Kramer v. Colorado Dept. of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Div.

• Decision Date: 03 September 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97CA1039,97CA1039
• Parties: 98 CJ C.A.R. 4600 Daniel David KRAMER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION, Defendant-Appellee. . III
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

Page 629

964 P.2d 629

98 CJ C.A.R. 4600

Daniel David KRAMER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, MOTOR VEHICLE DIVISION,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 97CA1039.

Colorado Court of Appeals,

Div. III.

Sept. 3, 1998.

Harry J. Holmes, Longmont, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Gale A. Norton, Attorney General, Martha Phillips Allbright, Chief Deputy Attorney General, Richard A. Westfall, Solicitor General, James E. Heiser, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, for Defendant-Appellee.

Opinion by Judge MARQUEZ.

Plaintiff, Daniel David Kramer, appeals the district court's judgment affirming the decision of defendant, Colorado Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division (Department), adjudicating plaintiff an habitual traffic offender and revoking his motor vehicle license. At issue is the propriety of considering two out-of-state convictions. We affirm.

In 1995, plaintiff was convicted of driving under the influence (DUI) in violation of § 42-4-1301(1), C.R.S.1997. Previously, plaintiff had been twice convicted on charges of driving under the influence in Idaho. Based on his three convictions, the Department held a revocation hearing.

Relying on § 24-60-1101, et seq., C.R.S.1997, the Driver License Compact (Compact), plaintiff contended that the Idaho convictions could not be considered. However, the hearing officer ruled that the Compact did not apply, adjudicated plaintiff an habitual traffic offender under the provisions of § 42-2-201, et seq., C.R.S.1997, and revoked his driver's license for five years. On review, the district court interpreted the Compact to allow consideration of the Idaho convictions and affirmed the ruling.

I.

Plaintiff contends that the Compact must apply to habitual traffic offender proceedings when the basis for the revocation is out-of-state convictions and that the specific provisions limiting consideration of out-of-state violations must prevail over the general purposes of the Compact. Essentially, he argues that for purposes of revocation, the Compact requires Colorado to give the same effect to certain offenses that it would if they had occurred in Colorado and that consideration of his Idaho convictions for driving under the influence is limited by Compact language describing such a conviction as one in which the person was found to be under the influence "to a degree which renders the driver incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle." Section 24-60-1101, art. IV(a), C.R.S.1997. Thus, he reasons that, because in Idaho the state must prove only that a driver's ability to drive was impaired by alcohol, his Idaho convictions cannot be considered. In our view, however, we need not decide whether the habitual traffic offender statute requires application of the Compact, because even if we assume it does apply, we conclude that defendant's Idaho convictions can be considered for purposes of revocation.

The interpretation of a statute is a question of law, and an appellate court is not bound by the trial court's interpretation. Colorado Division of Employment & Training v. Parkview Episcopal Hospital, 725 P.2d 787 (Colo.1986). When interpreting two statutory sections, we must attempt to harmonize them in order to give effect to their purposes. Norsby v. Jensen, 916 P.2d 555 (Colo.App.1995).

A reviewing court may not reverse the decision of an agency unless the court finds it to be arbitrary and capricious or contrary to rule or law. Sections 42-4-204, C.R.S.1997; 24-4-106(7) and 24-4-106(11)(e), C.R.S.1997. An agency interpretation that is not only in conformity with the relevant statutory provisions but is reasonably supported by the agency's reasoning and the record is entitled to deference. Department of Revenue v. Woodmen of the World, 919 P.2d 806 (Colo.1996).

In Colorado, § 42-2-202, C.R.S.1997, sets forth the conditions under which a person's privilege to drive may be revoked. There is no reference in this statute to the Compact.

Section 42-2-202(2), C.R.S.1997, provides in pertinent part:

(a) An habitual offender is a person having three or more convictions of any of the following separate and distinct offenses arising out of separate acts committed within a period of seven years:

(I) Driving a motor vehicle in violation of any provision of section 42-4-1301(1) or (2)(a);

....

(b) The offenses included in subparagraphs I ... shall be deemed to include convictions under any ... law of another state ... that substantially conforms to the statutory provisions of this state....

The plain terms of the above statute thus provide that any conviction under § 42-4-1301(1), C.R.S.1997, will be counted for purposes of habitual traffic offender status. Included within § 42-4-1301(1) are convictions for driving while a person is impaired by alcohol (DWAI). See People v. Swann, 770 P.2d 411 (Colo.1989). Thus, a driver with three DWAI convictions within a seven-year period is an habitual traffic offender and may have his or her license revoked by the Department. See § 42-2-203, C.R.S.1997 (Department has authority to revoke the license of any person whose record brings such person within the definition of an habitual offender in § 42-2-202).

Further, convictions under the law of another state that "substantially conforms" to the statutory provisions of Colorado may be included for purposes of habitual traffic offender status. See § 42-2-202(2)(b), C.R.S.1997. Thus, even if plaintiff's Idaho convictions are the equivalent of Colorado DWAI convictions, they may be considered for purposes of imposing habitual traffic offender status.

However, even if we assume the provisions of the Compact must be considered in determining defendant's habitual traffic offender status, the terms of the Compact do not limit consideration of his Idaho convictions.

Under the Compact, party states are required to report convictions of persons from another party state to the home state of the licensee. Section 24-60-1101, art. III, C.R.S.1997.

Section 24-60-1101, art. IV, states:

(a) The licensing authority in the home state, for purposes of suspension, revocation or limitation of the license to operate a motor vehicle, shall give the same effect to the offense reported ... as it would if such offense had occurred in the home state, in the case of convictions for:

....

(2) Driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor ... to a degree which renders the driver incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle;

....

(b) As to other convictions, reported pursuant to Article III, the licensing authority in the home state shall give such effect to the offense as is provided by the laws of the home state.

The Compact is to be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes. Section 24-60-1101, art. IX, C.R.S.1997.

Section 24-60-1105(1), C.R.S.1997, provides:

Those offenses described in article IV(a) of the compact refer only to the following ... No conviction in another state for an offense described in article IV(a) of the compact shall be considered in this state unless the executive director of the department of revenue has made a finding with respect thereto that the prerequisites to such conviction in such other state with respect to trial by jury, burden of proof, and elements of the offense are not less stringent than such prerequisites to conviction for such offense in this state.

As a preliminary matter, plaintiff here does not dispute that Colorado is his home state under the Compact. In his reply brief to the district court, plaintiff conceded that his Idaho convictions were reported to the Department as required by the Compact. Further, the Department takes the position that the Idaho driving under the influence convictions are equivalent to Colorado DWAI convictions.

Idaho Code § 18-8004 (1987), the statute under which plaintiff was convicted, provided:

It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol ... or who has an alcohol...