Kondamuri v. Kondamuri, 45A03-0305-CV-189.

• Decision Date: 09 December 2003
• Docket Number: No. 45A03-0305-CV-189.,45A03-0305-CV-189.
• Citation: 799 N.E.2d 1153
• Parties: Saveen KONDAMURI, Appellant-Petitioner, v. Jayasri KONDAMURI, Appellee-Respondent.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

799 N.E.2d 1153

Saveen KONDAMURI, Appellant-Petitioner, v. Jayasri KONDAMURI, Appellee-Respondent.

No. 45A03-0305-CV-189.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

December 9, 2003.

Debra Lynch Dubovich, Levy & Dubovich, Highland, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

James M. Kapitan, Rice & Kapitan, Thomas C. O'Donnell, Highland, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

VAIDIK, Judge.

Case Summary

Saveen Kondamuri ("Husband") argues that the trial court erred when it granted the motion to dismiss of Jayasri Kondamuri ("Wife"). We find that the residency requirements for a dissolution petition call into question a trial court's jurisdiction over the particular case and not its subject matter jurisdiction. We also find that because Wife did not seek affirmative relief from the trial court and because she objected to the trial court's jurisdiction over the particular case at the earliest opportunity possible, she was not barred from challenging the trial court's jurisdiction. Consequently, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

Husband and Wife were married in November 1993 and lived in Illinois starting in May 1994. At that time, Husband was completing his medical residency requirements in Chicago. While still living in Illinois, Husband and Wife had a child together in December 1998. In August 1999, Wife, who also had been trained as a medical doctor, moved to Boston, Massachusetts, to perform medical research in the hopes of gaining entry into a medical residency program. Husband remained in Illinois with their child.

In May 2001, even though Husband lived with his parents in Orland Park, Illinois, he obtained an Indiana driver's license and registered to vote in Indiana. Husband used his brother's Indiana address as his place of residence because he "was weighing [his] options" and "may have thought about moving in with [his] brother." Tr. p. 64.

In September 2001, Husband rented an apartment in Schererville, Indiana, which he furnished with a plastic patio chair and a sleeping bag. During his testimony, Husband originally testified the address of the apartment was 704 Moraine Trace, and then he stated it was 714 Moraine Trace. The actual address of the apartment was 724 Moraine Trace. While signing the lease, Husband informed the landlord that he wanted an apartment near Merrillville, his place of employment, in the event he needed to sleep between performing medical procedures. Husband estimated that he stayed at the apartment one or two nights per week, and the other nights he would stay in Illinois with his parents. Husband and Wife's child regularly attended pre-school in Illinois from the time she was two until February 2003.

In August 2002, Husband filed for dissolution of marriage in Indiana, alleging that he had been a continuous resident of the state for at least the preceding six months and a Lake County resident for at least the preceding three months. Wife was served with a copy of the dissolution petition while in Massachusetts. She did not attend, in person or by counsel, the provisional hearing involving the dissolution. Instead, in December 2002, Wife filed for dissolution of marriage in Illinois.

Thereafter, Husband moved for discovery sanctions in the Indiana dissolution case. On January 9, 2003, Wife's attorney filed an appearance and sought a continuance of the discovery sanctions hearing ("discovery hearing continuance"). Wife made no other request at that time. On January 14, 2003, Wife filed a motion to dismiss, challenging the jurisdiction of the Indiana trial court, and a motion to continue the final hearing ("first final hearing continuance"). The motion to continue the final hearing was granted. In early April 2003, Wife sought another continuance of the final hearing ("second final hearing continuance"), in which she requested that "the hearing presently set be continued, and for all other just and equitable relief in the premises." Appellant's App. p. 152. In mid-April 2003, the trial court heard arguments and testimony on Wife's motion to dismiss, which it granted. In granting the motion to dismiss, the trial court found that:

Clearly this Court has general subject matter jurisdiction over dissolution of marriage cases. However, [Wife] challenges this Court's jurisdiction over this particular case.

. . . .

Based upon the evidence presented at the April 16, 2003 hearing, the Court finds that [Husband] has not met the residency requirements of Indiana Code [§] XX-XX-X-X.¹

The Court further finds that [Wife] timely objected to this Court's jurisdiction by filing her Motion to Dismiss within a week of her attorney entering his appearance on her behalf.

