Koome, In re
| Decision Date | 27 September 1973 |
| Docket Number | No. 42529,42529 |
| Citation | 514 P.2d 520,82 Wn.2d 816 |
| Parties | In the Matter of A. Frans KOOME. |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Geraghty, Geraghty, VanDerhoef & Sawyer, Kenneth D. VanDerhoef, David D. Hoff, Christopher T. Bayley, Pros. Atty., James E. Warme, Sharon A. Finegold, Deputy Pros. Atty., Seattle-King Co. Legal Services, James Fearn, Seattle, for appellant.
Raymond J. Lee, Seattle, Stanley E. Stone, Renton, for respondent.
This is a contempt proceeding.
In July, 1972, a 16-year-old, unmarried, pregnant female, with the assistance of representatives of the Legal Services Center located in Seattle, petitioned the Juvenile Court for King County, of which she was a ward, for permission to obtain a therapeutic abortion. A hearing was held before the juvenile court at which time the juvenile's petition was opposed by her parents. At the conclusion of the hearing the juvenile court judge granted the petition and gave consent to the performance of an abortion.
Upon entry of the juvenile court order, the parents filed a petition with this court seeking review of the juvenile court action and for an immediate stay of the order entered in that action. On August 14, 1972, the application for the stay was granted pending a further hearing on the petition for a writ of certiorari then scheduled for determination by this court on August 17, 1972. Notice of the stay order was communicated by a representative of the Legal Services Center on August 14, 1972, to the juvenile and to the respondent, Dr. A. Frans Koome, who had been previously contacted relative to performing the abortion. On August 15, 1972, respondent performed an abortion procedure upon the juvenile.
Upon being advised of the action of the respondent and the juvenile, an investigation was directed to be made by the office of the Prosecuting Attorney for King County. Thereafter an affidavit confirming commission of the abortion on August 15, 1972, was filed, which resulted in the issuance of a show cause order directed to respondent, and a remand by this court to the superior court for an evidentiary hearing and a factual determination as to the extent of respondent's knowledge on August 14 and 15, 1972, of the entry of the stay order. At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, at which respondent and his attorney were present, the superior court found as a fact that respondent had knowledge of the entry of the stay order and performed the abortion procedure on August 15, 1972, despite that order. Upon return of the superior court's findings of fact, respondent duly appeared before this court by counsel, and by way of written brief and oral argument, in response to the show cause order as to why he should not be held in contempt.
Procedurally speaking, we treat this contempt proceeding as one in aid of our appellate jurisdiction under the general contempt provisions of RCW 7.20. See Keller v. Keller, 52 Wash.2d 84, 323 P.2d 231 (1958), and State v. Estill, 55 Wash.2d 576, 349 P.2d 210 (1960), for an exposition upon the three categories of contempt proceedings in this jurisdiction. Respondent, however, has not and does not challenge the purely procedural aspects of the proceeding; hence, we are not confronted or concerned with such matters as the form of the affidavit prompting the issuance of the show cause order and the remand or the absence of the State of Washington as a designated party to the proceedings. RCW 7.20.040 and 7.20.060; Ramstead v. Hauge, 73 Wash.2d 162, 437 P.2d 402 (1968).
The primary thrust of respondent's response to the show cause order rests with the contention that he was not amenable to the stay order. He predicates this assertion on three grounds: (a) that the stay order was not in the form of an injunction or restraining order; (b) that he was not a party to the juvenile court proceeding or to the petition for a writ of certiorari seeking appellate review of that proceeding; and (c) that he never received a copy of the stay order, nor was he served with a copy, although he does not dispute the fact that he had notice and knowledge of the entry thereof.
We find no merit in respondent's principal contention.
A 'stay order' or a 'stay of proceedings,' such as we are here concerned with is respectively defined in Black's Law Dictionary 1583 (4th ed. rev. 1968) as:
A stopping; the act of arresting a judicial proceeding by the order of a court. . . .
The temporary suspension of the regular order of proceedings in a cause, by direction or order of the court, . . .
A stay order finds its genesis in the writ of supersedeas, originally an auxiliary process designed to supersede enforcement of a judgment or order brought up for review, thereby maintaining the status quo and preserving the fruits of the appeal should it prove successful. This court's authority to issue such an order, in aid of its appellate or original jurisdiction, emanates from its inherent power and the state constitution, 1 and is implemented by ROA I--57(c)(1). 2 Shamley v. Olympia, 47 Wash.2d 124, 286 P.2d 702 (1955); Northwestern Improvement Co. v. McNeil, 98 Wash. 1, 167 P. 115 (1917); Bier v. Clements, 95 Wash. 505, 164 P. 82 (1917); Campbell Lumber Co. v. Deep River Logging Co., 68 Wash. 431, 123 P. 596 (1912); State ex rel. Barnard v. Board of Education, 19 Wash. 8, 52 P. 317 (1898). Although restraining orders and injunctions sometimes partake of some of the aspects of supersedeas or stay orders, and the two processes are occasionally synonymously referred to, the two mediums of equitable relief are not, technically, identical judicial creatures.
A stay of proceedings or a supersedeas order normally operates upon and affects only parties or privies to the judgment, order, or decree of which a review is sought, and ordinarily may not be utilized to restrain the actions of persons who are not named in or privy to the stay order. 4A C.J.S. Appeal and Error § 668 (1957). Injunctive relief, on the other hand, may have a broader scope and reach.
The terms 'privy,' 'privies,' an...
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State v. Koome, 42645
...the operation on August 15, 1972. For so contravening this court's order, he was subsequently held in contempt. In re Koome, 82 Wash.2d 816, 514 P.2d 520 (1973). Dr. Koome's later criminal conviction for the same act, which is before us in this case, was under RCW 9.02.070, which reads in p......
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Mead School Dist. No. 354 v. Mead Ed. Ass'n (MEA), 43322
...'inherent' powers. The court has inherent power to punish for contempt and the legislature may not destroy this power. In re Koome, 82 Wash.2d 816, 514 P.2d 520 (1973); Deskins v. Waldt, 81 Wash.2d 1, 499 P.2d 206 (1972); State v. Caffrey, 70 Wash.2d 120, 422 P.2d 307 (1966); Keller v. Kell......
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General Telephone Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v. Washington Utilities & Transp. Com'n
...(temporary injunction pursuant to RAP 8.3 is "to prevent destruction of the fruits of a successful appeal.") See also In re Koome, 82 Wash.2d 816, 514 P.2d 520 (1973); Shamley v. Olympia, 47 Wash.2d 124, 286 P.2d 702 (1955). Preservation of the fruits of a successful appeal is the only appa......
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State v. Berry
...228 Cal. Rptr. 509, 721 P.2d at 599-600 ("stay" serves to comply with prohibition against multiple punishments) with In re Koome, 82 Wash.2d 816, 818, 514 P.2d 520 (1973) (a "stay order" in Washington is recognized as the "temporary suspension of the regular order of proceedings in a cause.......