Kopec v. City of Elmhurst, 96 C 2585.
| Decision Date | 17 April 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96 C 2585.,96 C 2585. |
| Citation | 966 F.Supp. 640 |
| Parties | Richard T. KOPEC, Plaintiff, v. The CITY OF ELMHURST, a municipal corporation; and The Board of Fire and Police Commissioners of the City of Elmhurst, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
Paul V. Esposito, Chicago, IL, for Richard T. Kopec.
John H. Brechin, Itasca, IL, for Board of Fire & Police Commissioners.
Jeffrey B. Huebsch, Kubiesa, Power & Cronin, Ltd., Oakbrook Terrace, IL, for City of Elmhurst.
Defendant, Board of Fire and Police Commissioners of the City of Elmhurst ("Board"), moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint on the basis that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint naming the Board is time barred under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1978, 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) and § 633(b). The Board raises two issues. First, the Board claims Plaintiff's charge of discrimination filed against it on August 12, 1996, with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") is time barred pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) because it was filed more than 300 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred. Second, the Board argues that Plaintiff's Amended Complaint naming the Board was filed less than 60 days after Plaintiff filed its EEOC charge against the Board, and is time barred pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 633(b). For the reasons set forth below, the Court denies the Board's Motion to Dismiss.
On April 30, 1996, Plaintiff, Richard Kopec, filed a complaint against the City of Elmhurst ("City") alleging that the City discriminated against him based on his age under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"). Plaintiff claims that this alleged discrimination occurred on September 6, 1995, when the City refused to hire him as a full time police officer (Amended Complaint, ¶ 21). On October 12, 1995, Plaintiff appeared at the EEOC and filed a charge of discrimination against the City (Affidavit of Richard T. Kopec ("Kopec Aff."), ¶ 3). At that time, Plaintiff did not name the Board in its EEOC charge (Kopec Aff., ¶ 3). On January 29, 1996, the EEOC issued Plaintiff a right to sue letter against the City (Kopec Aff, ¶ 11, Ex. 3).
Sometime after receiving the right to sue letter, Plaintiff discovered that the Board was a necessary defendant because of its substantial involvement in the City's hiring decisions (Kopec Aff., ¶ 4). Plaintiff then filed an additional charge with the EEOC on August 12, 1996, naming the Board as a defendant (Kopec Aff., ¶ 14). The EEOC issued a right to sue letter against the Board on August 29, 1996 (Kopec Aff, ¶ 16-17). On September 6, 1996, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint naming the Board. This Court granted Plaintiff's Motion on November 14, 1996, and Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint that day.
The Board now moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint on the grounds that (1) Plaintiff improperly filed a charge of discrimination against the Board more than 300 days after the alleged unlawful practice occurred pursuant to 29 U.S.C. § 626(d), and (2) Plaintiff's Amended Complaint naming the Board was filed less than 60 days after a charge of unlawful discrimination was filed with the EEOC against the Board in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 633(b).
Summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2555, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
When reviewing the record on summary judgment, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Hill v. Burrell Communications Group, Inc., 67 F.3d 665, 667 (7th Cir.1995). To avert summary judgment, however, plaintiff "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538, (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine only if the evidence presented is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmovant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A summary judgment proceeding is not a vehicle for the resolution of factual disputes; it is designed to determine whether there is any material dispute of fact that requires a trial. Id. If no reasonable jury could find for the party opposing the motion, it must be granted. Hedberg v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 47 F.3d 928, 931 (7th Cir.1995).
Plaintiff failed to file a charge against the Board with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged unlawful discrimination as generally required by 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). Plaintiff failed to name the Board at the same time it named the City in its original discrimination charge (Kopec Aff., Ex. 1). Before precluding Plaintiff's suit against the Board, the Court must determine whether Plaintiff had sufficient reason for failing to name the Board within the 300 day statutory period. Hamilton v. Komatsu Dresser Indus., Inc., 964 F.2d 600, 605 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 916, 113 S.Ct. 324, 121 L.Ed.2d 244 (1992).
In general, a party not named in an EEOC charge may not be sued under the ADEA. Schnellbaecher v. Baskin Clothing Co., 887 F.2d 124, 126 (7th Cir.1989). Although identifying individuals or entities in a charge of discrimination is a prerequisite to filing suit, it is not a jurisdictional requirement, but rather a statute of limitations. Id. It is well settled that the limitations period of the ADEA is not absolute, but subject to equitable modification. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 1132, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982); Chakonas v. City of Chicago, 42 F.3d 1132, 1135 (7th Cir.1994). Two separate kinds of equitable modification apply to ADEA claims: equitable tolling and adequate notice exception. Hamilton, 964 F.2d at 605.
The equitable tolling modification "permits a plaintiff to avoid the bar of the statute of limitations if, despite all due diligence, the plaintiff is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of his claim." Cada v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 451 (7th Cir.1990). This modification "focuses on the plaintiff's excusable ignorance of the limitations period and on lack of prejudice to the defendant." Mull v. ARCO Durethene Plastics, Inc., 784 F.2d 284, 291 (7th Cir.1986). However, equitable tolling should not be invoked if the plaintiff does not need extra time and application of the doctrine would deprive the defendant of the protection of the statute of limitations. Hamilton, 964 F.2d at 605.
Plaintiff's reliance on the equitable tolling modification is misplaced because Plaintiff had the vital information bearing on his claim under the ADEA. To determine whether a plaintiff in fact lacked vital information, the Court asks whether a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position would have been aware that he had been discriminated against in possible violation of the ADEA. Chakonas, 42 F.3d at 1135. If a reasonable person would have been aware, but the Plaintiff was not, equitable tolling is improper. Id. However, as soon as Kopec discovered that he was not hired as a full time police officer because of his age, he had the vital information bearing on the existence of his ADEA claim. Id. Kopec had this vital information necessary to file a claim under the ADEA as early as October 12, 1995, well before the statutory period. (Kopec Aff. ¶ 3). Therefore, equitable tolling is inappropriate.
Plaintiff properly relies upon the adequate notice exception to the requirement that a litigant be named in an EEOC charge before bringing suit. This adequate notice exception arises where "an unnamed party has been provided with adequate notice of the charge, under circumstances where the party has been given the opportunity to participate in conciliation proceedings aimed at voluntary compliance."2 Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 130, 657 F.2d 890, 905 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1017, 102 S.Ct. 1710, 72 L.Ed.2d 134 (1982); accord Perkins v. Silverstein, 939 F.2d 463, 471 (7th Cir.1991); EEOC v. Vucitech, 842 F.2d 936, 944 (7th Cir.1988). The purpose of this exception is to prevent frustration of the goals of anti-discrimination suits by not requiring procedural exactness in stating the charges. Eggleston, 657 F.2d at 905. Complainants frequently file EEOC charges without the assistance of counsel and are not well versed either in the technicalities of pleading or the jurisdictional elements of the ADEA. Id. at 906. Complainants are also not expected to file EEOC charges which "specifically articulate in precise terms, a narrow legal wrong which they have suffered, rather EEOC charges are typically detailed in lay person's terms." Id. Additionally, Congress did not intend that a person filing EEOC charges should accurately ascertain, at the risk of later facing dismissal, at the time the charges were made, every separate and distinct entity which may have committed the unlawful discrimination. Id. Given the ADEA's remedial purposes, courts construe EEOC charges with "utmost liberality," and parties sufficiently named or alluded to in the factual statement of the EEOC charge are to be joined.3 Id. at 906.
The ADEA requires potential plaintiffs to file a complaint with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged...
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Kopec v. City of Elmhurst
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