Krahn v. Goodrich

• Decision Date: 16 January 1917
• Citation: 160 N.W. 1072,164 Wis. 600
• Parties: KRAHN ET AL. v. GOODRICH.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

164 Wis. 600

160 N.W. 1072

KRAHN ET AL.

v.GOODRICH.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Jan. 16, 1917.

Appeal from a Judgment of the Circuit Court for Sauk County; James O'Neill, Circuit Judge. Reversed and remanded.

Action to enforce a lien on real estate.

The issues were decided as the following abridgment of the findings indicates:

1. April 19, 1897, Gottfreid Schiefelbein owned the SE 1/4 of SE 1/4 of section 1, town 12, range 3, east in Sauk County, Wisconsin.

2. July 5, 1883, defendant owned and sold on land contract to said Schiefelbein the west 1/2 of said southeast quarter, agreeing to deed the same to him on payment of $1,600, and interest as specified, and the vendee was thereafter in possession until said April 19th.

3. Schiefelbein died March 4, 1898, leaving a widow, Henrietta Schiefelbein.

4. April 19, 1897, Schiefelbein owed a mortgage indebtedness of $400 on the first mentioned lands and $1,600, principal and interest, on the other land.

5. On said day, he and his wife deeded said lands to their son-in-law, Frank Mittelstadt.

6. Schiefelbein left four children, Louise Mittelstadt, William Schiefelbein, Ida Oust and Amelia Krahn, who were alive April 19, 1897.

7. The deed aforesaid contained this:

“Upon the following terms and conditions--That said 2 party is to pay to first part the sum of one hundred dollars annually--in case of the death of the wife of 2nd part and 1st party shall not reside with 2 party, otherwise the sum of $25.00 shall be payable annually Dec. 1st so long as 1st parties or either of them shall live. Said 2nd party also is to pay off and discharge all indebtedness of first parties. He is also to furnish to first parties or the survivor of them with a comfortable place to live, to furnish to them with proper and sufficient provisions, with proper care and all medical treatment for them or either of them so long as they or either of them shall live and to the survivor of them and on their death to pay all necessary funeral expenses for them. That in case of the payment of $1,000 indebtedness by 2 part at the end of ten years, he shall pay to the three children of 1st party $300--in annual payments of $1,000 each.”

8. When the deed was made, Schiefelbein owed, in addition to the indebtedness aforesaid, $100 to Ferdinand Garske and $40 of small bills. Mittelstadt paid the bills, the mortgage indebtedness, and the $100, soon after he took the property. He continued in possession until September 15, 1899.

9. At the date of such deed the property was worth $4,000.

10. September 15, 1899, the grantee and his wife quit-claimed the land to Mrs. Schiefelbein.

11. September 19, 1899, she conveyed the land to defendant.

12. Thereafter the grantors conveyed unencumbered personal property, of the agreed value of $944, to Mittelstadt.

13. April 19, 1897, Ida Oust was fourteen years old and William Schiefelbein twenty-three.

14. In 1906 Ida Oust conveyed her interest in said lands to plaintiffs.

15. The three children mentioned in the first deed were Ida and plaintiffs.

16. That was conceded in the answer where it was alleged that if Mittelstadt should pay $1,000 of his grantor's indebtedness, he should pay to Ida and plaintiffs $300 in sums of $100 annually.

17. It was intended by the deed agreement that said Frank Mittelstadt, his heirs or assigns, should pay said three each $1,000, $100 to each April 19, 1907, and the same annually thereafter until each should receive $1,000.

18. The value of their lien, April 19, 1897, was $1,289.58.

19. The words “annual payments” and “$1,000 each” make impossible a construction that only $300 was to be paid each person.

21. Over $1,000 of indebtedness was paid under the deed to Mittelstadt before the ten years. $600 were paid within two years and the obligation to defendant on the land contract was discharged.

22. When the deed was made to Mittelstadt, Schiefelbein thought he would not live long.

23. The deed was recorded April 19, 1897.

24. Plaintiffs knew nothing of the conveyance by Mittelstadt until after the transaction.

25. Ida Oust did not know of such conveyance, or the one to defendant, until after they were made.

26. Plaintiffs are not estopped to assert their claim under the deed to Mittelstadt. They have continuously asserted it. No money became due them until April 19, 1907. After learning of the deed mentioned in 25, they asserted their rights and have never ceased doing so.

