Kormanik v. Cooper
| Decision Date | 01 November 2011 |
| Docket Number | 11AP–77.,Nos. 11AP–74,11AP–75,11AP–76,s. 11AP–74 |
| Citation | 961 N.E.2d 1187,2011 -Ohio- 5617,195 Ohio App.3d 790 |
| Parties | KORMANIK, Gdn., Appellant, v. COOPER et al., Appellees.Kormanik, Gdn., Appellant, v. Baxter et al., Appellees.Kormanik, Gdn., v. Cooper et al., Appellees;Ohio McGivney Pooled Special Needs Trust, Appellant.Kormanik, Gdn., v. Baxter et al., Appellees;Ohio McGivney Pooled Special Needs Trust, Appellant. |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Michael L. Miller, for appellant Paul Kormanik.
Browning, Meyer & Ball Co., L.P.A., and Richard F. Meyer, Columbus, for appellant Ohio McGivney Pooled Special Needs Trust.
Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Henry G. Appel, for appellees Ohio Department of Job and Family Services and state of Ohio.KLATT, Judge.
[Ohio App.3d 792] {¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Paul S. Kormanik, as the guardian for the estates of Violet Baxter and David Cooper, and defendant-appellant, the Ohio McGivney Pooled Special Needs Trust (“McGivney”), filed these consolidated appeals. Kormanik and McGivney appeal from judgments of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Probate Division, that dismissed defendants-appellees, the state of Ohio and the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (collectively, the ), as parties. For the following reasons, we affirm the probate court's judgment regarding Baxter and we dismiss the appeals from the judgment regarding Cooper.
{¶ 2} The probate court appointed Kormanik guardian of Baxter, who is 83 years old. Subsequently, Kormanik filed a petition asking the probate court to “create a 42 U.S.C. 1396p(d)(4)(C) qualifying pooled special-needs trust for the benefit of the ward, Violet Baxter, that maintains the Medicaid eligibility for the ward.” 1 The petition named as defendants Baxter, the state of Ohio, the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services (“ODJFS”), and McGivney.
[Ohio App.3d 793] {¶ 3} Kormanik included the state of Ohio and ODJFS as defendants due to their statutory duty to “oversee[ ] Medicaid benefits and eligibility.” Kormanik later amended the petition to join the Franklin County Department of Job and Family Services (“FCDJFS”) as a defendant. Kormanik added FCDJFS because it would be responsible for making the initial determination regarding Baxter's Medicaid eligibility once she applied for benefits.
{¶ 4} Instead of filing an answer, the state defendants moved for dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(1) and (6). In their motion, the state defendants asserted that Kormanik included them as defendants “solely so [the probate court could] affirmatively determine whether Ms. Baxter is eligible for Medicaid.” However, as the state defendants pointed out, the probate court did not possess jurisdiction to decide Medicaid eligibility. Because the court lacked authority to rule on Baxter's eligibility for Medicaid, the state defendants asserted that they had “no significant role” to play in the proceedings and should be dismissed.
{¶ 5} In response, Kormanik argued that federal and state statutes invested the probate court with jurisdiction to establish a pooled trust. According to Kormanik, the probate court could not establish a pooled trust without declaring that the trust complied with the applicable statutory requirements and that any assets transferred into the trust could not be counted as resources for the purpose of deciding Medicaid eligibility. Kormanik reasoned that “if the [probate] court create[d] a pooled trust and declare[d] it to fit within the parameters of [federal and state statute], the State [would] be estopped from later arguing the creation of the trust and the transfer of assets into the trust was an invalid or disqualifying transfer.” Due to the estoppel effect of the declaration, Kormanik argued that the state defendants had an interest to protect and should remain parties to the litigation.
{¶ 6} The probate court agreed with the state defendants' argument, and it issued a judgment granting their motion to dismiss. Kormanik and McGivney appealed the judgment to this court. After reviewing the matter, we concluded that the dismissal of the state defendants did not completely resolve the action, because the probate court had yet to decide whether to grant Kormanik's petition and create the pooled trust. Kormanik v. Cooper, 190 Ohio App.3d 184, 2010-Ohio-4745, 941 N.E.2d 110, ¶ 9. As the judgment neither disposed of all issues nor contained Civ.R. 54(B) language, it did not constitute a final, appealable order. Id. at ¶ 12. Consequently, we dismissed the appeal.
{¶ 7} Immediately before Kormanik and McGivney appealed the probate court's judgment, McGivney filed a motion for reconsideration. The probate [Ohio App.3d 794] court held that motion in abeyance during the pendency of the appeal. Once we dismissed the appeal, Kormanik also filed a motion for reconsideration.
{¶ 8} The probate court granted Kormanik and McGivney's motions for reconsideration and reanalyzed whether dismissal of the state defendants was appropriate. The reconsideration, however, did not produce a different result. In a judgment issued December 27, 2010, the probate court again dismissed the state defendants from the proceedings.