Appellant's App. p. 8. Husband now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

Husband argues that the trial court erred when it granted Wife's motion to dismiss. In particular, Husband contends that whether he met the residency requirements for dissolution implicates the trial court's jurisdiction over the particular case. As such, Husband argues that Wife is barred from challenging the trial court's jurisdiction because she sought affirmative relief from the trial court and because she failed to object at the earliest opportunity possible. By contrast, Wife counters that the residency requirements involve the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction, and therefore, she could not waive her objection. We address each of these arguments.

A court's jurisdiction either exists or does not, and the question of a court's jurisdiction is therefore a question of law that is not entrusted to the trial court's discretion but rather is reviewed de novo. In re Paternity of M.R., 778 N.E.2d 861, 863 (Ind.Ct.App.2002),

reh'g granted on other grounds. To the extent that the existence of jurisdiction must be determined on the basis of disputed facts, the trial court's determination of jurisdictional facts is reviewed for clear error. Id.

I. Jurisdiction

In this case, Husband contends that the failure to satisfy the residency requirements found at Indiana Code § 31-15-2-6 implicates the trial court's jurisdiction over the particular case. Wife counters that the failure to meet the residency requirements calls into question the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. We agree with Husband.

There are three types of jurisdiction: (1) jurisdiction of the subject matter, (2) jurisdiction of the person,² and (3) jurisdiction over the particular case. In re Guardianship of K.T., 743 N.E.2d 348, 351 (Ind.Ct.App.2001). Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the power of courts to hear and decide a class of cases. Id. The issue of subject matter jurisdiction is resolved by determining whether the claim involved falls within the general scope of authority conferred on the court by the Indiana Constitution or by statute. Adler v. Adler, 713 N.E.2d 348, 352 (Ind.Ct.App. 1999). When courts lack subject matter jurisdiction, their actions are void ab initio and may be attacked at any time. In re K.T., 743 N.E.2d at 351. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the particular case refers to a trial court's right, authority, and power to hear and decide a specific case within the class of cases over which a court has subject matter jurisdiction. Id. A judgment rendered by a court that lacks jurisdiction over the particular case is voidable and requires a timely objection or the lack of jurisdiction over the particular case is waived. Id.

The parties do not direct us to any case that explicitly resolves the issue of whether the residency requirements involve a court's subject matter jurisdiction or its jurisdiction over the particular case. In support of her argument that the residency requirements for dissolution implicate the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction, Wife cites to several court of appeals decisions. See Burbach v. Burbach, 651 N.E.2d 1158, 1161 (Ind.Ct.App.1995)

("one of the parties in this dissolution proceeding met the residency requirement for purposes of subject matter jurisdiction"); Person v. Person, 563 N.E.2d 161 (Ind.Ct.App. 1990),

trans. denied; Payne v. Payne, 90 Ind.App. 594, 169 N.E. 475 (1930); see also Skiles v. Skiles, 646 N.E.2d 353, 355 (Ind. Ct.App.1995) ("In Indiana, a divorce court does not obtain subject matter jurisdiction unless at least one party has been an Indiana resident ...."), trans. denied; Orejuela v. Orejuela, 494 N.E.2d 329, 331 (Ind.Ct.App.1986) ("If neither of the parties meets this [residency] requirement, the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the case."). However, none of these cases turned on whether the residency requirements implicated the subject matter jurisdiction of the court or its jurisdiction over the particular case. Rather, these cases were decided on whether a party had met the residency requirements. Accordingly, we do not feel bound by the language of these cases.³

Instead, for guidance, we look to an Indiana Supreme Court case that addressed the distinction between subject matter jurisdiction and jurisdiction over the particular case in the child custody context. In Williams v. Williams, 555 N.E.2d 142 (Ind.1990), Bonnie and Charles were married in Illinois in 1974. Both of their children, a son and a daughter, were born in Illinois. Bonnie and Charles both resided in Illinois until 1982, when Charles moved to Indiana. In 1987, the daughter joined her father to live in Indiana, and the son remained in Illinois with his mother. Shortly after his daughter moved to Indiana, Charles filed for dissolution in Indiana and sought custody of his daughter. The trial court dissolved the marriage, but it made no finding as to the custody of the children. In 1988, Bonnie filed a request with the Indiana trial court to adjudicate the unresolved issues, including child custody. Upon additional inquiry, Bonnie explicitly consented to the Indiana trial court's exercise of jurisdiction. Thereafter, the trial court awarded custody of both children to Charles.

On the initial appeal of the Williams c...