidence that raised, for the first time, the argument that his subdivision application should be "deemed approved" pursuant to California statutes. The court held two additional days of trial in April 1981. On November 11, 1981, the court issued an opinion stating that it had found for the plaintiff on the issue of liability and directing plaintiff's counsel to submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. Over the City's opposition, the court on February 22, 1982, granted Kollsman's motion to amend the complaint to conform to proof. The amendment added two counts: Count VII asserts that Kollsman's application must be "deemed approved" under California law, and Count VIII claims rights under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983.

On February 2, 1983, the district court held that Kollsman's subdivision application must be "deemed approved" pursuant to California Government Code Sections 65950 and 65956(a). ³ This result is based The City filed a timely notice of appeal. ⁴

on the court's conclusion that Kollsman's application was complete in fact and must be "deemed complete" on November 22, 1978. The court asserted that this conclusion is valid even though the City sent Kollsman a notice on that date stating that his application was incomplete. The district court found that the City could not in good faith determine that the application was incomplete when Kollsman had submitted all information that the City could lawfully request under applicable California statutes. The application was complete, and we must read its letter of November 22, 1978 to say that. Because the City did not act on Kollsman's application within one year from November 22, 1978, the court concluded that the application must be deemed approved.

Count VII raises difficult state law issues of great importance to the people of California. As already indicated, abstention is the appropriate course here.

We, therefore, vacate and remand.

II. DISCUSSION

The abstention doctrine based on Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 61 S.Ct. 643, 85 L.Ed. 971 (1941) is a narrow exception to the district court's duty to decide cases properly before it. Pullman allows postponement of the exercise of federal jurisdiction when "a federal constitutional issue ... might be mooted or presented in a different posture by a state court determination of pertinent state law." C-Y Development Co. v. City of Redlands, 703 F.2d 375, 377 (9th Cir.1983) (quoting County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 189, 79 S.Ct. 1060, 1063, 3 L.Ed.2d 1163 (1959)).

We apply an abuse of discretion test in reviewing district court abstention decisions. E.g., C-Y Development Co., 703 F.2d at 377. This standard of review, however, does not preclude invoking abstention in cases in which there exist compelling reasons to allow state courts to resolve issues of state law. Cf. Richardson v. Koshiba, 693 F.2d 911, 915-18 (9th Cir.1982) (ordering Pullman abstention after raising issue sua sponte ). We believe that this is such a case. ⁵

We have relied on three criteria for the application of Pullman abstention: (1) the complaint must touch a sensitive area of social policy into which the federal courts should not enter unless there is no alternative to adjudication; (2) a definitive ruling on the state issues by a state court could obviate the need for constitutional adjudication by the federal court; and (3) the proper resolution of the potentially determinative state law issue is uncertain. Richardson, 693 F.2d at 915; see C-Y Development Co., 703 F.2d at 377; Canton v. Spokane School Dist. No. 81, 498 F.2d 840, 845 (1974).

The first and second criteria are clearly satisfied in this case. We have repeatedly noted that land use planning is a sensitive area of social policy that meets the first requirement for Pullman abstention. E.g. C-Y Development Co., 703 F.2d at 377; Santa Fe Land Improvement Co. v. City of Chula Vista, 596 F.2d 838, 840 (9th Cir.1979); Ranchos Palos Verdes We also find that the third requirement for Pullman abstention is met here. The district court's decision rests on an interpretation of interlocking statutory provisions enacted during the course of this litigation. The district court acknowledged that there have been few state cases that interpret the particular California code sections underlying its decision. Slip op. at 21. Moreover, appellants persuasively argue that resolution of this case requires attention not only to Chapter 4.5 of the California Government Code, the focus of the district court's opinion, but also consideration of the interrelation of that chapter with the Subdivision Map Act and the California Environmental Quality Act. ⁶

Corp. v. City of Laguna Beach, 547 F.2d 1092, 1094 (9th Cir.1976). The second requirement is also met. The conclusion eventually reached by the district court illustrates that a ruling on Kollsman's state law claims could obviate the need to address the federal constitutional claims.

The uncertainty of state law issues is illustrated by comparing the reasoning of the district court with the City's arguments before this court. For example, the district court relied on section 65941 of the California Government Code to conclude that the City could not in good faith refuse to accept Kollsman's application as complete. ⁷ That section, the court held, prohibits the City from requiring Kollsman to submit the "informational equivalent" of an EIR. Because the district court found that Kollsman had submitted sufficient information to allow the City to prepare a legally adequate EIR, the court held that the City must consider Kollsman's application complete even...