Komater v. Kenton Court Associates, 2-86-0390

• Decision Date: 31 December 1986
• Docket Number: No. 2-86-0390,2-86-0390
• Citation: 104 Ill.Dec. 635,151 Ill.App.3d 632,502 N.E.2d 1295
• Parties: , 104 Ill.Dec. 635 Arthur J. KOMATER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KENTON COURT ASSOCIATES, an Illinois General Partnership; Julian J. Golding; Jerroll L. Iseberg; Donald Kaplan; and the Estate of Maurice Harris, Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1295

502 N.E.2d 1295

151 Ill.App.3d 632, 104 Ill.Dec. 635

Arthur J. KOMATER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KENTON COURT ASSOCIATES, an Illinois General Partnership Julian J. Golding; Jerroll L. Iseberg; Donald Kaplan; and the Estate of Maurice Harris, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 2-86-0390.

Appellate Court of Illinois Second District.

Dec. 31, 1986.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 9, 1987.

Thomas W. Gooch & Associates, Ltd., Thomas W. Gooch, III, Kim A. Lewis, Wauconda, for plaintiff-appellant.

Brydges, Riseborough, Morris, Franke & Miller, Louis W. Brydges, Jr., John C. Polster, Waukegan, for defendants-appellees.

Presiding Justice NASH delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff, Arthur Komater, appeals from a summary judgment entered in favor of defendant, Kenton Court Associates, contending the trial court erred in granting summary judgment because defendant's unverified motion for that relief was not supported by affidavit.

On January 11, 1984, plaintiff filed a complaint for breach of contract against defendant alleging in count I that on April 1, 1982, plaintiff entered into an oral contract with defendant to furnish carpentry and labor services for defendant's construction project for the sum of $481,000. By January 12, 1983, plaintiff had completed $276,000 worth of work on the project, but defendant had only paid plaintiff $140,000 despite plaintiff's repeated demands, and he sought damages of $136,000 and interest. Count II of the complaint alleged that on April 1, 1982, plaintiff also entered into an oral contract with defendant to furnish general construction supervision for the project for $96,000. By January 12, 1983, plaintiff had completed $76,000 worth of supervisory work on the project, but defendant had only paid $37,800, and plaintiff sought damages of $38,200 and interest.

On November 27, 1985, defendant submitted interrogatories to plaintiff whose answers were filed on January 21, 1986. Defendant's Interrogatory No. 2 stated:

"2. State the exact nature and terms of the alleged agreement between Plaintiff and the Kenton Court Associates reaffirming to in the complaint, the date the agreement was reached, who else was present, whether there was any writing contained or referred to in the terms of the agreement, and whether the agreement was subsequently modified, rescinded or altered in any manner."

Plaintiff's answer stated:

"ANSWER: On or about April 1, 1982, Plaintiff made an oral contract with Kenton Court Associates through one of its General Partners, Jerroll L. Iseberg, by which Plaintiff agreed to furnish General carpentry services, miscellaneous labor services and supervision for a certain construction project being build by the Defendants, specifically 5311 North Kenmore, Chicago, Illinois. Present at that meeting were Arthur J. Komater, Carol Komater, and Jerroll L. Iseberg. There is no writing containing or referring to the terms of the agreement, investigation continues."

On February 19, 1986, defendant filed an unverified motion for summary judgment alleging that plaintiff's answer to the interrogatory did not set forth a legally enforceable contract because it failed to state the existence of a writing of the agreement, a price, the term, a specific subject matter or a time for payment or performance, and was otherwise so vague that the additional terms necessary to make the contract enforceable were not reasonably inferable from the answer. On March 12, 1986, plaintiff filed a verified response to defendant's motion, which incorporated his verified complaint by reference, and alleged that "Plaintiff did not interpret the interrogatory question as requiring that he set forth each and every term of the agreement particularly in view of the fact that discovery is ongoing." Plaintiff's response did not set forth any of the missing contract terms.

On March 17, 1986, the trial court found that plaintiff's answer to the interrogatory was insufficient to support a cause of action for breach of contract and as plaintiff had failed to offer an appropriate affidavit or response to the motion for summary judgment, it was granted. This appeal followed.

Plaintiff's sole contention on appeal is that defendant's unverified motion for summary judgment was not supported by facts in affidavit form and plaintiff's complaint alone was therefore sufficient to raise genuine issues of material fact.

We first note that Supreme Court Rule 191(a) (87 Ill.2d R. 191(a)) only requires that an affidavit in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment be based on the personal knowledge of the affiant; it does not impose a requirement that a motion for summary judgment be similarly verified. Defendant's motion for summary judgment does not, therefore, fail merely because it was not verified.

Summary judgment is properly granted only where there is no genuine issue of material fact (Thompson v. Webb (1985), 138 Ill.App.3d 629, 631, 93 Ill.Dec. 225, 486 N.E.2d 326; Fearon v. Mobil Joliet Refining Corp. (1984), 131 Ill.App.3d 1, 5, 86 Ill.Dec. 335, 475 N.E.2d 549, appeal denied ), and this is to be determined from the pleadings, depositions, affidavits and admissions on file in each case (Heman v. Jefferson (1985), 136 Ill.App.3d 745, 752, 91 Ill.Dec. 191, 483 N.E.2d 537; In re Estate of Myers (1983), 120 Ill.App.3d 726, 730-31 76 Ill.Dec. 448, 458 N.E.2d 1102, appeal denied ). Summary judgment is to be granted only where the evidence, when construed most strongly against the moving party, establishes clearly and with no doubt his right thereto. Rambert v. Advance Construction Co. (1985), 134 Ill.App.3d 155, 157-58, 89 Ill.Dec. 1, 479 N.E.2d 1007, appeal denied; Becovic v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank (1984), 128 Ill.App.3d 107, 113, 83 Ill.Dec. 233, 469 N.E.2d 1379.

Where the movant supplies well-pleaded facts in an affidavit in support of summary judgment which, if not contradicted, would entitle him to judgment, the opposing party cannot rely upon his complaint or answer alone to raise issues of material fact. (In re Estate of Garbalinski (1983), 120 Ill.App.3d 767, 770, 76 Ill.Dec. 411, 458 N.E.2d 1065; Deltak, Inc. v. Schwartz (1983), 119 Ill.App.3d 119, 121-22, 74 Ill.Dec. 685, 456 N.E.2d 187; Burks Drywall, Inc. v. Washington Bank & Trust Co. (1982), 110 Ill.App.3d 569, 575, 66 Ill.Dec. 222, 442 N.E.2d 648.) That is, the consequence of failing to file a counteraffidavit is that any statements and affidavits supporting the motion for summary judgment stand as admitted. (Kellerman v. Mar-Rue Realty & Builders, Inc. (1985), 132 Ill.App.3d 300, 306, 87 Ill.Dec. 267, 476 N.E.2d 1259; Harris v. Bethlehem Steel Corp. (1984), ...