Kootsillas v. City of Riverview

• Decision Date: 15 December 1995
• Docket Number: Docket No. 157069
• Citation: 543 N.W.2d 356,214 Mich.App. 570
• Parties: Francis KOOTSILLAS, Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. CITY OF RIVERVIEW, Third-Party Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 356

543 N.W.2d 356

214 Mich.App. 570

Francis KOOTSILLAS, Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. CITY OF RIVERVIEW, Third-Party Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Docket No. 157069.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted July 19, 1995, at Detroit.

Decided Dec. 15, 1995, at 9:20 a.m.

Released for Publication Feb. 7, 1996.

Garan, Lucow, Miller, Seward, Cooper & Becker, P.C. by Thomas L. Misuraca and David M. Shafer, Detroit, for Francis Kootsillas.

Cummings, McClorey, Davis & Acho, P.C. by Marcia L. Howe, Livonia, for City of Riverview.

Before MICHAEL J. KELLY, P.J., and SAWYER and D.R. FREEMAN, ^* JJ.

MICHAEL J. KELLY, Presiding Judge.

Defendant and third-party plaintiff, Francis Kootsillas, appeals as of right and third-party defendant, City of Riverview, cross appeals from a Wayne Circuit Court order of September 22, 1992, granting the city's motion for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7). We reverse.

The circuit court found that the city was a governmental agency engaged in the exercise of a governmental function embracing the activities of the garbage dump landfill in question. The trial court did, however, find that the city operated its garbage dump for profit. This conclusion was fully supported by the record; in fact, the trial court's opinion underscored that the city admitted the activity was "conducted primarily for the purpose of producing a pecuniary profit." The court then went on to find that garbage-collecting activity and garbage disposal activity "can normally be supported by taxes or fees." Because the underlying tort claim and plaintiffs' claims against the city, Kootsillas, and Albright Construction Company, Inc., have been dismissed with prejudice by stipulation of the parties, we need decide only the propriety of the grant of the city's motion under MCR 2.116(C)(7) for summary disposition based on governmental immunity. The third-party plaintiff's well-pleaded allegations are to be accepted as true unless specifically contradicted by affidavits or appropriate documentation submitted by the city.

The pivotal case is Hyde v. Univ of Michigan Bd. of Regents, 426 Mich. 223, 393 N.W.2d 847 (1986). There, the Court explained that an activity can be deemed a proprietary function only if it satisfies two tests:

(1) The activity must be conducted primarily for the purpose of producing a pecuniary profit, and

(2) the activity cannot normally be supported by taxes or fees. [Hyde, supra at 257-258, 393 N.W.2d 847. Emphasis in original.]

In addition, the Hyde Court explained that M.C.L. § 691.1413; M.S.A. § 3.996(113) does not require that the activity actually be supported by taxes or fees to be subject to immunity, rather the activity need only be one which is "normally supported by taxes or fees." Hyde, supra at 260, n. 32, 393 N.W.2d 847. (Emphasis in original.)

Here, we are convinced that the city's vast commercial landfill activity has dwarfed any governmental function and converted the activity into a proprietary function. The city's intent is fully conceded by its admissions and confirmed by documentary evidence, newspaper articles, depositions, accounting information, and millage and budget comparisons. The city invites customers to truck in garbage from all over Michigan and Canada, to deposit refuse in its landfill collected from more than seventeen different governmental entities outside the city's geographic limits. The fees collected permit the city to use millions of dollars in profits to fund a host of services wholly unrelated to its landfill operations, and even to pay off municipal debts and to keep the city's millage artificially low. The landfill is the city's biggest business.

We hold that a governmental entity can forfeit its immunity for garbage and trash collection and landfill activity by charging fees that change the governmental function into a private one by the sheer scope of its profit-making enterprise, and we find that to be the case here. See 63 CJS, Municipal Corporations, § 777(b), pp. 85-86; 57 Am Jur 2d, Municipal, County, School, and State Tort Liability, § 252, pp. 256-257. Other states limit the immunity for activities that involve collection and fees for services in the community and abutting communities and the income is used to offset related expenses. That is, where the revenue would not "take the garbage collection service outside a governmental function and convert it into a ministerial one." City of Valdosta v. Bellew, 178 Ga.App. 423, 343 S.E.2d 111 (1986). See also Tadjer v. Montgomery Co., 300 Md. 539, 479 A.2d 1321 (1984), Koontz v. City of Winston-Salem, 280 N.C. 513, 186 S.E.2d 897 (1972), and Kaczor v. City of Minot, 138 N.W.2d 784 (N.D.1965). The intent to produce a pecuniary profit, especially one as sizeable as in the case at bar, converts the governmental activity into a commercial enterprise and requires the governmental entity either to forfeit its immunity or to insure itself against liability for damages precisely as any other commercial entrepreneur. The scope of the city's activity is disproportionate to its size and hence is not one that can "normally" be supported by its citizens and taxpayers in the sense of being proportionate to and in reasonable dimension with the size and scope of its geography and population.

Reversed. On remand, the trial court should grant leave to amend the city's cross-complaint and third-party complaint in order to litigate the city's indemnification claims, express and implied.

FREEMAN, J., concurred.

SAWYER, Judge (dissenting).

I respectfully dissent.

The principal plaintiff, Jimmie Coleman, an employee of Waste Management Company, was injured in the course of his employment as a garbage truck operator while at a landfill operated by third-party defendant, City of Riverview. At issue here is whether Riverview is entitled to governmental immunity for the claims...