Krajewski v. Krajewski, Docket No. 71755
| Decision Date | 25 January 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 10,Docket No. 71755,10 |
| Parties | Edna KRAJEWSKI (now Edna Kiser), Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Gerhard KRAJEWSKI, Defendant, v. Theresa KRAJEWSKI, minor by Guardian ad litem James M. STRAUB and Prosecuting Attorney For Berrien County, Michigan, Defendants-Appellants. Calendar420 Mich. 729, 362 N.W.2d 230 |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Berrien County Legal Services Bureau, Inc. by Mary Ellen Drolet, St. Joseph, for plaintiff-appellee.
Paul L. Maloney, Pros. Atty. by John T. Burhans, Robert S. Yampolsky, Asst. Pros. Attys., St. Joseph, and James M. Straub, Guardian Ad Litem by Margaret A. Penninger, Seymour, Conybeare, Straub, Seaman & Allen, P.C., St. Joseph, for defendants-appellants.
The Michigan Probate and Juvenile Court Judges Association by R. Scott Ryder, Chief Referee, Kalamazoo County Probate Court-Juvenile Division, Kalamazoo.
Peter D. Houk, President, Prosecuting Attys., Association of Michigan by Joseph P. Kwiatkowski, Prosecuting Atty., Cheboygan.
This case concerns the extent of power that may be exercised by the juvenile division of probate court in dealing with abused or neglected minors who are wards of a circuit court by virtue of a custody award rendered as part of a divorce decree.
The trial court held that a waiver of circuit court jurisdiction was not required. The Court of Appeals reversed. Krajewski v. Krajewski, 125 Mich.App. 407, 335 N.W.2d 923 (1983). We are persuaded the Court of Appeals erred.
The facts giving rise to this controversy are not complicated. Theresa Krajewski, a minor, was under the continuous jurisdiction of the Berrien Circuit Court by virtue of a custody order entered in connection with her parents' divorce in 1974. In 1979, a petition was filed in the Berrien Probate Court, juvenile division, asserting that Theresa came within the appropriate provisions, M.C.L. Sec. 712A.2(b); M.S.A. Sec. 27.3178(598.2)(b), of the Juvenile Code and praying the court to take jurisdiction. A temporary order granting the petition was entered.
At a hearing in April, 1981, to determine if parental rights should be terminated, the question was raised whether, in light of Rozelle v. Dora, 103 Mich.App. 607, 303 N.W.2d 43 (1981), a waiver of circuit court jurisdiction was necessary. The juvenile court judge took the matter under advisement pending determination of that issue.
The juvenile division of probate court has:
M.C.L. Sec. 712A.2(b); M.S.A. Sec. 27.3178(598.2)(b).
The Court of Appeals concluded that under the circumstances described by the foregoing statute the probate court has jurisdiction to enter only temporary orders. Until the circuit court waives its jurisdiction, said the Court of Appeals, the probate court cannot exercise its full jurisdiction.
We do not read that statute so narrowly. Once having given concurrent jurisdiction to the probate court, the Legislature intended the act's other provisions, such as for notice, to operate as procedural rules calculated to accomplish efficiently the act's purpose. Such provisions prescribe the manner in which the conferred jurisdiction should be exercised, but do not purport to limit jurisdiction. The authorization of temporary orders should not be read as a proscription of permanent orders.
Waiver by circuit court confers no jurisdiction on the probate court. The statute confers the jurisdiction.
To obviate questions over which court should first attend to the child's needs, we adopted GCR 1963, 724.1(5) and PCR 111.2, which for the most part adopted the procedures suggested by the Legislature.
The relevant provisions of GCR 1963, 724.1 read:
The observation in GCR 1963, 724.1(5) that "no waiver or transfer of jurisdiction is required for the full and valid exercise of jurisdiction of the subsequent court" evinces our conviction that the children intended to be protected by the constitution and the Juvenile Code can best be served by a procedure which, having provided for appropriate notice and opportunity for the prior court to exercise its responsibility under its jurisdiction to further the child's best interests, nonetheless gives unrestricted freedom to the juvenile court to carry out its mandate.
For the foregoing reasons, we set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstate the order of the Berrien Circuit Court.
We granted leave to appeal in this case to determine whether M.C.L. Sec. 712A.2(b); M.S.A. Sec. 27.3178(598.2)(b) sets forth only procedural rules to be employed when the circuit court and the juvenile division of the probate court have concurrent jurisdiction over a child. The facts of this case and the statute at issue are set forth in the majority opinion.
Circuit courts have original jurisdiction in all matters not prohibited by law. Const.1963, art. 6, Sec. 13. 1 The jurisdiction of probate courts is more limited. Under Const.1963, art. 6, Sec. 15, probate courts have original jurisdiction in all cases involving juvenile delinquents and dependents, except as otherwise provided by law. The jurisdiction, powers and duties of the probate court and its judges are further provided by law. 2
Although much of the statute at issue sets forth procedural rules, the above-quoted sentence clearly is jurisdictional in nature. 3
GCR 1963, 724.1(5), which is incorporated into PCR 111.2, provides that the court having prior continuing jurisdiction over a child need not waive or transfer jurisdiction before the subsequent court can exercise its full jurisdiction. 4 Insofar as these court rules authorize the juvenile division of the probate court to enter permanent orders prior to the circuit court waiving its concurrent jurisdiction, the rules are in conflict with the last sentence of M.C.L. Sec. 712A.2(b); M.S.A. Sec. 27.3178(598.2)(b). The Court of Appeals correctly concluded that since the conflict involves a jurisdictional matter, the statute controls. 5
After this Court granted leave to appeal and heard oral arguments in this case, M.C.L. Sec. 712A.2; M.S.A. Sec. 27.3178(598.2) was amended by 1984 P.A. 131, effective June 1, 1984. Although the language of subsection (b)(2) was not significantly changed, the Legislature specifically provided that subsection (b)(2) was not to apply between June 20, 1984, and July 1, 1986. This "moratorium" means that there is no statute presently limiting the probate court's jurisdiction to the issuance of temporary orders pending the circuit court's waiver of jurisdiction. 6 Probate courts therefore may now exercise the full extent of their concurrent jurisdiction over neglected and dependent children, as long as they otherwise comply with the procedural requirements of PCR 111.2 and GCR 1963, 724.1(5). 7
For these reasons, we would affirm the...
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