Koors v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 16 May 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 29A02-8708-CV-00315,29A02-8708-CV-00315 |
| Citation | 538 N.E.2d 259 |
| Parties | Edward H. KOORS, et al., Appellant (Plaintiff), v. GREAT SOUTHWEST FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellee (Defendant), Donald E. HEDRICK, et al., Appellant (Defendant), v. Edward H. KOORS, et al., Appellee (Plaintiff). |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Great Southwest Fire Insurance Company (the Garnishee) raises several questions concerning our earlier opinion, which appeared as Koors v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co. (1988), Ind.App., 530 N.E.2d 780, asserting in its petition for rehearing that we failed to discuss the continuing validity of a judgment in proceedings supplemental. We now elucidate.
We thought it obvious that we had disposed of all the issues raised by the parties. We did not address the proceedings supplemental because the result there was rendered moot by the reversal of the underlying case against Donald E. Hedrick (Hedrick) and the other named defendants. The Garnishee, however, asserts that the decision of the trial court in the proceedings supplemental continues to have validity irrespective of the reversal of the underlying case, citing no authority. Under the current trial rules, proceedings supplemental are merely a continuation of the underlying claim on the merits. Ind. Rules of Procedure, Trial Rule 69(E).
Previously this court has stressed the importance of a valid final judgment upon which the court may enter an order of garnishment in proceedings supplemental. Most often, we have discussed this issue in the context of a collateral attack on the underlying judgment; it is well established that the proceedings supplemental cannot be used to collaterally attack the underlying judgment. See De Later v. Hudak (1980), Ind.App., 399 N.E.2d 832; see also North v. Newlin (1982), Ind.App., 435 N.E.2d 314, trans. denied.
Here, however, we consider the problem of the continuing validity of a proceedings supplemental which was based on an underlying judgment that has now been overturned. It is plain that with the reversal of the underlying judgment, the basic requirement of T.R. 69(E)(1), that the plaintiff own a judgment...
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...supplemental "are a continuation of the underlying claim on the merits — not an independent action," Koors v. Great Southwest Fire Ins. Co., 538 N.E.2d 259, 260 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). Because Ms. Robbins' appeal was not docketed in the Superior Court until February 13, 2015, Med-1 argues tha......
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