Kraft v. Paul Reed Const. & Supply, Inc.

• Decision Date: 11 October 1991
• Docket Number: No. 90-1202,90-1202
• Citation: 475 N.W.2d 513,239 Neb. 257
• Parties: Arthur KRAFT, Appellee, v. PAUL REED CONSTRUCTION & SUPPLY, INC., et al., Appellants.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Page 513

475 N.W.2d 513

239 Neb. 257

Arthur KRAFT, Appellee, v. PAUL REED CONSTRUCTION & SUPPLY, INC., et al., Appellants.

No. 90-1202.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

Oct. 11, 1991.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Workers' Compensation. If a work-related injury is limited to a specific body member, a workers' compensation claimant is limited to the scheduled compensation provided under Neb.Rev.Stat. § 48-121(3) (Reissue 1988).

2. Workers' Compensation. An exception to a Neb.Rev.Stat. § 48-121(3) (Reissue 1988) specific-member injury exists when an unusual or extraordinary condition as to other members or other parts of the body has developed; in such an event, a claimant is entitled to compensation based on lost earning capacity as provided under subsection (1) or (2) of the statute.

3. Workers' Compensation. A workers' compensation claimant may be allowed compensation for neurosis if it is a proximate result of his or her injury and results in disability.

4. Workers' Compensation. In a work-related accident there is no requirement that an unusual or extraordinary condition be physical; the disabling condition must only be the proximate result of the work-related accident.

5. Workers' Compensation: Appeal and Error. Pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 48-185 (Reissue 1988), the Nebraska Supreme Court may modify, reverse, or set aside a Workers' Compensation Court decision only when (1) the compensation court acted without or in excess of its powers, (2) the judgment, order, or award was procured by fraud, (3) there is not sufficient competent evidence in the record to warrant the making of the order, judgment, or award, or (4) the findings of fact by the compensation court do not support the order or award.

6. Workers' Compensation: Appeal and Error. The findings of fact made by the Workers' Compensation Court have the same force and effect as a jury verdict in a civil case and will not be set aside unless clearly wrong.

7. Workers' Compensation: Appeal and Error. In testing the sufficiency of evidence to support findings of fact made by the Workers' Compensation Court, the evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the successful party.

8. Workers' Compensation. The Workers' Compensation Court, as the trier of fact, is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and weight to be given testimony.

9. Workers' Compensation: Appeal and Error. The Nebraska Supreme Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the Workers' Compensation Court but, rather, may simply review the decision for error.

Steven W. Olsen, of Simmons, Olsen, Ediger & Selzer, P.C., Scottsbluff, for appellants.

G. Kirk Meade, of Nichols, Douglas, Kelly and Arfmann, P.C., Scottsbluff, for appellee.

HASTINGS, C.J., and WHITE, CAPORALE, SHANAHAN, GRANT, and FAHRNBRUCH, JJ.

CAPORALE, Justice.

The defendant-appellant employer, Paul Reed Construction & Supply, Inc., and its insurer, defendant-appellant General Casualty Company, contend that the evidence does not support the 50-percent loss of earning power benefit the Nebraska Workers' Compensation Court awarded the plaintiff-appellee employee, Arthur Kraft. We affirm.

It is unquestioned that on July 14, 1987, the then 63-year-old Kraft was involved in an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment as a carpenter with Paul Reed Construction when he was kicked and punched by a fellow employee and caused to fall over a pile of lumber. As a consequence of the assault, Kraft suffered a variety of injuries, including internal bleeding, wounds to his head and to an elbow, and damage to the left bursa over the greater trochanter. The greater trochanter is the "bony prominence" of the femur, or thigh bone, which can be felt just below the beltline on the hip. The bursa is "a thin, filmy sac that acts as a lubricant or a bearing ... between bone and tendon." There is medical evidence that the permanent effects of Kraft's injuries are limited to a 10-percent permanent partial disability of his left leg. There is other medical opinion that Kraft's physical limitations amount to a 5-percent disability of the body as a whole. Because of the pain he claims to experience in his left hip and back, Kraft has not worked since the accident. In addition, he has significantly decreased his physical activity; he no longer fishes or hunts, and he avoids any exertion which requires bending, stooping, climbing, or lifting.

