Kott v. State
| Decision Date | 15 January 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. BS-67,BS-67 |
| Citation | 518 So.2d 957,13 Fla. L. Weekly 213 |
| Parties | 13 Fla. L. Weekly 213 Douglas KOTT, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Gwendolyn Spivey Lanier, Orlando, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Bradford L. Thomas, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.
The appellant raises three issues in this criminal appeal, contending that the trial court reversibly erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal, in refusing to instruct the jury as to his theory of the case, and in summarily denying his pro se motion to dismiss court-appointed counsel. We affirm as to all three issues, but address only the third issue on appeal, considering the first two without merit.
The appellant was charged with inmate possession of contraband, to wit: a weapon. Before trial the appellant moved to dismiss his court-appointed attorney. 1 On the day of the trial, the court, after acknowledging that it had seen the appellant's motion to dismiss his counsel, then inquired, "Do you have any comments you wish to make other than or in addition to those contained in the motion?" Upon appellant's negative response, the court denied the motion, and appellant proceeded to trial with his attorney and was found guilty of the offense charged.
The appellant argues that the trial court's failure to make an adequate inquiry as to the grounds for his motion to dismiss counsel denied him his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel and was therefore fundamental error. We disagree. Although it is well settled that when a defendant voices a seemingly substantial complaint about counsel, the court should make a thorough inquiry concerning the reasons for a defendant's dissatisfaction, Hudson v. Rushen, 686 F.2d 826 (9th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 916, 103 S.Ct. 1896, 77 L.Ed.2d 285 (1983); McKee v. Harris, 649 F.2d 927 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 917, 102 S.Ct. 1773, 72 L.Ed.2d 177 (1982), the trial court's failure to make a thorough inquiry and thereafter deny the motion for substitution of counsel is, however, not in and of itself a Sixth Amendment violation. In determining whether an abuse of discretion warranting reversal has occurred, an appellate court must consider several factors, in addition to the adequacy of the trial court's inquiry regarding the defendant's complaint, including as well whether the motion was timely made, and if the conflict was so great as to result in a total lack of communication preventing an adequate defense. United States v. Allen, 789 F.2d 90 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 846, 107 S.Ct. 164, 93 L.Ed.2d 103 (1986).
In the present case, the record reflects that defendant's motion to dismiss counsel was timely filed before trial. Although the trial court's inquiry as to the grounds stated for discharge was not extensive, the court acknowledged receipt of the motion and gave defendant an opportunity to argue the motion further. When the appellant did not respond, the motion was denied. The most important circumstance militating in favor of affirmance, however, is the fact that the appellant proceeded to trial with his court-appointed counsel, and made no additional attempt to dismiss counsel or request self-representation. Similarly, there is no evidence in the record of any conflict or lack of communication during the trial between appellant and his attorney that would support a finding that the appellant did not receive an adequate defense. Thus, based on the record at bar, we conclude that the trial court's failure to conduct a more extensive inquiry regarding the merits of the motion to discharge did not violate the appellant's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, and was at most harmless only. See McKee v. Harris, (where failure to inquire causes the defendant no harm, such procedural irregularity cannot by itself be a basis for granting a writ of habeas corpus); United States v. Morrissey, 461 F.2d 666 (2d Cir.1972) (); State v. Green, 476 So.2d 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (...
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Mitchell v. State, 95-2671
...to trial with appointed counsel and made no additional attempt to dismiss his attorney or to seek self-representation. Kott v. State, 518 So.2d 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988). As his second claim of error, Mitchell asserts that the prosecutor made improper burden-shifting comments during closing a......
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Wilder v. State, s. 89-205 and 89-593
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Savala v. State
...89 L.Ed.2d 345 (1984); Ferguson v. State, 417 So.2d 639 (Fla.1982); Parrish v. State, 90 Fla. 25, 105 So. 130 (1925); Kott v. State, 518 So.2d 957 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Johnson v. State, 486 So.2d 657 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); Fratello v. State, 496 So.2d 903 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986); State v. Green, ......
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