Krambeck v. Children and Families of Iowa, Inc.

• Decision Date: 05 September 2006
• Docket Number: No. 4:04-CV-40011-JEG.,4:04-CV-40011-JEG.
• Citation: 451 F.Supp.2d 1037
• Parties: Becky KRAMBECK, Plaintiff, v. CHILDREN AND FAMILIES OF IOWA, INC., et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa

451 F.Supp.2d 1037

Becky KRAMBECK, Plaintiff, v. CHILDREN AND FAMILIES OF IOWA, INC., et al., Defendants.

No. 4:04-CV-40011-JEG.

United States District Court, S.D. Iowa, Central Division.

September 5, 2006.

Jeffrey M. Lipman, Lipman Law Firm, PC, Clive, IA, Steven L. Udelhofen, Udelhofen Law Office, Ankeny, IA, for Plaintiff.

Helen C. Adams, Dickinson Mackaman Tyler & Hagen PC, Des Moines, IA, Stuart J. Cochrane, Johnson, Erb, Bice, Kramer, Good & Mulholland, PC, Fort Dodge, IA, for Defendants.

ORDER

GRITZNER, District Judge.

This matter comes before the Court on the motion of Plaintiff Becky Krambeck (Krambeck) "to Dismiss All Federal Claims and Remove and Remand Case Back to Iowa District Court." Krambeck is represented by Jeff Lipman and Steven Udelhofen. Defendants Children and Families of Iowa, Inc. (CFI), Chris Carmon (Carmon), and Alicia Lewis (Lewis) are represented by Helen Adams. Carmon is also represented by Stuart Cochrane. The Defendants `requested oral argument, and a hearing was held on July 13, 2006. The matter is now fully submitted and ready for ruling.

SUMMARY OF MATERIAL FACTS

Krambeck was employed with CFI for approximately three years. During that time, Carmon and his supervisor, Lewis, were also in CFI's employ. Krambeck claims Carmon subjected her to sexually offensive comments and conduct, of which CFI and Lewis were aware. Lewis discharged Krambeck on September 26, 2003, for inappropriate workplace behavior.

Krambeck filed a petition in the Iowa District Court for Polk County on December 26, 2003, alleging claims of sexual harassment discrimination and retaliation under the Iowa Civil Rights Act, Iowa Code ch. 216, and Title VII of the federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.

On. January 7, 2004, Defendants CFI and Lewis removed the case to this court because the petition included claims based on Title VII, a federal statute.¹ 28 U.S.C § 1441. Defendants therefore invoke the court's federal question jurisdiction to hear the Title VII claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 1343, and its supplemental jurisdiction as to the related state claims, 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

On April 10, 2006, Krambeck filed a motion to dismiss the federal claims and remand the remaining state claims to state court. Defendants resisted that motion on May 22, 2006.

APPLICABLE LAW AND DISCUSSION

I. MOTION TO DISMISS FEDERAL CLAIMS

Defendants CFI and Lewis do not resist Krambeck's motion to dismiss her federal claims, provided the dismissal is with prejudice. In a separate resistance, Carmon purports to resist Krambeck's motion on the same grounds as Defendants CFI and Lewis, so it is assumed he does not resist the dismissal of the federal claims, although his request is postured as a general denial of the motion as a whole (including the motion to dismiss).

Krambeck's motion does not specify whether she is requesting dismissal of the federal claims with or without prejudice. At oral argument, counsel for Krambeck represented that if the motion to remand is granted, she concedes to a dismissal with prejudice. While the Court appreciates Plaintiff's strategic desire to obtain the most favorable result whatever the Court's determination on the motion to remand, Plaintiff brought the federal claims, has extensively litigated them in this Court, and has exposed Defendants to defending the claims. Therefore, Krambeck's motion to dismiss is granted, and her federal claims will be dismissed with prejudice.

II. MOTION TO REMAND REMAINING STATE LAW CLAIMS

In the absence of federal claims, whether the Court should retain jurisdiction depends upon construction of its supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which provides in relevant part:

(a) Except as provided in subsections (b) and (c) or as expressly provided otherwise by Federal statute, in any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.

. . . . .

(c) The district courts may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if—

(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law,

(2) the claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has original jurisdiction,

(3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or

(4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction.

