Kollsman v. City of Los Angeles
| Decision Date | 01 February 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. CV 77-0770-ALS.,CV 77-0770-ALS. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of California |
| Parties | Paul KOLLSMAN: Tashi Land Corporation, a New York corporation, Plaintiffs, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a municipal corporation, Defendant. |
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED
Jerrold A. Fadem, Michael Berger, Richard D. Norton of Fadem, Berger & Norton, Santa Monica, Cal., for plaintiffs.
Ira Reiner, City Atty., Gary R. Netzer, Asst. City Atty., William L. Waterhouse, Deputy City Atty., Los Angeles, Cal., for defendant.
This court has jurisdiction founded on diversity of citizenship and amount in controversy pursuant to Title 28, United States Code Section 1332.
Plaintiff is a citizen of the State of New York and defendant is a municipal corporation incorporated under the laws of the State of California having its principal place of business in the State of California. The matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum of ten thousand dollars. The court also has jurisdiction founded upon Title 28, United States Code Section 1331, the existence of a federal question.
This opinion is limited in its scope to Count VII, added with the permission of the court to conform to proof, without deciding the constitutional questions raised in other counts, a procedure which honors the principle that preferably controversies should be decided upon other than constitutional grounds. The court has retained jurisdiction of the other counts.
The facts are largely undisputed. However, in some instances there are conflicts in the evidence which must be resolved. The facts as stated in this opinion represent a resolution of conflicting evidence as well as a recitation of the undisputed facts. Where there is a conflict in the evidence, the statement of the court in this opinion is intended as a finding of fact. To contribute to clarity, the opinion combines fact and law. The court intends that its statements of law be taken as the court's conclusions of law. See Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 52(a).
On March 1, 1977, plaintiffs filed a six count complaint for inverse condemnation and a declaration that certain actions by the City were invalid. Counts I, II, and III raised claims under the Taking and Equal Protection Clauses of the United States Constitution. Counts IV, V, and VI raised claims under various provisions of California state zoning and environmental control laws.
On March 31, 1977, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, defendants moved to dismiss Counts II, III, IV, V and VI. The motion was granted only as to Count V. Thereafter, on May 16, 1977, the City filed its answer to plaintiffs' complaint.
On September 8, 1977, the City filed a second motion to dismiss for lack of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction and on the grounds that this court should abstain from exercising federal question jurisdiction. On November 22, 1977, the City's motion to dismiss was denied.
On February 10, 1978, the City filed a motion for summary judgment, pursuant to Rule 56, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking a summary judgment as to plaintiffs' five remaining causes of action. Summary judgment was granted as to Count IV and Count VI, and denied as to Counts I, II, and III.
On March 15, 1978, the City filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The City argued before the Court of Appeals that plaintiffs' complaint was not ripe for adjudication and that the district court exceeded its jurisdiction and abused its discretion by declining to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over this case. On June 7, 1978, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for writ of mandamus stating in an order as follows:
On August 10, 1978, the Court of Appeals denied the City's petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc.
On July 27, 1978, the City filed a motion to strike plaintiffs' demand for a jury trial and said motion was granted. The first phase of the trial was a six day court trial ending April 5, 1979. On November 26, 1979, plaintiffs' development application was disapproved by the City for lack of completeness. Subsequently, the court viewed subject property and two more days of trial were conducted, ending April 22, 1981.
On February 17, 1982, at the suggestion of the court, Kollsman filed a motion for leave to amend his complaint to conform to the evidence pursuant to Rule 15(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In a minute order dated February 22, 1982, the court granted the motion. Kollsman's amendment adds two causes of action. Count VIII was a civil rights claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City. Kollsman argued that as a result of the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), he was entitled to raise a claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against the City.1 This count has not been litigated. Count VII was added to conform to proof. This cause of action involved the application of Cal. Government Code Sections 65920 et seq. (Review and Approval of Development Projects), which became effective while this case was pending. Since as expressed in this opinion, Kollsman is entitled to relief under the provisions of Cal. Government Code Sections 65920 et seq., it is unnecessary to address his claims under the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 at this time.
A discussion of the facts requires reference to the City's subdivision approval procedure.2 A prospective subdivider initiates the process for subdivision approval by submitting to the City Planning Department a "Tentative Tract Map" which must describe the proposed development project. This Tentative Map is circulated among a number of City departments for comment. The departments respond through written reports which are submitted to the Planning Department to be consolidated and considered by a Deputy Advisory Agency, a member of the Planning Department staff with the statutory power to approve, conditionally approve, or disapprove the proposed subdivision. Prior to making its decision on the Tentative Map, the Deputy Advisory Agency notifies all property owners within 300 feet of the property proposed to be subdivided of a public hearing to consider the proposal.
Along with the reports from various City departments, the Deputy Advisory Agency also has the benefit of information developed through the City's environmental review process. This procedure is mandated by the California Environmental Quality Act of 1970 (hereafter "CEQA" Pub. Resources Code Section 21000 et seq.) and the State and City Guidelines promulgated under its authority. CEQA requires that the City undertake a preliminary analysis of all projects which may have an impact on the environment. In Los Angeles, this initial screening is accomplished by a Planning Department Environmental Review Committee. If the screening identifies any "significant" effects on the environment which may arise from the project, then the Planning Department may require the developer to submit material for preparation of a draft Environmental Impact Report (EIR). This draft EIR, once complete, is then used by the Planning Department to develop a full-scale analysis of all potential environmental impacts. This analysis is circulated to interested government agencies, the State Clearinghouse in Sacramento, and the public for its review and comment. Once all comments are received, the analysis emerges in the Final EIR. This final EIR must be certified as complete and then used by the Deputy Advisory Agency in making his final decision. Pub. Resources Code § 21151.
If the information submitted by the developer for preparation of a draft EIR is inadequate, subsequent submissions are required until enough information is provided for the City to describe the project, its impacts, and alternatives in sufficient detail to solicit public comments.
If the Deputy Advisory Agency disapproves the proposed subdivision, the developer may appeal to the City Planning Commission and, if necessary thereafter, to the City Council. L.A.M.C. § 17.06. If the Deputy Advisory Agency approves the subdivision, any "interested person adversely affected by the proposed subdivision" may appeal to the Commission and then to the Council. Id. Ordinarily, approved subdivisions are subject to a number of conditions which must be satisfied before construction begins, such as dedication of property for streets, installation of necessary utilities, etc. Once the conditions for approval have been satisfied, the subdivider may submit to the City his Final Tract Map. L.A.M.C. § 17.07. When this Final Map is accepted and recorded, the subdivider may commence construction and sell lots.
Elements of the City's General Plan — like the Beverly Crest-Bel Air District Plan — play an important role in the subdivision process. Under state law, a subdivision cannot be approved unless the Advisory Agency makes a finding that the development is "consistent with applicable general or specific plans." Cal.Gov.Code § 66474.60. This Advisory Agency finding is based on all available information, including the final EIR and reports from City Departments, and cannot be made until that information base is complete.
In 1946 Kollsman purchased a Mediterranean-style home in the Santa Monica mountains above Beverly Hills. The home was situated on 12 acres of land. Thereafter, Kollsman began acquiring other...
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Kollsman v. City of Los Angeles
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