Komyatti v. State Of Ind.
| Decision Date | 28 July 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 52A04-1002-MI-74.,52A04-1002-MI-74. |
| Citation | 931 N.E.2d 411 |
| Parties | Paul KOMYATTI, Appellant-Petitioner, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Respondent. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED.
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Paul Komyatti, Bunker Hill, IN, Appellant Pro Se.
Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Kathy Bradley, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Paul Komyatti, Jr., appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief (“PCR petition”), which challenged the revocation of his parole. We affirm.
Komyatti raises a number of issues, which we combine and restate as:
I. whether various alleged procedural missteps require reversal of his parole revocation;
II. whether there is sufficient evidence to support the revocation of his parole; and
III. whether the revocation of his parole deprived him of earned credit time.
On December 28, 1983, Komyatti was sentenced to a fifty-five-year term for murder. Komyatti was released to parole on May 14, 2009; he took up residence in Indianapolis. Among the conditions of Komyatti's parole was that he comply with all laws and regulations governing the use of motor vehicles, which was Rule 4(b) of his parole agreement, and that he receive permission from his parole agent before traveling outside of his parole district for frequent or prolonged periods of time, which was Rule 3(b) of the agreement. 1
On July 13, 2009, parole agent Mike Degraw and United States Marshal Jim Truitt spoke to Komyatti at his home about an allegation that he had violated parole conditions. Komyatti waived his Miranda rights and told Degraw and Truitt that, on July 10, 2009, he had driven alone to Michigan City to visit a casino in a car belonging to another person, even though Komyatti only had a learner's permit and not a valid driver's license; Komyatti returned to Indianapolis in the early morning hours of July 11, 2009. On July 13, the Indiana Parole Board (“the Board”) issued a parole violation warrant for Komyatti.
On July 14, 2009, Komyatti again was interviewed at his home. This time, Komyatti said that Steven Ellis had driven him to Michigan City. After this interview, Komyatti was taken into custody on the parole violation warrant. He also received a notice of preliminary hearing for the violation, which alleged that he had violated Rules 3(a) and 4(b) of his parole agreement. 2 Komyatti waived his right to seventy-two hour notice of the preliminary hearing, and it was held on that same day. Komyatti pled not guilty to the allegations, but the hearing officer found that probable cause existed for both violations. Komyatti was informed that a final hearing would be held within sixty days. No separate written findings of fact were issued after the preliminary hearing.
Komyatti then was transported to the Plainfield Correctional Facility while awaiting a final hearing. On August 11, 2009, Department of Correction employee Justin Bennett delivered a notice of parole violation final hearing to Komyatti. Komyatti refused to accept or sign the notice, and it was placed with his property. The notice informed Komyatti that the final hearing would take place on August 13, 2009 and that he was alleged to have violated Rules 3(b) and 4(b) of his parole agreement. The notice also informed Komyatti of his rights at the hearing, and that he could request, and the Board would grant, a 30-day continuance of the hearing for any reason.
Komyatti appeared at the hearing before the Board on August 13, 2009, in full shackles. He was accompanied by his attorney and two witnesses, Ellis and Komyatti's girlfriend, Jenny Sterling. At the beginning of the hearing, Komyatti affirmed that he had received notice of the hearing and that he was ready to proceed; he did not request a continuance. Before receiving evidence, Board Vice-Chairman Randy Gentry told Komyatti that the Board would not consider the alleged violation of Rule 3(b) and would only consider the alleged violation of Rule 4(b), i.e. driving without a license. Komyatti testified that he had first said he had driven alone to Michigan City because he did not want to reveal that he had been with Ellis, who is a convicted felon. He also stated that on July 14, 2009, Degraw and a different U.S. Marshal, Ryan Harmon, told Komyatti that they had seen a parking lot surveillance videotape from the casino in Michigan City that revealed Ellis driving a car, different from the one Komyatti originally said he had driven, in which Komyatti was a passenger. Ellis and Sterling also testified that Ellis had driven Komyatti to Michigan City. When called to testify, however, Degraw denied seeing any videotape of Ellis driving a vehicle in the casino parking lot in which Komyatti was a passenger. Harmon was not present at the hearing. Gentry also stated that the Board had no videotape in its possession.
