Koplinka-Loehr v. Cnty. of Tompkins

• Decision Date: 31 December 2020
• Docket Number: 531049
• Citation: 139 N.Y.S.3d 661,189 A.D.3d 2039
• Parties: Michael A. KOPLINKA–LOEHR, Appellant, v. COUNTY OF TOMPKINS et al., Respondents.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

189 A.D.3d 2039
139 N.Y.S.3d 661

Michael A. KOPLINKA–LOEHR, Appellant,
v.
COUNTY OF TOMPKINS et al., Respondents.

531049

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Calendar Date: November 17, 2020
Decided and Entered: December 31, 2020

139 N.Y.S.3d 662

Allen & Maines, Ithaca (Russell E. Maines of counsel), for appellant.

Jonathan Wood, County Attorney, Ithaca (William Troy III of counsel), for respondents.

Before: Egan Jr., J.P., Aarons, Pritzker and Colangelo, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Egan Jr., J.P.

Appeals from two orders of the Supreme Court (McBride, J.), entered January 22, 2020 and January 31, 2020 in Tompkins County, which, among other things, partially granted defendants' motion to dismiss the second amended complaint.

In February 2018, plaintiff was offered a position as a transportation analyst with defendant Ithaca–Tompkins County Transportation Council. Plaintiff accepted the position; however, on March 2, 2018, prior to his proposed start date, the Transportation Council rescinded the job offer. In June 2018, plaintiff commenced this action against defendant County of Tompkins and defendants John Does 1–10, alleging causes of action for wrongful termination/tortious interference with contract, breach of an employment contract, negligent hiring and ratification of tortious and wrongful conduct. The County moved to

139 N.Y.S.3d 663

dismiss the complaint against it, arguing that the action was premature since plaintiff had failed to comply with its prior demand for examination pursuant to General Municipal Law § 50–h (5). Plaintiff thereafter filed an amended complaint as of right (see CPLR 3025[a] ), adding the Transportation Council as a defendant and simultaneously withdrawing its four state tort claims and replaced them with two constitutional claims, including a federal due process claim.

The County and the Transportation Council (hereinafter collectively referred to as the County defendants) moved to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a cause of action (see CPLR 3211[a][7] ). Plaintiff opposed the motion and cross-moved to consolidate the action with a second, separate action that it had commenced against the County and John Does 1–10, stemming from the same underlying incident.¹ In October 2018, Supreme Court (Reynolds Fitzgerald, J.) denied the County defendants' motion to dismiss and granted plaintiff's cross motion to the extent of "consolidating" the two pending actions for purposes of discovery.² The County defendants subsequently answered and discovery ensued.

On February 5, 2019, plaintiff moved for leave to file a second amended complaint, seeking to add defendant Martha Robertson, the chair of the Tompkins County Legislature, as a named defendant. On June 4, 2019, Supreme Court (McBride, J.) granted plaintiff's motion and, on August 21, 2019, plaintiff filed the second amended complaint, asserting a constitutional due process cause of action against all defendants (first cause of action) and three additional causes of action against Robertson, including two defamation causes of action (second and third causes of action) and a cause of action for tortious interference with a prospective economic opportunity (fourth cause of action). In September 2019, defendants moved to dismiss the second amended complaint, arguing that the defamation causes of action against Robertson were time-barred.³ Plaintiff opposed the motion and cross-moved to, among other things, have the second amended complaint deemed timely as against Robertson, arguing, as relevant here, law office failure or, alternatively, that the relation back doctrine was applicable. By order entered January 22, 2020, Supreme Court partially granted defendants' motion to dismiss the second amended complaint, determining that "the defamation claim against [Robertson]" was untimely as it was commenced beyond the applicable one-year statute of limitations, and denied plaintiff's cross motion. Defendants thereafter sought clarification of Supreme Court's order and, by order entered January 31, 2020, Supreme Court clarified that plaintiff's second, third and fourth causes of action against Robertson

139 N.Y.S.3d 664

were dismissed. Plaintiff appeals from both January 2020 orders.

Plaintiff initially contends that Supreme Court erred in dismissing his fourth cause of action against Robertson for tortious interference with prospective economic opportunity as it was timely commenced within the applicable statute of limitations. We agree. As relevant here, a defamation cause of action is governed by a one-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 215[3] ) and a tortious interference with prospective economic opportunity is governed by a three-year statute of limitations (see CPLR 214[4] ; Ullmannglass v. Oneida, Ltd., 86 A.D.3d 827, 828, 927 N.Y.S.2d 702 [2011] ). "In determining which statute of limitations is applicable to a cause of action, it is the essence of the action and not its mere name that controls" ( Ullmannglass v. Oneida, Ltd., 86 A.D.3d at 828, 927 N.Y.S.2d 702 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see Krog Corp. v. Vanner Group, Inc., 158 A.D.3d 914, 919, 72 N.Y.S.3d 178 [2018] ).

Although plaintiff's fourth cause of action includes allegations that Robertson made defamatory statements about him, the gravamen of this claim is not reputational injury, but economic injury resulting from Robertson's alleged interference...