Koss v. City of Cedar Rapids, 63421

Decision Date14 January 1981
Docket NumberNo. 63421,63421
Citation300 N.W.2d 153
PartiesMary KOSS, Appellant, v. CITY OF CEDAR RAPIDS, Iowa, et al., and Orlie J. Workman, Sheriff of Linn County, Iowa, Kenneth L. Perry, Jr., Clerk of Linn County District Court, Appellees.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

John D. Randall, Jr., and Ronald W. Wendt, Cedar Rapids, for appellant.

David F. McGuire, City Atty., Cedar Rapids, for appellees.

Considered by REYNOLDSON, C. J., and LeGRAND, UHLENHOPP, McCORMICK and LARSON, JJ.

LARSON, Justice.

We granted further review of the court of appeals' decision in this case to address one specific issue: Does an application for interlocutory appeal under Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 2 deprive the district court of jurisdiction to dismiss a case under Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 215.1? The district court ruled the action was dismissed, by operation of rule 215.1, during the pendency of the application. The court of appeals reversed. We vacate the decision of the court of appeals and affirm the district court.

The underlying controversy involved the condemnation by the City of Cedar Rapids of land owned by Mary Koss, who appealed the condemnation award to the district court as provided by section 472.22, The Code 1973. That action was filed in July, 1974; in 1976 notice was mailed by the clerk of district court, under rule 215.1, that the case was subject to dismissal if not disposed of or continued before January 1, 1977. In response to that notice the parties stipulated the case should be continued past the deadline, and an order was entered that the case be "continued over the term for trial or other disposition during the year of 1977."

Koss filed a motion for summary judgment, which was overruled on October 18, 1977. She then sought permission to appeal that ruling under appellate rule 2, by an application filed on November 17, 1977. Again a rule-215.1 notice had been sent by the clerk, stating the case was subject to dismissal if not tried prior to January 1, 1978. No order of continuance was entered in response to the 1977 notice. The interlocutory appeal was granted by an order of the supreme court on January 6, 1978. In the meantime, the clerk had affixed a rubber-stamped notation to the case, on December 30, 1977 (the last business day of the year), showing the case was dismissed under rule 215.1. Upon learning that the interlocutory appeal was granted, the clerk later crossed out the notation of dismissal. The interlocutory appeal was presented to this court and the order denying summary judgment was affirmed. Koss v. City of Cedar Rapids, 271 N.W.2d 730 (Iowa 1978). After the case was remanded for trial it was set for pre-trial conference. At that time, counsel for the city advised Koss' counsel that it would be asserting the case had been dismissed as of December 31, 1977, and was no longer viable. Koss then filed this action seeking a declaration of the status of the case. The district court held the case was dismissed under rule 215.1 as of December 31, 1977, and, the six-month time limit for reinstatement having passed, the case could not be prosecuted.

The court of appeals, in a three-to-two decision, reversed, holding that Koss' application for permission to appeal under appellate rule 2 "may reasonably be found to have transferred jurisdiction of the matter to the supreme court when it was filed on November 17, 1977." It further observed that the purpose of rule 215.1, to assure timely and diligent prosecution of cases, had not been frustrated because Koss was prosecuting the case in "a timely, diligent fashion."

I. Effect of application for interlocutory appeal.

Appellate rule 2 provides:

(a) Any party aggrieved by an interlocutory ruling or decision ... may apply to the supreme court or any justice thereof to grant an appeal in advance of final judgment. Such appeal may be granted, after service of the application and hearing as provided in rules 22 and 30, rules of appellate procedure, on finding that such ruling or decision involves substantial rights and will materially affect the final decision and that a determination of its correctness before trial on the merits will better serve the interests of justice.

(b) The order granting such appeal may be on terms advancing it for prompt submission. It shall stay further proceedings below and may require bond.

Iowa R.App.P. 2. Appellate rule 6 provides:

(b) An interlocutory appeal under rule 2, rules of appellate procedure, shall be deemed taken and perfected when the order allowing it is filed with the clerk of the supreme court. No notice of such appeal is necessary. The time for any further proceeding on such appeal which would run from the notice of appeal shall run from the date such order is so filed. The clerk of the supreme court shall promptly transmit a copy of such order to the attorneys of record and the clerk of the trial court.

Iowa R.App.P. 6(b) (emphasis added).

Koss concedes that an interlocutory appeal is perfected only when permission is granted, and that the district court continued to maintain "at least some jurisdiction" until the order granting the interlocutory appeal was entered on January 6, 1978. She argues, however, that the supreme court also had some jurisdiction during the pendency of the application for discretionary review. Relying on the general principle that jurisdiction simply means the power to hear and determine an issue, City of Ames v. Olsen, 253 Iowa 983, 986, 114 N.W.2d 904, 906 (1962), she asserts that power, and hence jurisdiction, was exercised by the supreme court in this case by entering preliminary orders setting times for hearing, denying oral argument, extending time to file briefs, and making the decision whether to grant permission to appeal. Proceeding from this premise that both courts have "some" jurisdiction during the pendency of an application for discretionary appeal she argues that the district court could take no action "which would defeat the purpose or the subject matter of the supreme court's jurisdiction." Dismissal under rule 215.1, she claims, would be such action, because it "would be directly contrary to the exercise of the supreme court's jurisdiction and would serve to defeat it."

A concept of divided jurisdiction in such cases is generally recognized. One authority has said that

(j)urisdiction as to the entire cause is not transferred in an appellate proceeding for the review of an incidental or interlocutory matter, but the trial court or parties may still proceed in matters not involved in the appeal and which are entirely collateral to the part of the case taken up; and the appellate court is without power to make any orders in the cause except with respect to the particular order appealed from. An appeal from an order on a motion brings up only the motion together with copies of papers on which it is founded, but does not bring up the action.

* * *

* * *

Furthermore, the lower court cannot proceed in such manner as to lead to a decision, pending the appeal, of the very question involved on the appeal, or of a question which cannot...

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