Kost v. Signal Lake Operations, LLC
| Decision Date | 03 January 2018 |
| Docket Number | FSTCV156025957S |
| Court | Connecticut Superior Court |
| Parties | Robert KOST v. SIGNAL LAKE OPERATIONS, LLC |
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
This is a lawsuit in which each of eight plaintiffs claims that the defendants owe the plaintiff substantial sums of money- hundreds of thousands of dollars if not into seven figures. See, e.g., # 101.00, the application for a prejudgment remedy in which individualized claims are recited.
Currently before the court is the plaintiffs’ application to cite in a new defendant, based on a claim of fraudulent conveyance of property by the individual defendant to the proposed defendant. The defendants have filed an objection (# 159.00) and the motion has appeared on a calendar as a non-arguable matter.
As recited in the motion, as well as the record before the court, certain facts are necessary for an understanding of the issue, and its timing. The individual defendant was served with suit papers, commencing this proceeding, in July 2015. In that same month- on July 7, 2015- the individual defendant quitclaimed real property to his wife, but the deed was not recorded on the land records until almost 3 weeks later, two days after the defendant actually had been served with the process commencing this action. Approximately one year later, in connection with discovery related to assets subject to an order of attachment, the individual defendant denied having transferred any property in a period of time that encompassed July 2015. Approximately one year later, in August 2017, the defendant acknowledged in a deposition that he had, in fact, executed a quitclaim deed in favor of his wife, in July 2015. That appears to have precipitated the motion currently before the court.
As noted, currently before the court is the plaintiffs’ application to cite in the individual defendant’s wife as a party, for purposes of asserting a claim of fraudulent conveyance. The defendants have objected to the motion, and the matter appeared as a non-arguable matter on the court’s calendar for January 2, 2018. (The motion was filed on December 11, 2017 and the objection was filed on December 29 2017.)
In support of their objection, the defendants have cited a number of authorities, but those authorities are generally inapposite. None of the cases cited appear to stand for the proposition that the defendants ultimately are implicitly arguing- that it would be improper if not error for the court to grant the motion. The court will address the issues and authorities cited in the defendants’ objection, roughly in the order presented.
The defendants cite and discuss In re Devon B., 264 Conn. 572 (2003). The decision includes a discussion of the proper characterization of a party as a necessary party, eventually concluding that the trial court had erred by failing to cite in a necessary party. This case, however, does not involve a failure to cite in a necessary party, nor is it necessary (as will be discussed below) for the proposed defendant to be characterized as a necessary party. Therefore, other than a general discussion of citing in necessary parties, the case sheds no light on the issue before the court.
The defendants also cite and rely upon a trial court decision Yoshu, LLC v. Ward, No. HHDCV095033580S, 2010 WL 3448065, at *7 (Conn.Super.Ct. Aug. 6, 2010), but in that case, it was the defendant who sought to compel parties to be brought in, over the objection of the plaintiff. Not only is the case procedurally distinct for that reason, but the decision also rejects the notion that the only relevant standard to be applied by the court relates to whether a party is necessary (or arguably as an extension indispensable).
Since the proposed defendants are not necessary parties to this action, the Court now addresses the issue of whether it should exercise its discretion to make them parties to this proceeding anyway. It is well established that, pursuant to section 52-102(1), the trial court has discretion to decide whether to allow the addition of a party to pending legal proceedings where that party is not a necessary party. See A. Secondino & Son, Inc. v. LoRicco, 19 Conn.App. 8, 14, 561 A.2d 142 (1989).[2]
The defendants also cite Jordaan v. Wayland, No. CV065004384, 2007 WL 3317678, at *2 (Conn.Super.Ct. Oct. 22, 2007), claiming that it contains the following statement: " It is true that there may be a cause of action by the present defendants against the parties to be cited in, but those interests are separable from those of the parties before the court." Aside from the fact that the paragraph contained that quote commences with the recognition that " [i]t is very clear that this court has wide discretion to decide this motion, " the defendants fail to note a critical procedural aspect of the case/decision- trial was already well underway when the court issued this decision. The court’s comments about the lack of necessity of bringing in additional parties, then, undoubtedly was heavily influenced by the fact that there is a recitation that there already had been some 35 days or more of trial, as of the date of this decision.
The defendants then cite Nadler v. Goldberg, J.D. New Haven, CV94 0355747, 1994 WL 385962, at *1 (Conn.Super.Ct. July 15, 1994), for the proposition that " [w]here the interests of a proposed added party are separable from those of the parties before the court, so that the court can proceed to a decree and to complete and final justice without affecting other persons not before the court, joinder is not appropriate, " in turn referencing Sturman v. Socha, 191 Conn. 1, 6-7 (1983), as authority. The language is there, but the context tells a different story- in both cases.
In Nadler, the quoted language is in response to the essentially conclusory but unsupported contention that the prospective party was necessary. The language of the decision in this regard is particularly telling:
The plaintiff claims in support of his motion to cite in Fiorello Barucca as an additional defendant, that he is a party necessary for complete determination of the issues involved in his dispute with the defendant. The proposed complaint against Barucca does not claim that he had an interest in the realty partnership at issue in the action for an accounting but asserts that Goldberg gave Barucca the use of funds converted by Goldberg from assets of the realty partnership. The proposed complaint against Barucca does not allege that he currently holds funds belonging to the realty partnership, nor does it allege that Barucca was the recipient of a fraudulent conveyance. Basically, the proposed claim of conspiracy against Barucca concerns allegations of what Goldberg did with assets of the partnership. (Emphasis added.)
As reflected by the emphasized language, the presence of a claim of fraudulent transfer might have (likely would have?) resulted in a different outcome.
Sturman v. Socha, 191 Conn. 1, 6-7 (1983), is referenced as authority in the Nadler decision, but again the context is highly distinguishable, Putting aside that the language relied upon in Nadler was part of a discussion of claimed status as a necessary or perhaps even indispensable party, the issue on appeal was not in the context of the discretion inherent in a decision as to whether to add a party, but rather was in the context of what amounted to a request for a continuance when the case had been reached for trial. As if that were not enough of a contextual distinction, the proposed party had already been the subject of a motion to be added as a party, which had been granted, but due to delays and difficulties in seeking the actual addition of the party (the State), the continuance had been requested. Other than recognizing that the trial court, if it had had better information when the motion to add the party was before it, might not have chosen to grant the motion, the decision has little relevance to a decision as to whether to grant a motion at this time, in this context.
Far closer to the situation at hand is Grasso Associates Financial Planning v. Horvath, No. NNHCV126030337S, 2015 WL 2167180, at *2 (Conn.Super.Ct. Apr. 9, 2015). The court in Grasso did deny an application to add a party based on a claim of fraudulent conveyance, but there are at least two highly significant distinctions. First, in Grasso, there was a serious question as to mootness as the alleged transferee " [argued] in her memorandum that the issues regarding the alleged fraudulent transfers have...
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