After the hearing, the Board determined that Komyatti had violated Rule 4(b) of his parole agreement, revoked his parole, and ordered him to return to prison. It issued written findings regarding that violation. Komyatti, however, did not immediately receive these findings. On September 9, 2009, Komyatti filed a PCR petition challenging his parole revocation. On November 3, 2009, the State filed a motion for summary disposition. Included with this motion were various exhibits, including a DVD of the final revocation hearing and the Board's findings of fact in support of Komyatti's parole revocation. After a hearing, the post-conviction court granted the State's motion for summary disposition on November 20, 2009. Komyatti now appeals pro se.
We review the grant of a motion for summary disposition in post-conviction proceedings on appeal in the same way as a civil motion for summary judgment. Norris v. State, 896 N.E.2d 1149, 1151 (Ind.2008). Summary disposition, like summary judgment, is a matter for appellate de novo review when the determinative issue is a matter of law, not fact. Id. Summary disposition should be granted only if “there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(4)(g). “We must resolve all doubts about facts, and the inferences to be drawn from the facts, in the non-movant's favor.” Allen v. State, 791 N.E.2d 748, 753 (Ind.Ct.App.2003), trans. denied.
Komyatti makes a number of arguments regarding alleged procedural missteps in his parole revocation proceedings. As a general rule, defendants facing potential parole revocation are entitled to a number of procedural due process rights, which include: written notice of the parole violation charges; disclosure of the evidence against the parolee; an opportunity to be heard in person and to present evidence; the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; a “neutral and detached” parole hearing board; and a written statement by the board of the evidence relied upon and the reasons for revoking parole. Harris v. State, 836 N.E.2d 267, 280 (Ind.Ct.App.2005) (citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2604, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972)), trans. denied. Parolees also are entitled to a two-stage revocation procedure: (1) a preliminary hearing to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that the parolee has committed acts that would constitute a violation of parole conditions; and (2) a final revocation hearing prior to the final decision on revocation to consider whether the facts as determined warrant revocation. Id.
By and large, these constitutional requirements have been embodied in the Indiana Code. Komyatti argues that several of these statutory provisions were violated in his case. We fail to find definitive indications that these provisions were violated. Even if some provisions were not followed to the letter, reversal of Komyatti's parole revocation is not required. As we review Komyatti's claims, we keep in mind that “[w]here the purpose and intent of a statutory mandate are satisfied, this court will not reverse for mere technical procedural errors unless the defendant can show that he was harmed or prejudiced by such errors.” Kindred v. State, 173 Ind.App. 624, 629, 365 N.E.2d 776, 779 (1977).
Komyatti contends the Board erred when it did not provide him, after the preliminary hearing, with written findings of fact and a statement of the evidence relied upon in finding there was probable cause he violated parole. Indiana Code Section 11-13-3-9(a)(4) does require such findings, 3 and it does not appear that Komyatti received anything resembling such findings until after his parole was finally revoked and he filed his PCR petition. We would observe that this findings requirement after the preliminary hearing would seem to serve the purpose of alerting a parolee of the nature of the allegations and evidence against him or her regarding an alleged parole violation in order to prepare a defense; as such, we could see the potential for prejudice if a parolee does not receive the preliminary hearing findings until after the final revocation hearing. Here, however, there never has been any doubt as to the nature of the evidence regarding Komyattis parole violation. It has, from the beginning, been based almost entirely upon Komyattis admission on July 13, 2009, that he had driven a car to Michigan City on July 10, 2009, while only having a learners permit.
We do not see that the failure to timely provide Komyatti with the preliminary hearing findings resulted in any prejudice in this case.
Komyatti also contends the notice he received for the final revocation hearing was inadequate in several respects. Indiana Code Section 11-13-3-8(e) governs required notices for revocation hearings and states:
the parolee shall be given written notice of:
(1) the date, time, and place of the hearing;
(2) the condition alleged to have been...
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