Falco v. Institute of Living

• Decision Date: 06 October 1998
• Docket Number: No. 16979,16979
• Citation: 50 Conn.App. 654,718 A.2d 1009
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Joseph FALCO v. INSTITUTE OF LIVING.

Page 1009

718 A.2d 1009

50 Conn.App. 654

Joseph FALCO v. INSTITUTE OF LIVING.

No. 16979.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued March 17, 1998.

Decided Oct. 6, 1998.

Donna R. Zito, with whom, on the brief, was Lois B. Tanzer, Hartford, for appellant (defendant).

Doreen J. Bonadies, North Haven, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before LANDAU, SCHALLER and SULLIVAN, JJ.

LANDAU, Judge.

The defendant, Institute of Living, appeals from the trial court's granting of the bill of discovery filed by the plaintiff, Joseph Falco, as to the name, last known address and social security number of one of the defendant's patients (John Doe). On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court improperly ordered it to disclose John Doe's name, last known address and social security number (1) in violation of GENERAL STATUTES § 52-146E, (2)¹ in violation of John Doe's constitutional right of privacy and (3) without affording John Doe notice or an opportunity to be heard. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the disposition of this appeal. On or about March 10, 1995, the plaintiff was admitted as an inpatient at the defendant psychiatric hospital in Hartford. Shortly thereafter, while attending a group meeting at the hospital, the plaintiff was allegedly attacked without provocation by John Doe.

Following the denial of the plaintiff's insurance claim, the plaintiff filed a bill of discovery against the defendant to obtain identifying information from the defendant that would enable the plaintiff to bring suit against John Doe. The trial court granted the plaintiff's bill of discovery and ordered the defendant to disclose John Doe's name, last known address and social security number. ² This appeal followed.

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court improperly ordered the defendant to disclose data on John Doe in violation of § 52-146e. ³ We disagree.

In addressing this issue of first impression, and determining whether the information sought by the plaintiff was protected by § 52-146e, we are initially guided by well defined principles of statutory interpretation. The court's "fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.... In seeking to discern that intent, we look to the words of the statute itself, to the legislative history and circumstances surrounding its enactment, to the legislative policy it was designed to implement, and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject matter." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Edelstein v. Dept. of Public Health & Addiction Services, 240 Conn. 658, 664, 692 A.2d 803 (1997), quoting State v. Metz, 230 Conn. 400, 409, 645 A.2d 965 (1994). Moreover, principles of statutory construction require the court to construe a statute in a manner that will not frustrate its intended purpose or lead to an absurd result. Turner v. Turner, 219 Conn. 703, 712, 595 A.2d 297 (1991). The court "must avoid a construction that fails to attain a rational and sensible result that bears directly on the purpose the legislature sought to achieve." Id., at 713, 595 A.2d 297.

While individuals enjoy a " 'broad privilege in the confidentiality of their psychiatric communications and records' "; Home Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 235 Conn. 185, 195, 663 A.2d 1001 (1995), quoting State v. D'Ambrosio, 212 Conn. 50, 55, 561 A.2d 422 (1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1063, 110 S.Ct. 880, 107 L.Ed.2d 963 (1990); the purpose of the statutory privilege is to protect the therapeutic relationship that exists between the psychiatrist and the patient. Bieluch v. Bieluch, 190 Conn. 813, 819, 462 A.2d 1060 (1983). Specifically, the purpose of the psychiatrist-patient privilege is to " 'give the patient an incentive to make full disclosure to a physician in order to obtain effective treatment free from the embarrassment and invasion of privacy which could result from a doctor's testimony.' " Home Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., supra, at 195, 663 A.2d 1001, quoting State v. White, 169 Conn. 223, 234-35, 363 A.2d 143, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1025, 96 S.Ct. 469, 46 L.Ed.2d 399 (1975). This statutory privilege ensures the patient that confidential communications that are necessary for effective treatment or diagnosis may be safely disclosed to a psychiatrist. Bieluch v. Bieluch, supra, at 819, 462 A.2d 1060. However, "[c]ommunications that bear no relationship to the purpose for which the privilege was enacted do not obtain shelter under the statute and are admissible subject to the normal rules of evidence." Id.

