Koontz v. Town of South Superior

• Decision Date: 27 March 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-155,85-155
• Citation: 716 P.2d 358
• Parties: Ira E. KOONTZ and Velma A. Koontz, Appellants (Defendants), v. TOWN OF SOUTH SUPERIOR, Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 358

716 P.2d 358

Ira E. KOONTZ and Velma A. Koontz, Appellants (Defendants), v. TOWN OF SOUTH SUPERIOR, Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. 85-155.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

March 27, 1986.

Jay Dee Schaefer and Paul Schierer (argued), of Schaefer & Newcomer, Laramie, for appellants.

Edward J. Hess (argued), and Warren W. Dill, Jackson, for appellee.

Before THOMAS, C.J., and ROONEY, ^* BROWN, CARDINE and URBIGKIT, JJ.

CARDINE, Justice.

In this appeal we must determine whether a district court may decide a case upon briefs submitted by the parties when those briefs are not accompanied by either a motion for judgment or a stipulation of facts. We reverse the district court's order and remand for further proceedings without reaching the merits.

On October 9, 1984, the town of South Superior filed a civil complaint against Ira and Velma Koontz in the district court. The town sought a declaratory judgment stating that it had acquired a prescriptive easement for a road through the Koontzes' real property. After the Koontzes filed an answer, the town moved for an order permitting it to file a brief on the legal issues likely to arise in the case. This motion led to a stipulation in which both parties agreed that the legal issues should be briefed. The court approved a briefing schedule and briefs were submitted.

The parties did not formally stipulate to any facts prior to briefing but instead made short, and to some extent, contradictory statements of facts in their briefs. Some of the factual contentions were supported by affidavits and maps appended to the briefs but most were simply bald assertions that remained to be proven.

In its brief, the town contended, as a matter of law, that a municipality can acquire an easement by prescription in Wyoming. The town also brought up the possibility that the disputed real estate had been dedicated to it by common law, a claim which it had never pled. The Koontzes argued in their brief that a Wyoming municipality lacks the power to acquire an easement by prescription. They also maintained that their property had never been dedicated to the town's use, either statutorily or by common law.

After the briefs had been filed, the Koontzes moved the court to order oral arguments on the briefs. In that motion, the Koontzes inaccurately stated that "[t]he Parties hereto entered into a Stipulation submitting the above-entitled matter to the Court on Briefs." In reality, the parties' stipulation to a briefing schedule did not indicate that the court should make a decision based only on the briefs. The Koontzes admitted in their motion for oral argument that the affidavits accompanying the briefs were an insufficient factual basis for a decision. Their motion said:

"A review of said Briefs will show an imposing array of facts which oral arguments might help clarify. * * * All evidentiary facts must be presented by Affidavit attached to the respective Briefs. Oral arguments may very well help clarify and explain those Affidavits."

Apparently relying on the Koontzes' statement that the case had been submitted on stipulated facts, the district court issued an opinion letter without granting oral argument and without taking any evidence in the case. In that opinion letter the court stated:

"I have assumed that the parties, in requesting a briefing schedule, intended that the Court decide this case on the basis of those briefs."

The court held in favor of the town and issued an order which stated:

"[T]he Town of Superior has acquired title by adverse possession in the portion of Lot 20, 21, and 22 of Block 12, Original Plat to the Town of Superior, Wyoming that is traversed by Division Street." ¹

The Koontzes have appealed from the court's order.

The orderly administration of our court system depends on adherence to the established rules of civil procedure. Hickey v. Burnett, Wyo., 707 P.2d 741 (1985). Novel procedures created by the parties or a district court will often cause surprise and unfairness. Larsen v. Roberts, Wyo., 676 P.2d 1046, 1048 (1984). Even if the participants are not surprised at the trial level, novel procedures force the appellate courts to enter uncharted territory beyond any familiar guidelines and standards. Almost twenty-five years ago this court held that the time had passed for lenient application of the rules of civil procedure. The court stated that "hereafter there must be careful adherence to all of the provisions of the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure." Ruby v. Schuett, Wyo., 360 P.2d 170, 172 (1961). We also pointed out that ignorance of the rules is no excuse. Id. at 173.