27. Ida Oust never waived or became estopped from asserting her rights.

28. Defendant did not at any time dispute the claims aforesaid, but sought to buy them up.

29. His possession has always been subject thereto.

30. He had notice of the claim of Ida Oust by the record of her deed to plaintiffs April 19, 1897.

31. He has had the use of the land from the date of his deed at which time seventy acres were under cultivation.

32. The rental value to September 19, 1904, was $100 per year and thereafter has been $200 per year.

33. Since he took possession, he has made permanent improvements of the value of $1,100.90.

34. He has paid $825.58 for taxes and insurance.

35. The amount due defendant on the land contract when he obtained his deed was less than on April 1, 1897.

36. He did not assume or agree to pay plaintiffs' claims.

37. They are entitled to interest at 6% on $300 from April 19, 1907, and the same subsequent payments from their due date.

38. Defendant took possession of the property with notice of the claims aforesaid, and has never evinced to plaintiffs that his possession was hostile thereto.

39. The amount Mittelstadt agreed to pay for land is not more than $2,473.

From such findings these conclusions were reached: 1. Plaintiffs have a lien on the lands for $3,000, and interest, subject to a prior lien in favor of defendant for $2,473. 2. Nine annual payments of $300 each have become due, commencing with April 19, 1907, and each draws interest as indicated in the findings. 3. They are entitled to enforce such lien by foreclosure and sale of the property. There were other conclusions as to details of the judgment and its execution and that plaintiffs were entitled to costs.

Several requests to find were made on behalf of defendant which were not embodied in the foregoing and due exceptions were taken to the refusal in respect thereto, and to many of the findings which were made.

The evidence was to the effect that the so-called conveyance of personal property was made nine days after the date of the deed and in the form of a lease to Frank Mittelstadt to have the use and benefit of the property during the life of the lessor, conditioned upon the lessee remaining upon the premises conveyed, by deed and in all things fulfilling his contract therein contained and in case of his removing from such premises or failing to perform such contract that he should deliver to the lessor and his wife, or the survivor of them, all said property, or account for and pay over that part not so delivered at the specified value, and that in case of full performance of said contract by said lessee and his remaining on the premises so long as the lessor and his wife, or either of them should live, the title to said property should vest absolutely in him, his heirs and assigns, he to have permission in the meantime to sell any of such property upon condition of replacing the same or paying the proceeds to the lessor and his wife, or the survivor of them.

Judgment was rendered according to the conclusions above indicated.James A. Stone and Henry N. Winchester, both of Reedsburg, and Olin, Butler, Stebbins & Stroud, of Madison, for appellant.

Chas. H. Stone, of Reedsburg, and Grotophorst & Thomas, of Baraboo, for respondents.

MARSHALL, J.

Many interesting questions are presented for consideration here, but, as what follows will show, we have not been able to proceed far before reaching an insuperable infirmity in the judgment.

Serious objection is made to the findings as a whole; but it does not seem necessary to deal therewith. We will consider only such features as seem to shed some light on the vital point to which we have referred and the features directly involved therein, some of which are not really findings of fact, though harmlessly classed as such.

The finding that the farm was worth $4,000, on the 19th of April, 1897, when it was conveyed to Frank Mittelstadt, doubtless, had a very important bearing on several other important points in the case. It is insisted that such finding is manifestly contrary to the clear preponderance of the evidence and, though contentions of that nature seldom require reference to the evidence in detail, the one here seems to be a rather striking exception, indicating that the conclusion was reached without appreciating the weakness of the basis for it.

[1] The rule that findings of fact made by a trial court will not be disturbed unless contrary to the clear preponderance of the evidence, giving due weight to the superior advantages below for discovering therefrom, in the light of appearance on the trial, the real truth of the matter, as has often been said, is a very important one in the administration of justice; but care must be constantly exercised not to treat such findings so lightly as to really classify them with jury findings. It must be appreciated that there is some difference as to the former, requiring the evidence on each side to be weighed and probabilities to be put against probabilities, sufficiently to determine whether those on one side so manifestly outweight those on the other as to clearly answer to the call for that clear preponderance essential to disapproval of the result complained of. The logic of the rule contemplates that a finding...