Kozak v. Ake

• Decision Date: 17 June 1941
• Citation: 3 So.2d 120,147 Fla. 508
• Parties: KOZAK et al. v. AKE et al. KOZAK v. SAME.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

3 So.2d 120

147 Fla. 508

KOZAK et al. v. AKE et al.

KOZAK v. SAME.

Florida Supreme Court

June 17, 1941

Horn & Ossinsky, of Daytona Beach, for plaintiffs in error.

P. W Harvey, of Daytona Beach, and Marks, Marks, Holt, Gray &amp Yates, of Jacksonville, for defendants in error.

ADAMS, Circuit Judge.

This appeal represents a consolidation of two cases involving the same state of facts, and is from adverse judgments against the plaintiffs in error after trial of the causes in the Court below.

The record shows that the litigation arose out of an automobile accident at a time when Mrs. Kozak and Mrs. Helen H. Mazur were riding as guests in the automobile of Mrs. Ake, of which she was the driver. Mrs. Kozak was injured, as was also Mrs. Mazur, and each, together with their husbands, sought recovery of damages from Mrs. Ake and her husband therefor. The causes of action are predicated on the provisions of Chapter 18033 Laws of Florida, Acts of 1937, and commonly known as the 'Automobile Guest Statute.' The pertinent portion of which, to this case, is as follows:

'Section 1. That no person, transported by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle as his guest or passenger, without payment for such transportation, shall have a cause of action for damages against such owner or operator for injury, death or loss, in case of accident, unless such accident shall have been caused by the gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct of the owner or operator of such motor vehicle and unless such gross negligence or wilful and wanton misconduct was the proximate cause of the injury, death or loss for which the action is brought, provided that the question or issue of negligence, gross negligence, and wilful or wanton misconduct, and the question of proximate cause, and the issue or question of assumed risk, shall in all such cases be solely for the jury.'

It is, therefore clear from even a casual reading of above quoted statute that the legislature fully intended to severely limit the right of automobile guest to sue the host for damages in case of an accident, and that such action could only be successfully maintained when the operator or driver of the car in which the guest was riding, was guilty of the highest degree of negligence or misconduct, and even then recovery could not be had unless such negligence or misconduct was the proximate cause of any injury sustained. It is also clear that the Legislature fully intended for the jury in such cases to be the sole judges of the facts as to all such matters, and that it was the clear legislative...