The legislature drafted exceptions to the general rule of nondisclosure of psychiatrist-patient communications. ⁴ These exceptions were drafted narrowly to protect the confidentiality of communications "unless important countervailing considerations require their disclosure." Home Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., supra, 235 Conn. at 195, 663 A.2d 1001. Furthermore, the exceptions to the privilege "are not limited to those found in General Statutes § 52-146f." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Lieb v. Dept. of Health Services, 14 Conn.App. 552, 559, 542 A.2d 741 (1988). Section 52-146e "defines the protected relationship carefully and at the same time recognizes the legitimate interest of society in intruding upon the relationship in certain limited situations ...." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Home Ins. Co. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., supra, at 195-96, 663 A.2d 1001, quoting 9 H.R. Proc., Pt. 8, 1961 Sess., p. 3945, remarks of Representative Nicholas B. Eddy.

The defendant cites Connecticut State Medical Society v. Commission on Hospitals & Health Care, 223 Conn. 450, 612 A.2d 1217 (1992), in support of its argument that the information sought by the plaintiff identifies John Doe and, as such, should be protected from disclosure under § 52-146e. In that case, our Supreme Court withheld the disclosure of certain information under § 52-146e. The defendant's reliance on Connecticut State Medical Society, however, is misplaced. In that case, the court held that a four digit zip code suffix should be excluded from the submission of data to a state agency disclosed pursuant to agency regulations because it was possible to ascertain a patient's identity from that suffix and thus violated the confidentiality provisions of existing law, including § 52-146e. Id., at 458-60, 612 A.2d 1217. Connecticut State Medical Society, however, involved agency regulations that required the submission of patient data from "all of Connecticut's general hospitals" at the agency's discretion to enable the agency to develop and implement a payment system. Id., at 453, 612 A.2d 1217. That authorization to obtain information from all of Connecticut's general hospitals could inhibit an individual from seeking assistance from a hospital. In this case, the plaintiff is seeking access to a single limited disclosure for the sole purpose of pursuing his constitutional right ⁵ to seek redress for his injuries.

The defendant also cites Lieb v. Dept. of Health Services, supra, 14 Conn.App. 552, 542 A.2d 741, in support of its argument. In Lieb, this court held that, despite the strong interests involved in the case, the court had no basis to establish an exception to § 52-146e. Id., at 561, 542 A.2d 741. In that case, the defendant sought access to complete patient records. We held that the defendant did not provide the trial court with good cause for access to the complete patient records. Id., at 560-61, 542 A.2d 741. In the present case, the plaintiff requests access only to limited information, not John Doe's complete medical records. In addition, the plaintiff has provided a sufficient showing of good cause because he requires the information to institute a legal action against John Doe. ⁶

Interpreting the statute to preclude the plaintiff from having access to the information when his sole purpose is to bring an action against John Doe would lead to an absurd result that was not intended by the legislature. The plaintiff's need for the information to institute a claim against John Doe creates a compelling countervailing interest that requires disclosure. Because the exceptions are not limited to those found in § 52-146e and the compelling countervailing interest provides a basis on which to intrude upon the psychiatrist-patient relationship, we hold that, under the narrow facts of this case, § 52-146e does not protect this type of information from disclosure. We therefore conclude that the trial court's order of disclosure did not violate § 52-146e.

II

The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly ordered it to disclose the information in violation of John Doe's constitutional right of privacy. We disagree.

The defendant argues that John Doe has federal and state constitutional rights to privacy. ⁷ The defendant further argues that the trial court improperly concluded that, if a constitutional right to privacy exists, it was outweighed by the plaintiff's economic interest to pursue a tort claim. Specifically, the defendant argues that the plaintiff would be reasonably restricted rather than denied access to the court. ⁸

We begin with an analysis of John Doe's right to privacy as protected by our state constitution. "[A]ll rights derived by statute and the common law extant at the time of the adoption of article first, § 10, [of the Connecticut constitution of 1818] ⁹ are incorporated in that provision by virtue of being established by law as rights the breach of which precipitates a recognized injury...." Gentile v. Altermatt, 169 Conn. 267, 286, 363 A.2d 1 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1041, 96 S.Ct. 763, 46 L.Ed.2d 631 (1976). These rights are referred to as "constitutionally incorporated common-law right[s]." Id., at 284, 363 A.2d 1. Nearly every state recognizes the right to...