Kozmina v. Commonwealth of Va..

• Citation: 281 Va. 347,706 S.E.2d 860
• Decision Date: 04 March 2011
• Docket Number: Record No. 092395.
• Parties: Anastasia KOZMINAv.COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.
• Court: Supreme Court of Virginia

281 Va. 347
706 S.E.2d 860

Anastasia KOZMINA
v.
COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.

Record No. 092395.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

March 4, 2011.

[706 S.E.2d 861]

Carlos E. Wall; David Bernhard (Bernhard & Gardner, Falls Church, on briefs), for appellant.Robert H. Anderson III, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Kenneth T. Cuccinelli II, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.Present: KINSER, C.J., LEMONS, GOODWYN, MILLETTE, and MIMS, JJ., and KOONTZ, S.J.^*OPINION BY Justice DONALD W. LEMONS.

[281 Va. 348] In this appeal, we consider whether the trial court erred by denying the defendant's motion to disqualify the Commonwealth's Attorney[281 Va. 349] from prosecuting a charge of first-offense refusal to take a breath test in violation of Code § 18.2–268.3.

I. Facts and Proceedings Below

Anastasia Kozmina (“Kozmina”) was tried and found guilty by the Fairfax County General District Court for refusal of a breath test in violation of Code § 18.2–268.3. She appealed the case to the Circuit Court of Fairfax County. Prior to her trial in the circuit court, Kozmina filed a motion to disqualify the Commonwealth's Attorney from prosecuting the case. Kozmina argued that Virginia law does not permit the prosecution of a first-offense refusal by the Commonwealth's Attorney and that only the Attorney General was permitted to prosecute the case. Specifically, she argued that Code § 15.2–1627 does not grant the Commonwealth's

[706 S.E.2d 862]

Attorney the statutory authority to prosecute the case because a first-offense refusal is a civil offense.¹ The trial court denied Kozmina's motion and found her guilty of refusal of a breath test in violation of Code § 18.2–268.3.

Kozmina timely filed her notice of appeal to this Court, and we granted an appeal on the following assignment of error:

1. The trial court erred in denying Ms. Kozmina's motion to remove the Assistant Commonwealth's Attorney as counsel for the Commonwealth from trial of the case.

II. Analysis A. Standard of Review

An issue of statutory interpretation is a pure question of law which we review de novo. Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007).

When the language of a statute is unambiguous, we are bound by the plain meaning of that language. Furthermore, we must give effect to the legislature's intention as expressed by the language used unless a literal interpretation of the language would result in a manifest absurdity. If a statute is subject to [281 Va. 350] more than one interpretation, we must apply the interpretation that will carry out the legislative intent behind the statute.

Id. (citations omitted). Additionally, “[t]he plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is to be preferred over any curious, narrow, or strained construction.” Meeks v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 798, 802, 651 S.E.2d 637, 639 (2007) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).B. Commonwealth's Attorneys May Prosecute First–Offense Refusal Cases Pursuant to Code § 18.2–268.3

Code § 15.2–1627(B) outlines the duties and powers of Commonwealth's and assistant Commonwealth's Attorneys generally. It declares that they

shall have the duties and powers imposed upon [them] by general law, including the duty of prosecuting all warrants, indictments or informations charging a felony, and [they] may in [their] discretion, prosecute Class 1, 2 and 3 misdemeanors, or any other violation, the conviction of which carries a penalty of...