Kozinski v. Schmidt

• Decision Date: 28 July 1977
• Docket Number: No. 75-C-650.,75-C-650.
• Citation: 436 F. Supp. 201
• Parties: Donald KOZINSKI, and Kathleen Kozinski, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Wilbur J. SCHMIDT et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Wisconsin

436 F. Supp. 201

Donald KOZINSKI, and Kathleen Kozinski, Individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. Wilbur J. SCHMIDT et al., Defendants.

No. 75-C-650.

United States District Court, E. D. Wisconsin.

July 28, 1977.

Anne L. DeLeo, Steven H. Steinglass, Milwaukee Legal Services, Milwaukee, Wis., for plaintiffs.

Bronson C. LaFollette, Atty. Gen. by Maureen A. McGlynn and Ward L. Johnson, Jr., Madison, Wis., for defendants.

Before WOOD, Circuit Judge, and REYNOLDS and GORDON, District Judges.

DECISION and ORDER

I. INTRODUCTION

The plaintiffs and the defendants have filed cross-motions for summary judgment. This is a class action brought by individuals who were denied benefits under the Wisconsin emergency assistance program against the secretary of the Wisconsin department of health and social services, his successors and agents. The plaintiffs allege that the Wisconsin program for emergency assistance, Wis. Stat. § 49.19(11)(b) (1973), as recreated by ch. 39, Laws of 1975, operates to exclude them from eligibility for emergency assistance in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs seek an injunction preventing the defendants from refusing to provide emergency assistance to the class.

The plaintiffs also contend that the Wisconsin program violates their rights under the federal emergency assistance program, 42 U.S.C. § 606(e)(1) and the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution and seek a declaration that future participation by the defendants in the federal program is illegal.

A. Statutory background

At the time this action was commenced, Wisconsin participated in the federal program of aid to families with dependent children (AFDC), 42 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq., which includes a program of emergency assistance to families with needy children, 42 U.S.C. § 606(e). The latter section

". . . authorizes emergency assistance to a needy child under 21, living with relatives specified in 42 U.S.C. § 606(a), who is without available resources, if the assistance is necessary to avoid destitution or to provide living arrangements in a home, and if the need did not arise because such child or relatives refused without good cause to accept training or employment." Mandley v. Trainor, 523 F.2d 415, 418 (7th Cir. 1975).

As a condition of receiving federal reimbursement, the states must submit plans complying with the social security act.

Wisconsin's participation in the federal emergency assistance plan began in 1973, when Wis. Stat. § 49.19(12) was created by ch. 90, Laws of 1973, § 247m. The statute established a program for AFDC recipients covering emergencies caused by "fire, flood, tornado or other natural disasters or for replacement of major household appliances when there has been a nonreparable breakdown."

In 1975, the Wisconsin legislature amended Wis. Stat. 49.19(11)(b), as follows:

"The department shall implement a program of emergency assistance to needy persons in case of fire, flood or natural disaster. Eligibility shall not exceed the limitations for federal participation defined by federal regulations, including 45 CFR 233.120. The aid granted shall not exceed $150 per family member."

This statute modified the Wisconsin program to extend assistance to all needy families with children even though ineligible for the AFDC unemployed father program. See Wis. Stat. § 49.19(4)(dm) (1973), and 42 U.S.C. § 607. The legislature rejected a proposal submitted by the governor of Wisconsin to eliminate the requirement that emergencies arise from fire, flood, or natural disaster. Assembly Bill 222, section 376, January 28, 1975.

B. Facts

The facts are undisputed. The named plaintiffs, Donald and Kathleen Kozinski, have nine children. At the commencement of this action, Donald Kozinski was temporarily unable to work for medical reasons, forcing the Kozinski family to rely on other limited sources of income. Gas service to the Kozinski home had been disconnected, and the gas company had informed the Kozinski family that service would not be restored unless they complied with a payment schedule imposed to eliminate arrearages and assure future payments. The Kozinskis were also served with a five-day notice to quit or pay back rent in the amount of $660.00 shortly after this action was filed.

