Kraft Foods Glob. v. United Egg Producers, Inc.
| Docket Number | 11-cv-8808 |
| Decision Date | 15 September 2023 |
| Parties | KRAFT FOODS GLOBAL, INC., et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED EGG PRODUCERS, INC., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
The Court grants in part and denies in part Plaintiffs' motion in limine to exclude liability evidence after 2008 (Dckt. No. 173). The conspiracy allegedly ended in 2008 so Plaintiffs seek to draw a bright dividing line when it comes to evidence about liability.
The motion overlaps with a few other motions filed by Plaintiffs about post-2008 evidence, including a motion about state laws enacted after 2008 and a motion about Sparboe Farms. This Court already ruled on those motions. See 8/31/23 Mem. Opin. & Order (Dckt. No. 286) (state laws enacted after 2008); 8/31/23 Mem. Opin. & Order (Dckt. No. 287) (incident at Sparboe Farms). This Opinion addresses what's left.
The Court will not permit the parties to introduce evidence after 2008 to show that Defendants did not conspire to restrain trade from 1999 to 2008. Evidence after 2008 does not shed much light on why Defendants did what they did before 2008.
But Defendants may introduce post-2008 evidence to show that the UEP Certified Program had procompetitive benefits after 2008. Plaintiffs are alleging an injury and seeking damages from 2009 to 2012. So Defendants can present evidence that the UEP Certified Program had procompetitive benefits - not anticompetitive effects - from 2009 to 2012. Plaintiffs have opened the door so Defendants can walk through it.
Plaintiffs also objected to evidence from 2009 to 2012 on the grounds that the parties did not conduct discovery about that period. Based on this Court's understanding of what took place in the MDL, Plaintiffs have had a sufficient opportunity to obtain information about events after 2008. Plaintiffs have had adequate notice about what Defendants seek to present. And Plaintiffs put the post-2008 period in play by seeking damages after 2008.
The parties also discuss a few dozen documents from the post-2008 period in the abstract, but the Court will reserve a ruling on those documents until trial. The Court will call balls and strikes, but wants to see the pitches first.
This case is about an alleged conspiracy to limit the supply of eggs. Plaintiffs Kraft Foods Global, Inc., The Kellogg Co. General Mills, Inc., and Nestle USA, Inc., are global food processing companies. They purchase eggs for use as ingredients in the foods that they manufacture. They're big egg buyers.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants United Egg Producers, Inc. (“UEP”), United States Egg Marketers, Inc., Cal-Maine Foods, Inc., and Rose Acre Farms, Inc. conspired to limit egg production. See Joint Status Report, at 2 (Dckt. No. 234). From a supply-and-demand perspective, less production meant higher prices.
The Court has summarized the procedural history and Plaintiffs' allegations in greater depth in its Opinions resolving other pretrial motions. See, e.g., 8/21/23 Mem. Opin. & Order, at 2-5 (Dckt. No. 277); 8/11/23 Mem. Opin. & Order, at 2-9 (Dckt. No. 272). So, the Court will be brief.
The second amended complaint alleges that Defendants conspired to limit the supply of eggs and increase egg prices from at least 1999 through 2008. See Second Am. Cplt., at ¶ 119 (Dckt. No. 73-17). For the motion at hand, that timing is especially important. Plaintiffs allege that the conspiracy ended in 2008. But the effects of the conspiracy lasted until 2012.
Plaintiffs allege that Defendants agreed to limit egg supply through three anticompetitive practices. One of those practices involved the size of enclosures for hens, ostensibly for animal-welfare reasons.
Defendants allegedly agreed to adopt animal-welfare guidelines (known as the UEP Certified Program) that increased the size of the enclosures housing egg-laying hens. Id. at ¶¶ 120-39. According to Plaintiffs, the agreement was not based on animal welfare. Instead, it was a ruse to reduce the total space available to house egg-laying hens.
The animal-welfare guidelines allegedly reduced the total supply of eggs. Id. at ¶¶ 121-22. Less space for hens meant fewer hens. Fewer hens meant fewer eggs. And fewer eggs meant higher egg prices.
