Konantz v. Stein, 40392

• Decision Date: 14 March 1969
• Docket Number: No. 40392,40392
• Citation: 167 N.W.2d 1,283 Minn. 33
• Parties: Casey KONANTZ, et al., Respondents, v. Thomas H. STEIN, et al., Appellants, Earl Zehnder, Treasurer of Dakota County, Respondent.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 1

167 N.W.2d 1

283 Minn. 33

Casey KONANTZ, et al., Respondents, v. Thomas H. STEIN, et al., Appellants, Earl Zehnder, Treasurer of Dakota County, Respondent.

No. 40392.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

March 14, 1969.

Syllabus by the Court

1. If a person is in possession of real estate which he has come to own either by adverse possession or the practical location of a boundary line, he is entitled to notice and the opportunity to be heard in title registration proceedings initiated pursuant to Minn.St. c. 508 which embrace the land owned by him, and a decree entered in registration proceedings where such notice and opportunity to be heard was not afforded does not extinguish the interest of the owner in possession.

2. Once title to real estate in Minnesota is registered pursuant to c. 508, it is impossible thereafter to acquire title to the registered land by holding adversely to the registered owner.

3. The continued adverse possession of a portion of real estate included by description in title registration proceedings gives notice to the world of such of the possessor's rights as had ripened into title before entry of the decree of registration.

4. Limitation laws cannot compel resort to legal proceedings by a real estate owner who is already in the complete enjoyment of all he claims.

5. Where a claim of title adverse to that of the record owner is made on the theory that title was acquired by adverse possession or practical location of a boundary line, there should be precise findings by the trial court demonstrating that the factual elements necessary for such title acquisition have been established by the party making the claim.

Grannis & Grannis, South St. Paul, for appellants.

Jerome Daly, Savage, for Konantz.

J. Jerome Kluck, County Atty., Jack A. Mitchell, Asst. County Atty., Hastings, for Zehnder.

Richard C. Smith, Marshall Sigford, George Maloney, Richard Weiblen, Minneapolis, Stringer, Donnelly & Sharood, Everett L. Peterson, St. Paul, Lawrence L. Lenertz, South St. Paul, William E. Manley, and Frederick W. Lambrecht, Jr., St. Paul, amici curiae.

OPINION

SHERAN, Justice.

Appeal from a judgment of the district court.

In this action for ejectment and damages for wrongful interference with the possession of real estate occurring about May 29, 1963, resolution of the rights of the parties came to depend on who then owned a 90-foot strip of land lying between a tract of real estate admittedly belonging to plaintiffs, Mr. and Mrs. Casey Konantz, (the Konantz tract) and a tract admittedly owned by defendant Mrs. Thomas H. Stein (the Stein tract).

Mrs. Stein's claim of ownership was based on a deed dated July 21, 1962, the description of which included the 90-foot strip. Mrs. Stein's vendor had a good record title to it, confirmed by a judgment in title registration proceedings commenced September 6, 1960, and terminated with the entry of the decree on April 12, 1961.

The claim of Mr. and Mrs. Konantz to the disputed strip is based upon an alleged title acquired before the registration action was commenced either by adverse possession ¹ or through the practical location of a boundary line. Although the Konantzes were using the strip for pasture in 1960--1961 when the registration action was commenced and pending, Mrs. Stein's predecessor in title failed to include them as named party defendants in the registration proceedings.

The Konantzes continued in possession of the disputed strip in 1962 when Mrs. Stein acquired her deed. Before Mrs. Stein purchased, she knew that they were in possession of the land now in controversy although she did not know until after the purchase was completed and a survey made that the true boundary line of the land which she had bought by description included the strip in dispute.

The trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law in plaintiffs' favor, holding, in effect, that the registration decree upon which Mrs. Stein relied did not extinguish the rights of the Konantzes in the strip of land because they were in possession when the registration proceedings were started and were not served with process therein. Because of the statewide significance of the basic issue, briefs amicus curiae were requested and submitted ² and the appeal, first considered by a division of this court, was reargued before the court sitting en banc.