Because the Kozinskis were financially unable to pay these bills, they were without heat in their home and were under the threat of eviction in November, 1975. They then requested that the Milwaukee county department of public welfare provide them with emergency assistance to forestall the threatened eviction and to restore gas service for their home. Since, apparently, their situation did not occur as a direct result of fire, flood or natural disaster, the Kozinskis were told they were ineligible to receive assistance under the Wisconsin emergency assistance program. The plaintiffs then commenced this action.

In a decision and order dated December 11, 1975, a single-judge court certified the following plaintiff class:

"All needy families with children in Wisconsin who are otherwise eligible to receive emergency assistance but who have been, are being and will be denied such emergency assistance to maintain or to restore their heat and utility services or to avoid eviction from their homes."

Relying on Mandley v. Trainor, 523 F.2d 415 (7th Cir. 1975) (Mandley I), the court entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting the defendants from limiting emergency assistance for the plaintiffs and their class to instances of emergency occasioned by fire, flood or natural disaster while accepting federal reimbursement pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 606(e)(1). The court also specified that "nothing in the order shall restrict the defendants' ability to modify or rescind its participation in the federal emergency assistance program . . . ." Kozinski v. Schmidt, 409 F.Supp. 215, 218-19 (E.D.Wis. 1975).

The defendants subsequently decided to withdraw from the federal emergency assistance program and forego further federal funding rather than expand the state program's coverage to be consistent with the preliminary injunction. The defendants then moved to dismiss the action on the ground that withdrawal from the federal program rendered the action moot. In a decision and order dated August 13, 1976, the single-judge court denied the defendants' motion on the ground that the plaintiffs' action also challenged the state program on Fourteenth Amendment equal protection grounds. Since the plaintiffs sought injunctive relief against a state statute on constitutional grounds, a three-judge court was convened on August 16, 1976. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2284.

II. SUMMARY JUDGMENT

A. Equal protection

The preliminary injunction was issued based on the probability of the plaintiffs' success on the merits of their statutory claim. In accordance with the practice of avoiding constitutional questions where a non-constitutional ground exists for resolving the case, Mandley I, supra, at 419, the merits of the equal protection aspects of the plaintiffs' case were not discussed in either of the earlier decisions. Because of the defendants' withdrawal from the federal program, the defendants have been able to withhold emergency assistance from the plaintiffs and still remain entirely consistent with the injunction. Consequently, the primary focus of the parties' briefs on the present motions has shifted to the equal protection claim.

We enter upon an examination of this claim cognizant of the standard for reviewing state social welfare legislation set forth in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970):

"In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification has some `reasonable basis,' it does not offend the Constitution simply because the classification `is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.' Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78, 31 S.Ct. 337, 55 L.Ed. 369. `The problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations —illogical, it may be, and unscientific.' Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69-70, 33 S.Ct. 441, 57 L.Ed. 730. `A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.' McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393."

The Court has reaffirmed that Dandridge governs the disposition of constitutional challenges to social welfare legislation. Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 95 S.Ct. 2457, 45 L.Ed.2d 522 (1975). Accordingly, we must afford considerable discretion to legislative choices in this field. Fisher v. Secretary of Dept. of Health, Education & Welfare, 522 F.2d 493 (7th Cir. 1975).

The plaintiffs argue that the defendants have no reasonable basis for extending emergency assistance to victims of fire, flood, or other natural disasters but denying it to families threatened with eviction and utility termination. It is asserted that the plaintiffs are faced with an immediate crisis that threatens the safety and security of their home, and therefore they have the same basic needs that eligible families have.

The defendants' position is that it is permissible for the legislature to create a limited welfare program because of the limitation on available state funds. The defendants contend that the legislature made a reasonable policy decision in adopting a program designed to provide benefits for emergencies caused by natural disasters as distinguished from "emergencies brought about by the inequities of our economic system and the chronic inadequacy of individual financial resources." The defendants do not dispute that it would be...