The case at bar represents an excessive departure from established procedures and must be remanded. We cannot treat the court's order as one granting summary judgment to the town of South Superior. "The appropriate procedure for seeking summary judgment is by making a motion under Rule 56," ² yet neither of the parties made such a motion--either orally or in writing. Even if such a motion had been made orally, it would not have been proper under Rule 7(b), W.R.C.P., which requires all motions, except those made at a hearing or trial, to be made in writing, to state with particularity the grounds therefor, and to set forth the relief or order sought.

Nor could we style the procedure employed as a motion for judgment on the pleadings which was converted to a motion for summary judgment. No motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c), W.R.C.P., was ever made; and, even if it was, it could not have been converted into a motion for summary judgment absent notice to the parties. See Kimbley v. City of Green River, Wyo., 642 P.2d 443, 445 (1982).

In several recent cases we have permitted district courts to decide cases based upon briefs and stipulated facts without a summary judgment motion. State ex rel. Scholl v. Anselmi, Wyo., 640 P.2d 746 (1982); Goodwin v. Upper Crust of Wyoming, Inc., Wyo., 624 P.2d 1192 (1981). This procedure, which is sometimes called an agreed case, really amounts to a condensed trial by the court under Rule 39(b), W.R.C.P., in which the parties stipulate to the facts and submit briefs which are the equivalent of pretrial memoranda. Rule 16, W.R.C.P.; 3 Am.Jur.2d Agreed Case § 1. It is justified by Rule 1, W.R.C.P., which states that the Rules of Civil Procedure should be construed "to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."

This is not to say that we can approve the procedure followed in every agreed case on the grounds of speed and efficiency. "Rule 1 places the objectives of 'speedy' and 'inexpensive' on a plane of equality with 'just.' " 4 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1029 at 131 (1969).

In order to make an agreed case a just proceeding there are certain requirements that must be met. First, there must be "a clear statement of the facts agreed on." 3 Am.Jur.2d Agreed Case § 12 at 732; see Fugate v. Mayor and City Council of Town of Buffalo, Wyo., 348 P.2d 76, 81, 97 A.L.R.2d 243 (1959). Second, the statement of facts must "be sufficient in itself to enable the court directly to draw conclusions of law determinative of the matter in controversy." 3 Am.Jur.2d Agreed Case § 14 at 733. Finally, "the statement of facts constituting an agreed case should be made part of the record in the proceeding, lest there be no basis for review of the judgment." Id. § 16 at 734.

It is clear from the record that the parties did not present an agreed case that could produce a just result. They did not enter a stipulation of facts from which the district court could draw legal conclusions. Nor can a stipulation be found in the record upon which we can ground our appellate review. The district court rendered judgment on its assumption that the parties had submitted the case for determination on the briefs. Yet there was no motion by either party indicating that the facts had been sufficiently developed for such a decision. Consequently, the surprise order was based only on conflicting and inadequate affidavits. The adjudication may have been speedy and inexpensive as encouraged by Rule 1, W.R.C.P., but it was unjust. ³

The town has argued that the Koontzes are estopped from denying the validity of the court's order because they invited that order in their motion for oral argument. We disagree. Although the Koontzes stated in their motion for oral argument that the parties had entered into a stipulation submitting the case on briefs, they did not admit that the case was factually ripe for an adjudication. In fact, they stated in the motion that oral argument was necessary to clarify the affidavits. We note also that the town admitted at oral argument that it was surprised when the district court issued its order deciding the case. If the Koontzes' motion for oral argument clearly requested an immediate decision by the court, then we wonder why the town was surprised when the court made that decision.

In a sense, the town is playing with fire when it argues in support of the procedure employed in this case. There was insufficient evidence before the court to support the town's adverse possession. Were we to hold that the procedure in this case was adequate, then we would reverse the trial court's decision on the merits because the town failed to carry its burden of proving adverse possession. The town would be barred by res judicata from any future action on the adverse possession claim. This is exactly what happened in State ex rel. Scholl v. Anselmi, supra, which was a case properly submitted to the district court on stipulated facts and briefs. When the plaintiff in Anselmi failed to include sufficient proof of damages in the parties' stipulation, we held that his "claim for damages must fail in the absence of any proof." Id. at 750.

When we reverse and remand a case due to procedural errors, we sometimes address the legal issues that are likely to arise again after remand. We do...