Neither party questions that the state and federal employment discrimination claims are so related that they form part of the same case or controversy. Krambeck urges the Court to decline to exercise its supplemental jurisdiction and remand the case under § 1367(c)(1) and (3). She asserts her claims raise novel or complex issues of state law and notes that granting her motion to dismiss would re move all claims over which this Court has original jurisdiction.

A. Novel or Complex Issues of State Law

Krambeck claims her case presents three novel or complex issues of state law that should be heard in state court and urges this Court to remand accordingly. First, Krambeck claims resolution of her case will require a court to decide whether the Iowa Civil Rights Act requires a plaintiff to report discriminatory activity of an "individual" who is also a supervisor in the same manner as Burlington Industries., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 118 S.Ct. 2257, 141 L.Ed.2d 633 (1998), and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 118 S.Ct. 2275, 141 L.Ed.2d 662 (1998). Second, Krambeck claims the court hearing her case must decide the issue of the definition of "supervisor" for purposes of imposing respondeat superior or strict liability on the company when the harassing "individual" under the ICRA is also part of the company's management. Finally, Krambeck claims the state court should be allowed to address "the affect a prior complaint under Iowa Chapter 216 has on reporting requirement to higher management of subsequent incidents of harassment."

These vague statements illuminate little standing alone. Counsel further elaborated at oral argument, and it appears that central to this case is a dispute over whether Carmon is Krambeck's supervisor. Under federal law, if Carmon is a co-worker, then Krambeck must prove as an additional element of her prima facie case that Defendants "knew or should have known of the conduct and failed to take proper remedial action." Cheshewalla v. Rand & Son Constr. Co., 415 F.3d 847, 850 (8th Cir.2005). If Carmon is a supervisor, CFI is vicariously liable for his conduct unless it can establish the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense. Id. Faragher and Ellerth provide that an employer is subject to vicarious liability for the discriminatory actions of a supervisor; however, when no tangible employment action is taken, an employer may raise an affirmative defense composed of two elements: (1) "that the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior" and (2) "that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise." Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807, 118 S.Ct. 2275; Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765, 118 S.Ct. 2257. Krambeck asserts that this dispute involves a novel question of state law because it is unclear whether the Iowa Supreme Court would adopt the definition of supervisor the Supreme Court used in Faragher and Ellerth, or use what Krambeck claims is a more restrictive definition applied by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals.

"In Ellerth, and Faragher, the Supreme Court did not answer the question, `who is a supervisor?,' other than to state that an employer is vicariously liable `for, an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or successively higher) authority over the [victimized] employee.'" Joens v. John Morrell & Co., 354 F.3d 938, 940 (8th Cir.2004) (quoting Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765, 118 S.Ct. 2257). In Joens, the Eighth Circuit addressed that question. The court considered the interpretation of the Fourth and Seventh Circuits, which held that a supervisor must have the power to take tangible employment action against the plaintiff-employee, and the somewhat broader interpretation of the Second Circuit, which found supervisory status indicated by the ability to direct the daily work activities of the plaintiff-employee. Id. The Eighth Circuit opted for the narrower approach and "held that to be considered a supervisor, the alleged harasser must have had the power (not necessarily exercised) to take tangible employment action against the victim, such as the authority to hire, fire, promote, or reassign to significantly different duties.'" Cheshewalla, 415 F.3d at 850-51 (quoting Joens, 354 F.3d at 940).

The Iowa Supreme Court has cited the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense, without comment, in Farmland Foods Inc. v. Dubuque Human Rights Commission, 672 N.W.2d 733, 744 & n. 2 (Iowa 2003). The court cited only federal case law, primarily from the Eighth Circuit, in discussing plaintiff's hostile work environment claims, even though none of the claims arose under Title VII. Id.; see also Lopez v. Aramark Uniform & Career Apparel, Inc., 426 F.Supp.2d 914, 949-50 (N.D.Iowa 2006) (finding that Farmland Foods demonstrates that the Iowa Supreme Court has adopted the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense for ICRA claims involving supervisor harassment); Boyle v. Alum-Line, Inc., 710 N.W.2d 741, 746 (Iowa 2006) (stating that the elements of an ICRA hostile work environment claim include the "knew or should have known" element when the harasser is a nonsupervisory employee). Though the Farmland Foods court did not have occasion to...