{¶ 9} Both Kormanik and McGivney now appeal the December 27, 2010 judgment. Kormanik assigns the following errors:
1. The trial court erred in dismissing the State of Ohio and the Ohio Department of Jobs [sic] and Family Services as defendants herein in that the Probate Court has jurisdiction over all beneficiaries in the creation and the construction of inter vivos trusts including those created pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1396p(d)(4)(C).
2. The trial court erred in dismissing the State of Ohio and the Ohio Department of Jobs [sic] and Family Services as defendants herein in that they are necessary parties for the creation and construction of the trust.
3. The trial court erred in dismissing the State of Ohio and the Ohio Department of Jobs [sic] and Family Services as defendants herein in that the Probate Court has plenary power pursuant to R.C. 2101.24(C) to [dispose] fully of any matter that is properly before the court, unless the power is expressly otherwise limited or denied by a section of the Revised Code.
{¶ 10} And McGivney assigns the following errors:
1. The trial court erred in finding that the defendants, State of Ohio and Ohio Department of Job and Family Services, were not necessary parties to the action.
2. The trial court erred in finding that the plaintiff was requesting determination of Medicaid eligibility.
3. The trial court erred in finding that it is not required under the Ohio Revised Code to make a finding pursuant to R.C. 5111.151(F)(3).
{¶ 11} Before addressing the merits of appellants' arguments, we must address the effect of Cooper's death on the viability of the appeals related to him. Cooper passed away on April 18, 2011. Soon thereafter, the state defendants filed a suggestion of death, and in it, they asserted that Cooper's death rendered moot Kormanik's request to use Cooper's assets to fund a special-needs pooled trust. We agree.
{¶ 12} Actions are moot when “ ‘they involve no actual genuine, live controversy, the decision of which can definitely affect existing legal relations.’ ” [Ohio App.3d 795] Ridgeway v. State Med. Bd., 10th Dist. No. 06AP–1197, 2007-Ohio-5657, 2007 WL 3072635, ¶ 11, quoting Lingo v. Ohio Cent. RR., Inc., 10th Dist. No. 05AP–206, 2006-Ohio-2268, 2006 WL 1230679, ¶ 20. Ohio courts exercise judicial restraint in cases that do not present actual controversies. Tschantz v. Ferguson (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 131, 133, 566 N.E.2d 655; Fortner v. Thomas (1970), 22 Ohio St.2d 13, 14, 51 O.O.2d 35, 257 N.E.2d 371. If while an action is pending, an event occurs that renders it impossible for a court to grant any effectual relief, the court will generally dismiss the action. Tschantz at 133, 566 N.E.2d 655, quoting Miner v. Witt (1910), 82 Ohio St. 237, 92 N.E. 21, syllabus.
{¶ 13} Here, Cooper's death eliminates any need to place his assets in trust so that he can qualify for Medicaid. Accordingly, the underlying petition, as well as this appeal, are moot. We thus dismiss the two appeals related to him.
{¶ 14} Resolution of the remaining appeals requires an examination of the Medicaid program, and particularly, the role of pooled special-needs trusts in the determination of Medicaid eligibility. Congress established the Medicaid program in 1965 by adding Title XIX to the Social Security Act. Arkansas Dept. of Health & Human Servs. v. Ahlborn (2006), 547 U.S. 268, 275, 126 S.Ct. 1752, 164 L.Ed.2d 459. Through the Medicaid program, the federal government provides financial assistance to states that reimburse needy persons for the cost of medical care. Pharmaceutical Research & Mfrs. v. Walsh (2003), 538 U.S. 644, 650, 123 S.Ct. 1855, 155 L.Ed.2d 889; Wisconsin Dept. of Health & Family Servs. v. Blumer (2002), 534 U.S. 473, 479, 122 S.Ct. 962, 151 L.Ed.2d 935. In order to participate in the Medicaid program, a state must adopt a plan for medical assistance approved by the secretary of Health and Human Services (“secretary”). Section 1396a(b), Title 42, U.S.Code; Pharmaceutical Research & Mfrs. at 650, 123 S.Ct. 1855, 155 L.Ed.2d 889. The plan must contain reasonable standards for determining eligibility for medical assistance within the boundaries set by the Medicaid Act, Section 1396, Title 42, U.S.Code et seq., and its implementing regulations. Section 1396a(a)(17), Title 42, U.S.Code; Blumer at 479, 122 S.Ct. 962, 151 L.Ed.2d 935. Additionally, the plan must comply with Section 1396p(d), Title 42, U.S.Code, the section of the Medicaid Act that sets forth rules concerning trusts created with an individual's assets. Section 1396a(a)(18), Title 42, U.S.Code.
{¶ 15} To be financially eligible for Medicaid assistance, a person must have income and resources below a threshold set by the secretary. Section 1396a(a)(17), Title 42,...
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