Konias v. State Dep't of Corrs.
| Decision Date | 25 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2:19-CV-01530-CRE |
| Parties | KENNETH J. KONIAS JR., Plaintiff, v. PA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, DONALD COLLINGS, LAWRENCE B. LEWIS, BETH RUDZIENSKI, DEBRA A HAWKINBERRY, MARK V. CAPOZZA, FRANK SALVAY, JOHN E. WETZEL, LOIS ALLEN, Defendants, |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
Plaintiff initiated this action against the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) and a number of its officials (collectively “Corrections Defendants”) alleging several civil rights and Americans with Disability Act claims based upon Plaintiff's inability to submit urine for a drug test which Plaintiff claims he is unable to do so because he suffers from Paruesis or Shy Bladder Syndrome while in DOC custody at State Corrections Institution at Fayette (“SCI Fayette”).
Presently pending before the court is a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint for failure to state a claim under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (ECF No. 41). The motion is fully briefed and ripe for disposition. (ECF Nos. 42, 49). Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. For the reasons that follow, Corrections Defendants motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
At the outset, Plaintiff's amended complaint is presented in a narrative and conclusory fashion, fails to include specific dates that the alleged conduct occurred and fails to include particularized allegations with respect to the conduct of each Defendant. While pro se litigants are afforded leniency in drafting pleadings, this leniency does not excuse a Plaintiff from alleging enough facts to support his claims and the court will construe his amended complaint to do substantial justice. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 234 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
DOC inmates must undergo periodic urinary drug tests. Plaintiff is an inmate of SCI Fayette and alleges that he suffers from Paruresis or Shy Bladder Syndrome related to anxiety which makes it difficult for him to urinate in the presence of others. Plaintiff alleges that he informed unspecified Defendants of his condition and they refuse to acknowledge it. Plaintiff also alleges that he was diagnosed with PTSD in 2017 and takes medication for depression and anxiety. He claims that he has no difficulty producing urine samples when given sufficient time and water and has historically provided clean urine tests while in DOC custody when not under pressure. He also claims that he was not offered alternative testing such as blood work or hair sampling even though he offered to pay for alternative testing. He claims that Defendants only gave him two hours to submit a urine sample which he could not produce and as a consequence he was given a misconduct for refusing to obey an order, was placed in the Restricted Housing Unit (“RHU”) and after a second offense, he was prohibited from receiving contact visits. He claims that he pleaded guilty to at least one of the misconducts, but alleges he would not have if he knew he would be prohibited from receiving contact visits as a consequence and Corrections Defendants acted unconstitutionally when they did not inform him about the sanctions for pleading guilty to his misconduct. While Plaintiff claims that he appealed his misconducts, his appeal was denied. He also alleges that one appeal was never received by the Program Review Committee (“PRC”) and this violates Plaintiff's due process rights and DOC policy. He also alleges that he was not permitted to call any witnesses at his misconduct hearings. He further claims that he was unable to appeal another misconduct because the sanction he received was imposed after the time to appeal had expired.
Plaintiff asserts claims under the First, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the American with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and argues that many of the DOC policies were violated.
A pro se pleading is held to a less stringent standard than more formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972). As a result, a pro se complaint under § 1983 must be construed liberally, Hunterson v. DiSabato, 308 F.3d 236, 243 (3d Cir. 2002), so “as to do substantial justice.” Alston, 363 F.3d at 234 (citations omitted). While pro se litigants are afforded this leniency, they “do not have a right to general legal advice from judges, ” and “courts need not provide substantive legal advice to pro se litigants” because pro se litigants must be treated “the same as any other litigant.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245, 58 V.I. 691 (3d Cir. 2013).
The applicable inquiry under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is well settled. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a complaint may be dismissed for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). A complaint that merely alleges entitlement to relief, without alleging facts that show entitlement, must be dismissed. See Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009). This “‘does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage,' but instead ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary elements.” Phillips v. Cty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 556). Yet the court need not accept as true “unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, ” Doug Grant, Inc. v. Greate Bay Casino Corp., 232 F.3d 173, 183-84 (3d Cir. 2000), or the plaintiff's “bald assertions” or “legal conclusions.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997).
Although a complaint does not need detailed factual allegations to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a complaint must provide more than labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. A “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986)). “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “sufficient to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555. Facial plausibility exists “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 556).
The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. . . . Where a complaint pleads facts that are “merely consistent with” a defendant's liability, it “stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of ‘entitlement to relief.'” Id. (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 556) (internal citations omitted).
When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court's role is limited to determining whether a plaintiff has a right to offer evidence in support of his claims. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). The court does not consider whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail. Id. A defendant bears the burden of establishing that a plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim. Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 2000).
As a general rule, if a court “consider[s] matters extraneous to the pleadings” on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the motion must be converted into one for summary judgment. In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997). Even so, a court may consider (1) exhibits attached to the complaint, (2) matters of public record, and (3) all documents integral to or explicitly relied on in the complaint, even if they are not attached, without converting the motion into one for summary judgment. Mele v. Fed. Rsrv. Bank of New York, 359 F.3d 251, 256 (3d Cir. 2004) n. 5 (3d Cir. 2004); Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).
Corrections Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's claims on a number of grounds including: (1) Plaintiff fails to state a claim under the ADA; (2) he fails to state a Fourteenth Amendment due process claim; (3) he fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim; and (4) there is no recognized cause of action for violations of DOC regulations or policy.
Plaintiff alleges that Corrections Defendants violated the ADA when they refused to provide alternative testing to accommodate Plaintiff's disability.
Corrections Defendants argue that the ADA does not apply to the individual Corrections Defendants and that as applied to the DOC itself, an inmate's shy bladder syndrome is not a recognized disability under the ADA.
Title II of the ADA provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities by a public entity, or be subjected to...
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