Kramer v. D.C. Dept. of Employment Service, 81-1204.

• Citation: 447 A.2d 28
• Decision Date: 16 June 1982
• Docket Number: No. 81-1204.,81-1204.
• Parties: Rodger KRAMER, Petitioner, v. D. C. DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, Respondent.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Columbia District

447 A.2d 28

Rodger KRAMER, Petitioner, v. D. C. DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SERVICES, Respondent.

No. 81-1204.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Submitted May 14, 1982.

Decided June 16, 1982.

Rodger Kramer pro se.

N. Denise Wilson-Taylor, Washington, D. C., for respondent.

Before NEWMAN, Chief Judge, and KELLY and PRYOR, Associate Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Petitioner challenges a ruling by the Department of Employment Services (DOES) that disqualified him from receiving unemployment benefits for a period of 10 weeks on the ground that he had voluntarily left his previous employment without good cause connected with the work. D.C.Code 1981, § 46-111(a). He argues, in sum, that the Final Decision is unsupported by substantial evidence of record. Upon review of the matter, we agree with petitioner and therefore reverse and remand.

I

On June 28, 1980 petitioner, Rodger Kramer, who had been employed for nearly two years at an establishment trading as Club East II, a male bathhouse, resigned from his position there. After hearing evidence provided solely by witnesses for the petitioner, a hearing examiner determined that the employment had been voluntarily terminated without good cause connected with the work.

Petitioner testified that, over a period of time, the management of the club, a 24-hour facility, had repeatedly failed to keep its promises to him and also engaged in coercive employment practices. More specifically, he stated that he was explicitly told that shift assignments would be made on the basis of seniority of the work staff. In fact, petitioner asserts, the practice was never followed. With regard to salary, petitioner testified that he was promised an increase from $4.00 to $4.50 an hour, but actually received a lesser amount. When-ever there was a shortage of monies received during a particular work shift, the manager routinely required all employees on the shift, regardless of fault, to make up the deficiency. Lastly, petitioner complained that in all instances where an employee reported late for his work shift, the manager required the employee on duty to continue until a replacement arrived. The manager then insisted that the employee who had worked extra hours, collect his compensation for the work from the tardy co-worker. Petitioner enumerated several days where he had not been paid for such overtime work.

A second witness, also an employee, gave cumulative and supporting evidence.

In ruling against petitioner, the examiner set forth the circumstances which had been described but concluded that, in leaving his employment, petitioner had not acted as a reasonable and prudent person in the labor market.

II

Recognizing our limited role in review of administrative proceedings, we have consistently said that we should not disturb a decision if it rationally flows from the facts relied upon, and those facts or findings are substantially supported by the evidence of record. D.C.Code 1981, § 1-1510(a)(3)(E); see Washington Post Co. v. District Unemployment Compensation Board, D.C.App., 377 A.2d 436, 439 (1977); Wallace v. District Unemployment Compensation Board, D.C.App., 294 A.2d 177, 178 (1972). Similarly, we recently reiterated in another case involving unemployment benefits, that, unless unreasonable, an appellate court should defer to the agency's construction of a controlling statute or regulation. Hockaday v. D. C. Department of Employment Services, D.C.App., 443 A.2d 8 (1982).

The governing statute in this circumstance provides in pertinent part that

[a]n individual who left his...