Koskey v. Harnischfeger Corp.

Decision Date03 March 1936
Citation265 N.W. 583,221 Wis. 267
PartiesKOSKEY v. HARNISCHFEGER CORPORATION.
CourtWisconsin Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from a judgment of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County; Edgar V. Werner, Judge.

Action by George H. Koskey against the Harnischfeger Corporation to recover $2,396.40, claimed to be due under a contract of employment for one year. From a judgment dismissing the complaint after directing a verdict for defendant at the conclusion of the evidence, plaintiff appeals.--[By Editorial Staff.]

Reversed and remanded, with instructions.

Harold J. McGrath, of Milwaukee, for appellant.

Lines, Spooner & Quarles, of Milwaukee (Leo Mann and Arthur W. Coppin, both of Milwaukee, of counsel), for respondent.

MARTIN, Justice.

In July, 1931, appellant was in the employ of the Highway Trailer Company located at Edgerton, Wis., under a contract providing for an annual salary of $7,200. The contract was for one year starting June 20, 1930. No change was made as to salary at the end of the first-year period. However, appellant desired another connection, and was anxious to get located in Milwaukee. Through a friend, he learned that the respondent corporation might be in a position to use his services, and on July 6, 1931, he addressed a letter to the vice president of the respondent corporation, in which he referred to the fact that he would like to relocate in Milwaukee, concluding the letter as follows: “I trust at least that we can get together for an interview at a time most convenient to yourself at which time we can go more into detail on what I feel is possible and also lay before you my past record, references, etc.”

To this letter, respondent replied: “Your letter of July 6 has had my attention and if you will call for an interview I shall be glad to talk to you. The most suitable time would be Friday afternoon.”

Pursuant to this correspondence, two conferences were had at respondent's office between the appellant and Mr. E. Standfuss, vice president of the respondent corporation. The first conference was had on July 10, and the second on July 18, 1931. It appears that during these conferences Mr. Walter Harnischfeger, president of the respondent corporation, participated to some extent, and at both conferences the parties discussed many details respecting appellant's experience, qualifications, and the work to be done, etc. Appellant told of his then employment with the Highway Trailer Company, and produced the written contract covering his employment with that company. He requested employment by respondent at the same salary and a written contract for one year from the time he started work.

At the conclusion of the conference on July 10, appellant was requested to return on July 18 for a further discussion of the proposed employment. In the conference on July 18, Walter Harnischfeger, the president, and Mr. Standfuss, the vice president, discussed with appellant matters which had been gone over in their first conference, but went more into detail; the conference lasting for several hours. During this conference, appellant stated that he would like to make a connection with the respondent corporation, that he believed his work would meet their expectations, and that, if he were employed, he wanted protection in the form of an agreement covering his employment for one year from the time he would start work. He further stated that he had worked under a contract in industrial engineering positions involving plant operation since 1924. The matter of the duration of his employment, his request for a contract for one year from the time he would start work, and the rate of pay were discussed.

Appellant testified that in this conference he produced the contract he had with the Highway Trailer Company, and that both Mr. Harnischfeger and Mr. Standfuss read it. It is claimed by appellant, and he so testified, that both Mr. Harnischfeger and Mr. Standfuss agreed to the feasibility of a contract for a year for such services as appellant intended to perform, and that they were both satisfied with the terms of the contract which appellant had with his then employer. He testified that Mr. Harnischfeger referred to a certain part of the contract, and stated: We don't want a complicated system here either. We want to cut out all the red tape possible. Otherwise it is all right.” However, it is conceded that the conference ended without definitely fixing the amount of salary or the date for beginning work. In this regard appellant testified:

We left the conference with the definite salary to be fixed rather vague, with this matter to be decided upon in the fall. The salary was not fixed, that was taken up in a later letter. * * * I was to go back to Edgerton and write them a letter. I was to think the thing over either on the basis of acceptance or non-acceptance.”

On July 22, appellant wrote respondent corporation; the material parts of his letter being as follows:

“In our conference of last Saturday no mention was made of references so I presume you are paying me the compliment of accepting me at my face value. I can, however, get the best of references from twenty or thirty nationally known executives. * * * I had my letters with me but did not offer them * * * I believe I can safely say for myself, however, that I have as good a record for consistent and large profit increases on tough assignments as anyone else you can find. If you are also convinced of this fact then I do not believe the salary question should bother us * * *

I would certainly be pleased to settle down in Milwaukee and know that I could, by results, win myself a permanent place in your organization and trust your final answer in this regard will be affirmative.”

