Pease v. International Union of Operating Engineers Local 150

• Decision Date: 11 February 1991
• Docket Number: No. 2-90-0064,2-90-0064
• Citation: 567 N.E.2d 614,153 Ill.Dec. 656,208 Ill.App.3d 863
• Parties: , 153 Ill.Dec. 656 Jack PEASE, Indiv., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL 150, et al.,Defendants-Appellees (C. Robert Darling, Defendant).
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 614

567 N.E.2d 614

208 Ill.App.3d 863, 153 Ill.Dec. 656

Jack PEASE, Indiv., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. INTERNATIONAL UNION OF OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL 150, et al.,Defendants-Appellees (C. Robert Darling, Defendant).

No. 2-90-0064.

Appellate Court of Illinois Second District.

Feb. 11, 1991.

Louis W. Brydges, Jr. (argued), Thomas K. Gerling, Brydges, Riseborough, Morris, Franke & Miller, Waukegan, for Jack Pease, Individually and J. Pease Const. Co., Inc.

Louis E. Sigman, Dale D. Pierson (argued), Baum & Sigman, Ltd., Chicago, Harold C. McKenney (argued), Holmstrom & Kennedy, Crystal Lake, Peter M. Katsaros, Chicago, for Intern. Union of Operating Engineers Local 150, William E. Dugan, Anthony S. Magdic, Keith Strong, and C. Robert Darling.

Justice WOODWARD delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs, Jack Pease, individually, and J. Pease Construction, Inc. (Pease), appeal from an order of the circuit court of Lake County granting a motion to dismiss and summary judgment and partial summary judgment as to various counts of Pease's third amended complaint against defendants, International Union of Operating Engineers Local 150 (International), William E. Dugan (Dugan), Anthony S. Magdic (Magdic), and Keith Strong (Strong).

By way of background, Pease and International were involved in a dispute over Pease's failure to sign a collective bargaining agreement with International. International began picketing at a sand and gravel pit partially owned by Pease and where several of his employees worked. The picketing was to protest the alleged failure of Pease to pay his employees operating heavy equipment the "area standard" for wages and benefits.

The allegations of Pease's third amended complaint arise from two separate incidents. On August 19, 1987, Magdic and Strong reported to the Lake County sheriff that Pease had threatened them with a revolver. Pease admitted that on that day he had a conversation with Magdic and Strong at the sand and gravel pit site and that at the time he had a toy squirt gun or cap gun tucked in the waistband of his pants. He also had a handgun, unloaded and in a gun case in his vehicle. Pease denied threatening Strong or Magdic. A warrant was issued for Pease's arrest charging him with two counts of aggravated assault and one count of unlawful use of weapons. He was arrested but was found not guilty of all charges following a jury trial.

The second incident occurred on September 30, 1987. On that day, the Northwest Herald printed an interview with Dugan, the president of International. In response to the questions by the Herald reporter, Dugan was quoted as making the following statements about Pease:

" 'He lies a lot'. Dugan said of Pease. 'He's dealing with half a deck, did you know that? I think he's crazy.' "

In his third amended complaint, Pease alleged that Dugan and International (under a theory of respondeat superior ) had defamed him by the above remarks (counts I and II). In counts III and IV, Pease alleged that he had been defamed by Magdic and International in that Magdic had told the police that Pease had pointed a revolver at him, knowing that statement to be false. In counts V and VI, Pease alleged false imprisonment by Magdic and International. In counts VII and VIII, Pease alleged defamation by Strong and International based upon the same allegations contained in counts III and IV. In counts IX and X, Pease alleged false imprisonment by Strong and International. Counts XI and XII directed against another individual defendant were dismissed by the trial court and are not a part of this appeal. In counts XIII and XIV, Pease alleged malicious prosecution by Magdic and International. In counts XV and XVI, Pease alleged malicious prosecution by Strong. On August 24, 1989, counts VII and VIII (defamation by Strong) were dismissed as untimely filed.

On September 20, 1989, a jury trial in this case commenced. On September 22, 1989, the trial court declared a mistrial. Thereafter, the case was continued for trial to November 27, 1989. Also, on September 22, 1989, Magdic, Strong, and International filed a motion to dismiss the counts alleging malicious prosecution (counts XIII through XVI), on the basis that the warrant for Pease's arrest was issued by the court upon a finding of probable cause. The motion also alleged that those counts failed to allege special injury as a result of the complained-of actions and also failed to allege that Magdic, Strong, or International was the legal cause of Pease's arrest.