Aided by the reargument, we are agreed on these propositions:

If the Konantzes had acquired title to the land in controversy by the time the registration proceedings were commenced, whether by adverse possession or practical location of the boundary line, and if they were then in possession of it, they were entitled to notice and opportunity to be heard. Because they had no actual notice of the pendency of the proceedings and no notice was ever given to them in the manner specified by law, the decree entered in the registration proceedings could not extinguish this interest.

On the other hand, if the Konantzes had not acquired title to the strip of land by the time the registration proceedings were accomplished, they have no present interest in the disputed strip. Once a title is registered, it is impossible thereafter to acquire title to the registered land by holding adversely to the registered owner.

If the Konantzes had title at the time the registration proceedings were commenced, their claim to the land cannot now be defeated by the Steins on the theory that Mrs. Stein was a good-faith purchaser for value of registered land without notice of the Konantz claim. This is so because the testimony establishes that the Konantzes were in possession of the disputed strip at and before the time Mrs. Stein purchased and that Mrs. Stein knew this to be the fact before she bought the land now owned by her.

(4) If the Konantzes had title to the disputed strip when the registration proceedings were carried out, their failure to attack the registration directly within the time specified by Minn.St. 508.26 (60 days from entry of the decree) and § 508.28 (6 months from entry of the decree) cannot bar them from asserting their title since they had neither actual nor constructive notice of the pendency of the registration proceedings and the entry of the registration decree within the time so limited.

(5) Where a claim of title adverse to that of the record owner is based on the theory that title was acquired by adverse possession or practical location of a boundary line, there should be a precise finding by the trial court that the factual elements necessary for such title acquisition have been established by the party making such a claim. In the absence of adequate findings of fact, the ultimate rights of the parties cannot be determined by this court. Since the evidence appearing in the record is vague and equivocal with respect to the relevant characteristics of the possession which had allegedly ripened into title by the time the registration proceedings were commenced, the matter must be remanded to the district court for a new trial.

1. Registration of titles is authorized and regulated by c. 508 of our statutes. The object of this law, first adopted in 1901, is to afford a method of acquiring a decree of registration and a certificate of title free, so far as possible, from all encumbrances and adverse claims not noted on the certificate. It is evident that the marketability of real estate is enhanced if prospective purchasers can rely on a certificate of title which purports to disclose fully the status of the title.

Chapter 508 sets out the procedure to be followed to secure such a decree of registration and title certificate. The process is initiated by filing an application for registration with the district court for the county in which the real estate involved is located. To the extent that its jurisdiction is invoked, the district court in these proceedings has power to hear evidence and, if the case is a proper one, ultimately to enter a decree of registration determining the ownership of all interest in the realty. Minn.St. 508.05 to 508.10. To enable the applicant to subject all persons having possible interests in the real estate to the jurisdiction of the district court, provision is made for the issuance of a summons (§ 508.15) to be served as a summons in a civil action, upon the proper parties. § 508.16. Exception to the requirement of such service is limited to parties 'who are not residents of the state or who cannot be found therein' and 'persons or parties unknown.' As to them, service by publication is permitted. § 508.16.

In the registration proceedings instituted by Mrs. Stein's predecessor in title, a decree of registration was entered and a certificate of title was issued which, by description, embraced the 90-foot strip conveyed later to Mrs. Stein. But no summons in that action was ever served on the Konantzes even though they were in possession of the 90-foot strip when the registration proceedings were commenced. A published summons is directed to 'all other persons or parties unknown claiming any right, title, estate, lien, or interest in the real estate described in the application herein.' If 'unknown,' the Konantzes were such persons because the 90-foot strip was included in the real estate in the application; they were in possession of the 90-foot strip; and they claimed title to it. In the registration proceedings, the district court found title to the described realty to be in Mrs. Stein's predecessor in title. No exception was made in the decree of registration and there was no notice on the certificate of title then issued bespeaking an interest of any kind on the part of the Konantzes in that portion of the described tract of which they were then in occupancy.

Read literally, the effect of the registration decree and certificate of title then issued would be to extinguish any rights that the Konantzes had in this land. This is so because § 508.22 provides in part:

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