On December 11, 1989, approximately 2 1/2 years after the accident and only 2 days before the initial hearing in this case, Kraft, for the first and only time, consulted a psychiatrist. The psychiatrist expressed the opinion that Kraft's continued pain was caused by the conversion of his psychological trauma into physical symptoms. In this witness' words:

[S]ince [Kraft] sees things in physical terms, if his body worked he'd probably be able to say I could work and perhaps it wouldn't cause him the distress that I assume that it would. But I see so much of the secondary or accompanying psychiatric distress that I think it would be hard for him to do that with a sense of competence and confidence....

The psychiatrist described Kraft's traumatic neurosis as an "extraordinary" reaction to the stress he has faced, and concluded that Kraft's prognosis was poor, explaining that "[i]f there was good physical restoration, in my opinion, he would still need psychiatric intervention, psychotherapy medications because my experience has been there would be yet another reason why he couldn't [work] or [work] well." In the psychiatrist's opinion, not only was Kraft's self-confidence shaken, but his "defenses have basically been overwhelmed," and, as a consequence, the psychiatrist did "not see him functioning in a competitive environment or workplace, particularly considering his age."

An employment counselor concluded that Kraft could not be rehabilitated, expressing the view that Kraft "is not employable in the competitive labor market and would have a total loss of earning capacity." A physical therapist also questioned whether Kraft would ever be able to work again.

Defendants' claim of error is based on the contentions that as Kraft's permanent physical impairment is to the left leg alone, and because his complaints qualify as neither unusual nor extraordinary consequences of the injury to the leg, the resulting condition is compensable only as a partial disability of the leg as a scheduled member under the provisions of Neb.Rev.Stat. § 48-121 (Reissue 1988), and not as a disability of the body as a whole.

Section 48-121 provides that if a work-related injury is limited to a specific body member, a workers' compensation claimant is limited to the scheduled compensation provided under subsection (3) of the statute. See Yager v. Bellco Midwest, 236 Neb. 888, 464 N.W.2d 335 (1991). An exception to a subsection (3) specific-member injury exists when an unusual or extraordinary condition as to other members or other parts of the body has developed. In such an event, a claimant is entitled to compensation based on lost earning capacity as provided under subsection (1) or (2) of the statute. Jeffers v. Pappas Trucking, Inc., 198 Neb. 379, 253 N.W.2d 30 (1977). As recently observed, in the event of body-as-a-whole disabilities, the basis for compensation "is determined by the employee's diminution of employability or impairment of earning power or earning capacity, and is not necessarily determined by a physician's evaluation and assessment of the employee's loss of bodily function." Heiliger v. Walters & Heiliger Electric, Inc., 236 Neb. 459, 470, 461 N.W.2d 565, 573 (1990). However, "[g]eneral disabilities which are the normal, usual, and logical consequence of injuries to specific members" are compensable only according to the fixed statutory member schedule. Mead v. Missouri Valley Grain, Inc., 178 Neb. 553, 559, 134 N.W.2d 243, 248 (1965).

In addition to physical impairments, psychological injuries are compensable. See, Johnston v. State, 219 Neb. 457, 364 N.W.2d 1 (1985); Van Winkle v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 214 Neb. 8, 332 N.W.2d 209 (1983); Lee v. Lincoln Cleaning & Dye Works, 145 Neb. 124, 15 N.W.2d 330 (1944); Davis v. Western Electric, 210 Neb. 771, 779, 317 N.W.2d 68, 73 (1982) ("a claimant may be allowed compensation for neurosis if it is a proximate result of her injury and...