Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.

• Decision Date: 31 October 1967
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
• Parties: William E. FORRER, Appellant, v. SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO., a foreign corporation, Respondent.

Page 587

153 N.W.2d 587

36 Wis.2d 388

William E. FORRER, Appellant, v. SEARS, ROEBUCK & CO., a foreign corporation, Respondent.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Oct. 31, 1967.

A. E. Simonson, Madison, for appellant.

John D. Winner, Jasper, Winner, Perina & Rouse, Madison, for respondent.

HEFFERNAN, Justice.

In Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc. (1965), 26 Wis.2d 683, 696, 133 N.W.2d 267, 273 this court adopted the doctrine embodied in sec. 90 of Restatement, 1 Contracts, p. 110, which states:

'A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.'

We stated in Hoffman that we chose to use the phrase, 'promissory estoppel' to describe this doctrine. It is promissory estoppel upon which the plaintiff, William E. Forrer, bases his action.

In Hoffman we stated that three questions must be answered affirmatively to support an action for promissory estoppel:

'(1) Was the promise one which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee?

'(2) Did the promise induce such action or forbearance?

'(3) Can injustice be avoided only by enforcement of the promise?' Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, Inc., supra, p. 698, 133 N.W.2d p. 275.

That all of these questions can be answered affirmatively is evident from the face of the complaint. Plaintiff alleged that he was promised full-time permanent employment in consideration of giving up his farming operations. He also alleges that he thereupon gave up his farming operations at great financial loss. It is apparent that the plaintiff alleges that his action was not only induced by the defendant's promise, but was the conduct that was specifically required as the condition of the defendant's promise. In light of all the circumstances, the sale of the livestock, the leasing of the barn, and putting the farm into the feed-grain program were all acts which the promisor should reasonably have expected that his promise would induce. We would not hesitate to apply the doctrine of promissory estoppel under these facts if justice required it. Justice, however, does not require the invocation of the doctrine, for the promise of the defendant was kept, and this court is not required, therefore, to enforce it.

The defendant's promise was that of 'permanent employment.' We conclude that the employment relationship that was established as the result of the defendant's inducements and the plaintiff's conduct is properly denominated as permanent employment. The plaintiff, in his brief, gives us the accepted and usual definition of what is meant by that term:

'* * * the assumption will be that, even though the parties speak in terms of permanent employment, the parties have in mind merely the ordinary business contract for a continuing employment, terminable at the will of either party.' 56 C.J.S. Master and Servant § 8, p. 78.

We concur with plaintiff's conclusion in that respect.

Generally speaking, a contract for permanent employment, for life employment, or for other terms purporting permanent employment, where the employee furnishes no consideration additional to the services incident to the employment, amounts to an indefinite general hiring terminable at the will of either party, and a discharge without cause does not constitute a breach of such contract justifying week, or month. Annot. (1917), 11 A.L.R. A.L.R. 1432, (1941) 135 A.L.R. 646. The same is true where the contract of hiring specifies no term of duration but fixes compensation at a certain amount per day, week, or month. Annot. (1917), 11 A.L.R. 469, (1934) 100 A.L.R. 834. Although not absolute, the above stated rule appears to be in the nature of a strong presumption in favor of a contract terminable at will unless the terms of the contract or other circumstances clearly manifest the parties' intent to bind each other. The presumption is grounded on a policy that it would otherwise be unreasonable for a man to bind himself permanently to a position, thus eliminating the possibility of later improving that position. Moreover, a contract of permanent employment is by its very nature indefinite, and thus any effort to interpret the duration of the contract and assess the amount of damages becomes difficult. Wisconsin has aligned itself with the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions that have adopted the above stated principles. Kovachik v. American Automobile ass'n (1958), 5 Wis.2d 188, 92 N.W.2d 254; Brown v. Oneida Knitting Mills (1938), 226 Wis. 662, 277 N.W. 653; Saylor v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank (1937), 224 Wis. 511, 272 N.W. 369; koskey v. Harnischfeger Corp. (1936), 221 Wis. 267, 265 N.W. 583; Brooks v. National Equipment Corp. (1932), 209 Wis. 198, 244 N.W. 598; Milwaukee Corrugating Co. v. Krueger (1924), 184 Wis. 139, 198 N.W. 394.

We thus conclude that the most that was promised by Sears was employment terminable at will. This promise was carried out when the plaintiff was hired as the...