Gurnsey v. Prelesnik

• Decision Date: 15 May 2014
• Docket Number: CASE NO. 2:11-CV-15038
• Parties: DAVID GURNSEY, Petitioner, v. JOHN PRELESNIK, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

DAVID GURNSEY, Petitioner, v. JOHN PRELESNIK, Respondent.

CASE NO. 2:11-CV-15038

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

Dated: May 15, 2014

HONORABLE GERALD E. ROSEN

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND

DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY OR LEAVE TO

APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

David Gurnsey, ("Petitioner"), presently incarcerated at the Richard A. Handlon Correctional Facility in Ionia, Michigan, has filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, in which he challenges his convictions of assault with intent to murder, M.C.L.A. § 750.83; operating while intoxicated causing death, M.C.L.A.§ 257.6254; and two counts of operating while intoxicated causing serious injury, M.C.L.A. § 257.6255A. He also challenges application of the 4^th Habitual Offender charge to counts 2, 3 and 4 at sentencing.¹ For the reasons stated below, the petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.

I. Background

Petitioner caused the death of 21 year-old Andrew Leroy, and seriously injured his parents, Gary and Susan, in a crash on Interstate 94 (I-94) on Thanksgiving evening, 2007. The crash resulted from Gurney's excessive blood alcohol level, the four drugs found in his system,and his desire to end his own life. Instead of ending his own life when he drove the wrong way on I-94, he ended the life another and severely injured the other occupants in the vehicle.

Petitioner pleaded guilty but mentally ill to the above charges in the St. Clair County Circuit Court. In exchange for his plea to the charges, the prosecution dismissed the second-degree murder charge and the judge agreed to take a plea of guilty but mentally ill. There was no sentencing agreement.

Petitioner's Presentence Report calculated the minimal guideline range as 225-375 months imprisonment. (Tr. 5/27/08 pp. 6-7). Trial counsel requested that petitioner be sentenced at the bottom of the guidelines, while the prosecution asked for the maximum 375 months within the guideline range. The Court sentenced petitioner beyond the guideline range to 35-50 years imprisonment on all four counts to run concurrently, after taking into consideration the circumstances of the crimes and petitioner's prior record. (Tr. 5/27/08 p. 7, 22). Petitioner moved to withdraw his plea at the time of sentencing, but the court denied his request. Counsel later filed a motion to withdraw the guilty but mentally ill plea on December 15, 2008, which was also denied.

The Michigan appellate court denied petitioner leave to appeal. People v. Gurnsey, No. 288313 (Mich.Ct.App. June 25, 2009); lv. den. 485 Mich. 978 (2009).

Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus on the following grounds:

I. (A) The trial court should have allowed Gurnsey to withdraw his plea. Additionally, (B) Gurnsey lacked the requisite intent for a charge of assault with intent to murder, (C) Gurnsey was not properly charged as a habitual fourth offender, (D) Gurnsey's plea was not knowing and voluntary, (E) Gurnsey's plea was rendered illusory, and (F) Gurnsey had a valid insanity defense.

II. Gurnsey is entitled to be resentenced within the guidelines.

III. Gurnsey is entitled to have his presentence investigation report corrected.

IV. The trial court denied Gurnsey due process of law by failing to recuse itself from the case where the court knew Andrew Leroy's father. In the alternative, Gurnsey was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to request that the trial judge be disqualified.

V. Gurnsey's guardian was improperly excluded from assisting him with his defense and Gurnsey himself lacked the requisite capacity to consent to the plea bargain.

VI. The trial court erred when it failed to give Gurnsey an adequate hearing on his competence to stand trial.

VII. The trial court failed to acknowledge Gurnsey's liberty interest in being free from antipsychotic drugs; drugs that impacted his ability to follow the proceedings.

II. Standard of Review

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

A decision of a state court is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An "unreasonableapplication" occurs when "a state court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409. A federal habeas court may not "issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 410-11.

The Supreme Court has explained that "[A] federal court's collateral review of a state-court decision must be consistent with the respect due state courts in our federal system." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). The "AEDPA thus imposes a 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,' and 'demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, 130 S. Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010)((quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7 (1997); Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)). "[A] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011)(citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court has emphasized "that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003)). Furthermore, pursuant to § 2254(d), "a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or...could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possible fairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision" of the Supreme Court. Id.

In the present case, the Michigan Court of Appeals on direct review of petitioner's case denied application for leave to appeal in a form order "for lack of merit in the groundspresented." The Michigan Supreme Court subsequently denied petitioner leave to appeal in a standard form order without any extended discussion. Determining whether a state court's decision resulted from an unreasonable legal or factual conclusion, as would warrant federal habeas relief, does not require that there be an opinion from the state court that explains the state court's reasoning. Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 784. "Where a state court's decision is unaccompanied by an explanation, the habeas petitioner's burden still must be met by showing there was no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief." Id. In fact, when a habeas petitioner has presented a federal claim to a state court and that state court has denied relief, "it may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural principles to the contrary." Id. at 784-85. That presumption may be overcome only when there is a reason to think that some other explanation for the state court's decision is more likely. Id. at 785.

In the present case, the AEDPA deferential standard of review applies to petitioner's case where the Michigan Court of Appeals rejected petitioner's appeal "for lack of merit in the grounds presented" and the Michigan Supreme Court subsequently denied leave to appeal in a standard form order, because these orders amounted to a decision on the merits. See Werth v. Bell, 692 F. 3d 486, 492-94 (6th Cir. 2012); Hardaway v. Robinson, 655 F. 3d 445, 447, 449, n. 1 (6th Cir. 2011).

III. Discussion

A. Claim # 1. Withdrawal of the plea.

Petitioner first contends that he should have been permitted to withdraw his guilty plea, because he lacked the requisite intent to be charged with the offense assault with intent tomurder, was not properly charged as a 4^th habitual offender, the plea was not knowing and voluntary, the plea was illusory, and petitioner had a valid insanity defense.

Initially, the Court observes that petitioner has no absolute right to withdraw his guilty plea. See Shanks v. Wolfenbarger, 387 F. Supp. 2d 740, 748, 655 (E.D. Mich. 2005)(internal citations omitted). Therefore, unless the plea violated a clearly-established constitutional right, whether to allow the withdrawal of a criminal defendant's guilty plea is discretionary with the state trial court. Id.

A guilty plea that is entered in state court must be voluntarily and intelligently made. See Shanks, 387 F. Supp. 2d at 749; Doyle v. Scutt, 347 F. Supp. 2d 474, 482 (E.D. Mich. 2004)(both citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969)). In order for a plea of guilty to be voluntarily and intelligently made, the defendant must be aware of the "relevant circumstances and likely consequences" of his plea. Hart v. Marion Correctional Institution, 927 F. 2d 256, 257 (6th Cir. 1991); Shanks, 387 F. Supp....