On November 2, 1989, Dugan, Magdic, Strong, and International filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to the counts alleging defamation by Dugan and International (counts I and II). The motion argued that Dugan and International were entitled to judgment on those counts because there was no dispute that Dugan believed his statements about Pease to be true; that Pease suffered no damages; and that Pease provoked Dugan's statement.

On November 21, 1989, Magdic, Strong, and International filed a motion for partial summary judgment as to the counts alleging false imprisonment (counts V, VI, IX and X) and on the defamation counts against Magdic and International (counts III and IV). The motion argued that Pease was arrested pursuant to a warrant issued upon a finding of probable cause and that, under Illinois law, an arrest by a warrant issued upon probable cause is an absolute bar to a claim for false imprisonment. The motion then pointed out that Pease was only charged with misdemeanors, while in order to be defamatory, per se, the statement complained of must allege the commission of an offense which is indictable, involves moral turpitude, and is punishable by a term in the Department of Corrections.

On December 15, 1989, the trial court entered an order granting the motion to dismiss counts XIII through XVI (malicious prosecution); granting partial summary judgment to Magdic, Strong, and International as to counts V, VI, IX, and X (false imprisonment); and granting partial summary judgment to Dugan and International as to counts I and II (defamation based upon the newspaper article). The trial court also found that pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (134 Ill.2d R. 304(a)) there was no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal of the order. The trial court then entered an order voluntarily dismissing counts III and IV without prejudice. This appeal followed.

On appeal, Pease raises the following issues: (1) whether claims for malicious prosecution and false imprisonment are barred by a judicial finding of probable cause and issuance of an arrest warrant based upon alleged perjured statements; and (2) whether the alleged defamatory statements in this case constitute defamation per se, for which actual damages need not be shown.

False imprisonment

Pease contends, first, that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment to Magdic, Strong, and International on the false imprisonment counts. Pease's claim for false imprisonment alleged in pertinent part as follows:

"4. That on or about August 19, 1987, MAGDIC wilfully and maliciously directed and procured the arrest of PEASE by Lake County Sheriff's Police by falsely and wrongfully accusing him of a criminal offense.

5. As a result of said unlawful arrest, [Pease] was illegally detained, restrained, and otherwise held against his will by Lake County Sheriff's Police for an extended period of time."

Identical allegations were directed at International and Strong, as well.

"A motion for summary judgment should be granted where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. The court is to determine the existence or absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact from the affidavits, depositions, admissions, exhibits and pleadings in the case. [Citations.] The facts to be considered by the court are evidentiary facts. [Citation.] Even though a complaint and answer may purport to raise issues of material fact, if such issues are not further supported by evidentiary facts through affidavits or such, summary judgment is then appropriate. [Citation.] If the party moving for summary judgment supplies such facts which, if not contradicted, would entitle such a party to a judgment as a matter of law, the opposing party cannot rely upon his complaint or answer alone to raise genuine issues of material fact." Carruthers v. B.C. Christopher & Co. (1974), 57 Ill.2d 376, 380, 313 N.E.2d 457.

It is undisputed that Pease was arrested pursuant to a warrant issued by a judge of the Lake County circuit court. An arrest made pursuant to a validly issued warrant is a complete answer to a claim of false imprisonment. (Feld v. Loftis (1909), 240 Ill. 105, 107-08, 88 N.E. 281.) Pease did allege that Magdic, Strong, and International "directed and procured" his arrest by giving false information to the Lake County authorities, which information was then used to obtain a warrant for his arrest. However, in his third amended complaint, Pease failed to allege an invalidity in the warrant process itself. In his response to the motion for summary judgment, Pease filed a memorandum but failed to set forth any facts to establish that the warrant itself was invalid.

The cases relied on by Pease (Dutton v. Roo-Mac, Inc. (1981), 100 Ill.App.3d 116, 55 Ill.Dec. 458, 426 N.E.2d 604; Mangus v. Cock Robin Ice Cream Co. (1977), 52 Ill.App.3d 110, 9 Ill.Dec. 769, 367 N.E.2d 203; Karow v. Student Inns, Inc. (1976), 43 Ill.App.3d 878, 2 Ill.Dec. 515, 357 N.E.2d 682) all involved arrests made without warrants and are, therefore, distinguishable from the case at bar. We conclude that Pease has not raised a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was arrested pursuant to a valid warrant. Thus, the trial court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the false imprisonment counts (counts V, VI, IX, and X). Nevertheless, we note that the defendants here may still be...