Kornig v. Western Life Indemnity Company
| Decision Date | 19 July 1907 |
| Docket Number | 15,161 - (152) |
| Citation | 112 N.W. 1039,102 Minn. 31 |
| Parties | ANNA KORNIG v. WESTERN LIFE INDEMNITY COMPANY |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Action in the district court for Hennepin county to recover upon a life insurance policy. The case was tried before Holt, J and a jury which rendered a verdict for $2,042 in favor of plaintiff. From an order denying a motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial, defendant appealed. Affirmed.
This was an action to recover the sum of $2,000 under a policy of insurance held by the deceased husband of plaintiff and respondent in appellant and defendant company. Defendant denied liability because of a provision of the policy to the effect that in case the death of the insured should result from his suicide, whether he were at the time sane or insane whether it were voluntary or involuntary, intentional or unintentional, the defendant company should be liable only for twenty five per cent. of the amount paid by the insured in assessments without interest. For that amount defendant offered judgment. The jury returned a verdict for the full amount of the policy. This appeal was taken from the order of the trial court denying defendant's motion to set aside the verdict and to grant a new trial. The testimony construed, as it must be on this appeal, as favorably to plaintiff as reasonably may be, was in brief, as follows:
Deceased was a man of cheerful disposition. He lived happily at home with his wife, without quarreling. He was a kind father, and was devoted to his children. He had been moderately successful in business, and immediately before his death was in the possession of a considerable sum of money, amounting to several thousand dollars, which he carried in cash in a canvas bag attached to his person. There was testimony to the effect that he had slept and lived at home, and got his meals at home, where he had all his things, including his clothing. His wife had seen him the day of his death, the night before his death, the night of the day before that, and every night so far as she knew. She thought, however, that he had been in Still-water one night a week before his death. In brief, he lived happily and contentedly with his family, and spent the evenings of the days immediately preceding the tragedy at home. On the morning of that day he was in his usual health and his manner was natural. In the afternoon he was found dead in a room in Minneapolis, which defendant's witness, a Mrs. B., testified he had rented from her. That witness said that she had known the deceased and his family for some time previously. She and her husband had rented the second and third floors of a building in Minneapolis. They sublet the upper floor -- four rooms -- to roomers. They had met the deceased on the street, and had been informed by him that his family were in California for their health and that he wanted a room. The wife of the deceased, however, swore that the witness Mrs. B. had seen her in Minneapolis about this time. On March 1 they had rented him a room. Mrs. B. testified that he had occupied the room all the time from then until April 12, the day of the tragedy. On that day, in substantially her own words, she was in the kitchen, when he stepped out into the hall and complained that his room was not in proper condition. She went upstairs and looked around the room, and started to come out of the door, and he was at the head of the stairs. He never uttered a word. He just stepped up and pointed the revolver. She heard the report, turned around, and dropped on her knees. Her head kind of went over, and she did not know whether it was two teeth, or a tooth and a bullet, that she spat out, but something rolled out. The bullet struck her in the lower part of the ear. Then, while resting on the bed, she said to deceased: He did not respond a word. She did not hear a second shot. She thinks she lost consciousness. How long she remained in the building is not clear. She says it was less than half an hour. Having regained possession of her faculties, she ran out of the house into the street. The first man she met inquired: "What is the matter with you?" She answered: "Run to the drug store, quick." When the police started upstairs with pistols drawn, she said: "Don't go up there! don't go up there!" The officers of the law entered the premises, searched the second floor and found nobody, went to the next floor, and found the deceased dead upon the floor. He was lying on his left side, with his left cheek on the floor, his left arm beneath the body, the legs bent at the knees and drawn up, and the right arm so that the hand was on his leg. Loosely gripped in his hand was the revolver, the muzzle of which projected between and below the legs, so that it was visible to one standing in the doorway. In the right side of the head was a bullet wound, about an inch and a half back of the ear. The trend of the bullet was downward and backward. Two or three cartridges remained in the revolver, which was of a .38 or a .32 caliber. Two or three empty cartridge shells had been extracted from it. Only a small amount of money and some papers were found on the person of the dead man. No one was found in the building in any wise connected with the death of the insured. The testimony of the unfortunate woman who was shot consistently maintained that deceased shot her; but she did not say that she saw the deceased shoot himself. She emphatically denied having maintained any illicit or improper relations with the deceased. There was no testimony that she called for help. She did nothing to cause the apprehension of her assailant. Her narrative as to what occurred immediately preceding the shooting varied at different times. More specifically, she told the dressmaker who occupied the first floor of the building that at the time she received the shot she was looking into a drawer in a dresser for a present of which he had told her, and that while stooping over she received the shot. This she denied in her deposition.
Life Insurance -- Suicide.
In an action brought by the beneficiary of a life insurance policy, which provided that there should be no recovery in case of death by suicide, intentional or unintentional, and whether the deceased was sane or insane at the time, it appeared in support of the defense of suicide that deceased was found dead, from a bullet in his head, with a pistol in his hand, in a room of a tenement leased by the principal witness for the insurance company. That witness testified that she had gone to the room, which she had leased to deceased, in answer to his complaint that it was not in order; that without a word he shot her; that she left the room; and that she did not hear a second shot. She denied any improper relations with the deceased. Her narrative was incomplete, and her testimony somewhat impeached. The jury found for the beneficiary. It is held:
(1) The trial court was not in error in receiving testimony that the deceased carried on his person a considerable sum of money, which was not found afterwards, nor in receiving in evidence a photograph of the rear of the premises, showing a stairway from the floor of the building on which the shooting occurred to the ground.
(2) Where the defense of suicide is asserted against an action by a beneficiary of an insurance policy:
(a) The burden of proving that the deceased committed suicide is upon the defendant.
(b) The presumption is against suicide.
(c) If the known facts are consistent with the theory of natural or accidental death, the presumption which the law raises from the ordinary motives and principles of human conduct requires a finding against suicide.
(d) When circumstantial evidence is relied on, the defendant must establish facts which preclude any reasonable hypothesis of natural or accidental death. Lindahl v. Supreme Court I.O.F., 100 Minn. 87, 110 N.W. 358, followed and applied.
(3) Only when the inferences or conclusions to be drawn from the facts in a case in which the defense of suicide is interposed to an action on an insurance policy are so clear and unambiguous that reasonable men, unaffected by bias or prejudice, would agree that the deceased intentionally shot himself, should a verdict for the beneficiary in the policy be set aside.
(4) A normal man is not driven to the desperation of suicide without some exciting cause of more than ordinary magnitude. The entire absence of motive, adequate or inadequate, inciting to self-destruction, was a circumstance to be considered by the jury in determining whether or not the defendant has borne the burden of proof of maintaining such a defense.
(5) The mere fact that a revolver was found in the hand of deceased was not conclusive that he committed suicide.
(6) The evidence in this case is examined, and held not to have shown suicide so conclusively as to have made it error for the trial court to have refused to set aside the verdict of the jury.
Van Derlip & Lum and Thomas J. Graydon, for appellant.
Chas. G. Laybourn, for respondent.
JAGGARD, J. (after stating the facts as above).
The first group of assignments of error is addressed to the alleged impropriety of the court in receiving evidence as to the amount the insured had shortly before his death and the amount found upon his body after death. The basis of the objection is that the record is barren of any testimony which can directly or indirectly suggest an inference of homicide, or remotely sustain such an inference. We are of the opinion that the evidence was properly received.
It is obviously desirable in these cases, which are of necessity shrouded in more or less mystery, that...
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