Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank
| Decision Date | 19 May 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. 81 CV 5018 (RJD).,81 CV 5018 (RJD). |
| Parties | Carolee KOSTER, Plaintiff, v. The CHASE MANHATTAN BANK and Allan Ross, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Carolee Koster, New York City, pro se.
Proskauer, Rose, Goetz & Mendelsohn, and Milgrim, Thomajan & Lee, P.C., New York City, for defendants.
The instant action was commenced in 1981. During the course of pre-trial litigation, many issues were vigorously contested before three District Court Judges and a Magistrate. On March 23, 1988, a 10 day bench trial commenced during which 16 witnesses, including plaintiff and defendant Ross, testified.
After weighing all the evidence, including resolving issues of credibility, the Court finds the plaintiff has failed to convince this Court of the merits of her case. Accordingly, all of plaintiffs claims are dismissed as to both defendants.
1. Plaintiff Carolee Koster is a female, and was an employee, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f), of the Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., from 1973 until 1980.
2. Defendant, The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. ("Chase" or the "Bank") is a national banking association with its principal office in New York, New York. Defendant Chase is engaged in an industry that affects commerce and employs more than 15 employees and is an employer within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b).
3. Defendant Allan S. Ross, was a Vice-President of Chase from October 1978 until January 1981.
4. On or about September 25, 1980, plaintiff filed a discrimination charge with the New York Commission of Human Rights and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). She alleged violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq.; the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d); and various pendant claims under the laws of the State and City of New York. During the course of pre-trial litigation, all of the claims except the Title VII claims alleging disparate treatment and sexual harassment were dismissed. (See ¶ 9, infra).
5. In the agency charge, plaintiff did not name Allan Ross as a defendant, nor did she allege sexual harassment by him.
6. A right-to-sue letter was issued on or about June 5, 1981, without a determination on the merits.
7. On or about August 12, 1981, plaintiff commenced the instant action. In her Complaint, she alleged for the first time she had been sexually harassed by defendant Ross.
8. Plaintiff has not alleged sexual discrimination by any Chase employee other than defendant Ross.
9. The specific claims remaining in this action are:
A. Disparate Treatment: Salary. Plaintiff alleges she was discriminatorily denied salary increases throughout her employment at Chase.
B. Disparate Treatment: "Transfer." Plaintiff alleges that in 1979 and 1980, defendant Chase denied her a transfer to another department within the Bank but allowed similarly situated males to transfer. The only position plaintiff identifies with any specificity to which she was denied a transfer is the Human Resources "Generalist" or "Executive"1 position in the Real Estate Finance Department. Testimony of plntf.
C. Sexual Harassment: Quid Pro Quo. Plaintiff asserts that defendant Ross demanded and received sexual favors from her in exchange for employment security and benefits. She further contends that when she refused to continue providing sexual favors, defendant Ross caused her to be denied salary increases and a transfer to another department within the Bank, and that he was instrumental in the termination of her employment.
D. Sexual Harassment: Hostile Environment. Plaintiff claims defendant Ross subjected her to a campaign of abuse in retaliation for the cessation of their sexual relationship, that he treated her in an abusive and demeaning way in the workplace.
10. Plaintiff was hired by Chase in October 1973 as the Evening Coordinator of the Learning Center.
11. In late 1973, plaintiff became a training analyst in the Operations Department.
12. In November 1975, plaintiff was promoted to senior training analyst. Subsequently, her duties included the development and execution of communications designed to explain the Integrated Product and Process Measurement and Improvement Program ("IPPMIP") to Bank personnel.
13. In November 1976, plaintiff was promoted to Assistant Treasurer, level 7, at a salary of $18,000. Assistant Treasurer is the first officer level position at the Bank.
14. In April 1977, plaintiff was transferred to the Corporate Human Resources Department ("CHR"). The CHR department had overall responsibility for the personnel activities of Chase, including, inter alia, compensation, benefits, organization planning, staffing, training and development, and employee relations.
15. From 1975 until 1984, Alan F. Lafley, Executive Vice-President, was the head of the CHR department and the Human Resources function throughout the Bank.
16. From April 1977 until November 1978, plaintiff reported to Luke Carbone, Jr., as did her co-worker William Gilbert. During this period, plaintiff's principal duties were to write personnel policies.