To this letter the respondent replied, under date of July 24, 1931; the material parts of the letter being as follows:

“* * * I have given this subject a great deal of thought ever since you called on us and have weighed everything rather carefully pertaining to your application as well as those of some other men. * * *

I believe that perhaps you would be suitable through past experience to fit into the picture. How valuable you can be to the corporation and how deeply and how permanently you can entrench yourself within the corporation, time would have to tell, but naturally your progress would depend entirely on your own self.

It would take you some time before you would get fully acquainted with all the problems around here and it would be some time before the corporation could expect any returns from the investment to be made in your services, and for that reason we feel that we cannot offer you the salary you ask for as a starting salary. However, we are willing to offer you as a starter a salary of $6,000 per annum. What comes after that would solely depend on yourself.

At the same time we feel that we have an unusual opening for a man who can visualize the possibilities ahead of him in that position. We do expect a rapid growth and expansion during coming years and the party affiliated in the capacity as you desire with our corporation can in due time become one of its most valuable members if he is broadminded enough to see the clear road ahead. * * *

As stated previously, the opportunities that present themselves to a man in your station are most unusual in our plant and so are his duties. Our offer to you is made with an open mind and the clear responsibility of a management whose aim it is to forge ahead energetically and recognize its obligation to those who are in a great measure responsible for needful aid in the development of its chosen path.

If you care to consider our offer after you have weighed carefully all angles of the present and future possibilities, we shall be glad to communicate with you further. If you feel that you would make a mistake in accepting the opportunities in our organization, just drop me a short note saying that you are not interested and we shall at your desire, consider the matter as closed.”

To this letter the appellant replied under date of July 31, 1931; the material parts being as follows:

“I made up my mind yesterday to accept your offer, but I have been all day yesterday and most of today resigning. * * * For the last week or two have been turning over all affairs to a subordinate who will now handle all matters. I would like to give him most of next week and then go up to northern Minnesota for about a week and join you between the fifteenth and twentieth if this is agreeable to you. If you desire me sooner I will forego the trip north. While I am losing one hundred dollars a month salary I realize your position sufficiently not to argue about this matter. * * * I am of the belief that it will not take me long to get back to my present basis and exceed it while here it was the most I could hope for.

As a basis of final agreement I would like to get some concessions from you, however, one being $100 toward moving expenses and the other the privilege of taking one week off on my own time if necessary in October or November. * * * As far as I am concerned the above are all the questions I have. The particular scope of my job and its ramifications I will leave to you--its ultimate scope will eventually depend on my ability anyway.”

Respondent allowed the item of $100 toward appellant's moving expenses and notified him to report for work on September 1, 1931.

Between September 1, 1931, and April, 1932, appellant received the sum of $3,603.60 to apply on his salary. There was a shortage in his second check. He went to Standfuss and informed him that his check was not for the full amount and that he was working under a contract. Standfuss replied that this was only temporary, and that the matter would be rectified when operations were on a better basis. In January, 1932, appellant was notified of a further reduction in his salary. He again called the matter to Standfuss' attention and objected, stating that his pay was not...

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5 cases
  • Porcelli v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Company
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin
    • August 13, 1975
    ...without any necessity for showing cause. Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis.2d 388, 153 N.W.2d 587 (1967); Koskey v. Harnischfeger Corp., 221 Wis. 267, 265 N. W. 583 (1936). Since Schlitz had the right to terminate plaintiff's employment, it cannot be liable on the contract. Further, no......
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    ...Mills (1938), 226 Wis. 662, 277 N.W. 653; Saylor v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank (1937), 224 Wis. 511, 272 N.W. 369; koskey v. Harnischfeger Corp. (1936), 221 Wis. 267, 265 N.W. 583; Brooks v. National Equipment Corp. (1932), 209 Wis. 198, 244 N.W. 598; Milwaukee Corrugating Co. v. Krueger (1924)......
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    ...year in the absence of other facts is an indefinite hiring which may be terminated at the will of either party. Koskey v. Harnischfeger Corp. (1936) 221 Wis. 267, 265 N.W. 583;Brooks v. Nat. Equipment Corp. (1932) 209 Wis. 198, 244 N.W. 598;Milwaukee Corrugating Co. v. Krueger (1924) 184 Wi......
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