Kornegay v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co.

• Decision Date: 22 March 1911
• Citation: 70 S.E. 731,154 N.C. 389
• Parties: KORNEGAY v. ATLANTIC COAST LINER. CO.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

70 S.E. 731

154 N.C. 389

KORNEGAY v. ATLANTIC COAST LINER. CO.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

March 22, 1911

Appeal from Superior Court, Wayne County; Cooke, Judge.

Action by W. C. Kornegay against the Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Company. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. No error.

Evidence that a fire originated from sparks from defendant railroad company's engine made out a prima facie case, entitling plaintiff to have the issue as to negligence submitted to the jury, and justified them in finding negligence, unless they were satisfied on all the evidence that there was no negligence, but that the engine was equipped with a proper spark arrester, and had been operated in a careful and prudent manner.

Action to recover damages for setting fire to plaintiff's house and destroying the same and a part of its contents. So much of the plaintiff's own testimony as is necessary to show the origin of the fire was as follows: "On 23d day of October, 1907, John H. Sparks' show train was pulling out of Mount Olive to go to Clinton. I was out on my piazza with my family, viewing the train as it passed our house. Sparks in great quantities were being emitted from the smokestack of the engine pulling that train of cars. My house was situated on the east side of the railroad, and the course the wind was blowing was from the northwest, coming directly across the railroad towards my house, and conveying the sparks in great quantities over the house, and at random, it seemed to me everywhere else. That was somewhere between 12 and 2 o'clock at night. We went to bed as soon as the train passed. I went to sleep; my wife roused me, and said there was a noise somewhere. On being aroused I heard a noise of something breaking or something falling; I then went out in the hall to get my gun, but did not get it. On getting in the hall and looking through the transom over the front door, it looked very red, but I still heard the noise, which seemed to be overhead. I then opened the front door, facing the railroad, and I saw the light from fire. I rushed out on the railroad right of way. The fire was burning on the roof of my house, and it was falling in. I rushed in and told my wife the fire was burning the roof of the house; to get up at once, which she did. There was no evidence of fire anywhere on the inside of the house, either downstairs or upstairs. There were two double chimneys to the house containing six fireplaces, but there had been no fire in the house for two days. The kitchen was at the rear of the house, a single room 10x12 feet and 9-foot pitch, and we had not cooked in the stove, nor had any fire in the kitchen, since six that morning. We had spent the entire day in the show grounds and in the shows. The house was consumed and (nearly) all the furniture. *** There was no fire in the kitchen when I first discovered it. The fire was confined to the front part of the room of the main house. *** I had not been asleep very long when fire broke out. Day broke about two hours after the fire was over. It appeared to be between 1 and 3 o'clock when fire was first discovered." There was other evidence tending to show that the fire was caused by sparks emitted from the smokestack of the defendant's locomotive engine. There also was evidence, on the part of the defendant, that the engine had a spark arrester in good condition and of the best approved type in common or general use, and that no sparks were emitted from the engine as it passed near the plaintiff's house. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff, and from the judgment thereon, the defendant appealed.

W. C Munroe, for appellant.

J. D Langston and W. T. Dortch, for appellee.

WALKER J. (after stating the facts as above).

The defendant's motion for a nonsuit was properly overruled. There was sufficient evidence tending to show that the fire was caused by sparks emitted from the defendant's engine. The plaintiff's own testimony, and there was more of the same kind, warranted the jury in finding, as a fact, that the house was set on fire in that way. If we construe the evidence in the most favorable light for the plaintiff giving him the benefit of all legitimate and reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, as we are required to do ( Cotton v. Railway, 149 N.C. 227, 62 S.E. 1093; Freeman v. Brown, 151 N.C. 111, 65 S.E. 743), the evidence is quite as strong as that which was held sufficient in ...