17. In June 1977, plaintiff's salary was increased to $19,800.
18. In June 1978, plaintiff's salary was increased to $22,800 (a 15.2% increase within a 12 month period).
19. Effective August 1, 1978, plaintiff was promoted to Second Vice-President, level 8.
20. In October 1978, defendant Allan S. Ross, who was hired by and reported to Alan F. Lafley, began working at Chase as Vice-President for Human Resources Planning, Programs and Systems. (See ¶ 66, infra).
21. In November 1978, plaintiff's unit was transferred and became one of defendant Ross' supervisory responsibilities. At that time, plaintiff was assigned to a task force headed by defendant Ross, the purpose of which was to identify and analyze the current structure of the Human Resources. Testimony of def. Ross, plntf.
22. In January 1979, plaintiff began reporting directly to defendant Ross.
23. In early 1979, plaintiff was appointed Manager of Human Resources Staffing and Development, although no corporate title change occurred at that time. Plaintiff assumed responsibility for staffing Human Resources positions at the Assistant Treasurer and Second Vice-President levels. Additionally, she assisted defendant Ross in staffing Human Resources positions at the Vice-President level.
24. In February 1979, Mr. Lafley authorized a salary increase for plaintiff from $22,800 to $25,000 (a 9.6% increase within a 12 month period).
25. In March 1979, plaintiff assumed the additional duty of assisting defendant Ross in budgeting activities. Plaintiff's new duty included the collection of data relating to the annual budget for the CHR department and all Human Resources components throughout the Bank.
26. Subsequently, plaintiff was relieved of her budgeting duties.
27. In August 1979, at the recommendation of defendant Ross, Mr. Lafley promoted plaintiff to Vice-President, level 11.
28. At the time defendant Ross recommended plaintiff's promotion to Vice-President, level 11, he also recommended that her salary be increased to the minimum salary for a level 11 at the time. Mr. Lafley did not approve the recommended increase; instead, he authorized an increase to $26,900. This represented a 17.9% increase within a 12 month period and was the maximum permitted under Chase's compensation guidelines. Testimony of Lafley, def. Ross. (See ¶ 35, 39, infra).
29. In February 1980, 6 months after her August 1979 increase, Mr. Lafley, at defendant Ross' recommendation, increased plaintiff's salary to $29,000 (a 7.8% increase within a 12 month period).
30. In late March or early April 1980, plaintiff was offered but refused a position in which she was to report to Neil Owen, a Vice-President, level 11, within CHR. Testimony of Lafley, Owen, def. Ross.
31. On or about July 25, 1980, plaintiff was advised by Mr. Lafley that there was no position available for which she was qualified, other than the position reporting to Owen. Accordingly, Mr. Lafley informed plaintiff that effective July 31, 1980, her employment with Chase was terminated. (See ¶¶ 81-89, infra). Her benefits were continued through October 31, 1980. (See ¶¶ 92-93, infra).
32. Officer titles were related to salary grades by means of level designation. Within each title was one or more levels with a concomitant salary range. An Assistant Treasurer was a level 7; a Second Vice-President could be a level 8, 9 or 10; and a Vice-President could be a level 11 through 16. Testimony of Lafley, plntf.
33. Each level was correlated with a salary range. Each salary range had a minimum, midpoint, and maximum salary. The salary ranges for a given level may overlap with the range for the previous or the succeeding level.
34. An individual's salary was indexed at 1.00 to the midpoint of the salary range. The relationship of the individual's salary to the corresponding point on the salary range is referred to as a "compa-ratio." Thus, the compa-ratio for a salary at the midpoint of the salary range for a given level was 1.00; the compa-ratio for the minimum salary of that range was .80; and the compa-ratio for the maximum salary of that range was 1.2.
35. Chase's compensation guidelines in 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979 and 1980 imposed 2 restrictions on salary increases: (a) an officer could not receive a salary increase sooner than 6 months after his/her last increase; (b) an aggregate salary increase could not exceed 18% within a 12 month period without special approval of Chase's Chief Executive Officer or a member of the management committee. Testimony of Lafley.
36. Title, level, and salary decisions were made separately. Thus, a promotion in title or level was not necessarily accompanied by an immediate salary increase. Testimony of Lafley, def. Ross.
37....
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