During discovery, the parties developed evidence about certain grocers' preferences for the animal-welfare guidelines in the UEP Certified Program. For example, the parties took the depositions of representatives from grocery stores and developed evidence about whether the grocers “supported or required UEP certified eggs.” See Pls.' Mtn. to Exclude Grocer Evidence, at 6 (Dckt. No. 180); see also id. at 5 nn.2-5, 6 n.6. Documents produced in discovery showed that certain grocers “required that their egg suppliers meet the UEP Guidelines.” See Defs.' Resp. to Grocer Evidence, at 7 (Dckt. No. 194).
Some of that evidence is from after 2008. See Pls.' Mtn. to Exclude Post-2008 Liability Evidence, at 9-10 (Dckt. No. 173). That is, the evidence is from after the alleged conspiracy ended.
In both trials before Judge Pratter, the plaintiffs filed motions to exclude evidence that the defendants joined the UEP Certified Program because of customer demand. See 3/22/18 Order, In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. 08-md-2002 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (Dckt. No. 1658); 9/24/19 Order, In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. 08-md-2002 (E.D. Pa. 2019) (Dckt. No. 1982). Judge Pratter denied both motions and permitted the defendants to introduce evidence of grocer demand for UEP-certified eggs. See 3/22/18 Order, In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. 08-md-2002 (E.D. Pa. 2018); 9/24/19 Order, In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. 08-md-2002 (E.D. Pa. 2019). Judge Pratter's rulings did not address the timing of the grocer-related evidence.
In the case at hand, Plaintiffs moved to exclude liability evidence after 2008, including evidence of support for and pressure to adopt the UEP Certified Program. See Pls.' Mtn. to Exclude Post-2008 Liability Evidence (Dckt. No. 173). Defendants oppose the motion. See Defs.' Resp. (Dckt. No. 195).
Trial courts have broad discretion in ruling on evidentiary issues before and during trial. See Bridgeview Health Care Ctr., Ltd. v. Clark, 816 F.3d 935, 939 (7th Cir. 2016); Whitfield v. Int'l Truck & Engine Corp., 755 F.3d 438, 447 (7th Cir. 2014). “Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not explicitly authorize in limine rulings, the practice has developed pursuant to the district court's inherent authority to manage the course of trials.” Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38, 41 n.4 (1984); see also Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 45 (2016) (“The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure set out many of the specific powers of a federal district court,” but “they are not all encompassing,” for example, they make no provision “for the power of a judge to hear a motion in limine.”).
Perry v. City of Chicago, 733 F.3d 248, 252 (7th Cir. 2013). Regardless of the Court's initial ruling on a motion in limine, the Court may adjust its ruling during the course of trial. See Farfaras v. Citizens Bank & Tr. of Chicago, 433 F.3d 558, 565 (7th Cir. 2006).
A motion in limine “is an important tool available to the trial judge to ensure the expeditious and evenhanded management of the trial proceedings.” Jonasson v. Lutheran Child & Fam. Servs., 115 F.3d 436, 440 (7th Cir. 1997). It “permits the trial judge to eliminate from further consideration evidentiary submissions that clearly ought not be presented to the jury because they clearly would be inadmissible for any purpose.” Id.
So, from the get-go, this Court underscores that the following rulings are preliminary. This Court might learn more as the case unfolds, and that additional information may change this Court's assessment of the admissibility of the evidence. But in the meantime, this Court makes the following rulings so that the parties can plan ahead and prepare for trial accordingly.
Under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, evidence is relevant if “it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence” and “the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” See Fed.R.Evid. 401; United States v. Boros, 668 F.3d 901, 907 (7th Cir. 2012). In short, Rule 401 defines relevance broadly. See United States v. Boswell, 772 F.3d 469, 475 (7th Cir. 2014). Rule 402 “provides the corollary that, with certain exceptions, ‘[r]elevant evidence is admissible' and ‘[irrelevant evidence is not admissible.'” Boros, 668 F.3d at 907.
The Court, however, may exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.” See Fed.R.Evid. 403. When considering Rule 403, courts use “a sliding scale approach: as the probative value increases, so does our tolerance of the risk of prejudice.” Whitehead v. Bond, 680 F.3d 919, 930 (7th Cir. 2012). “Evidence is unduly prejudicial if it creates a genuine risk that the emotions of the jury will be excited to irrational behavior, and the risk is disproportionate to the probative value of the offered evidence.” Morgan v. City of Chicago, 822 F.3d 317, 339 (7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
This motion is about evidence of conduct or events after 2008. A few other motions touched on specific pieces of post-...
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