Kramer v. Kastleman, 03-13-00133-CV

• Decision Date: 03 November 2017
• Docket Number: NO. 03-13-00133-CV,03-13-00133-CV
• Parties: Lisa Kramer, F/K/A Lisa Kastleman, Appellant v. Bryan Kastleman, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

Lisa Kramer, F/K/A Lisa Kastleman, Appellant v. Bryan Kastleman, Appellee

NO. 03-13-00133-CV

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

November 3, 2017

ON REMAND

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 53RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. D-1-FM-09-002598, HONORABLE ORLINDA NARANJO, JUDGE PRESIDING

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Following remand from the Texas Supreme Court, we consider the merits of this appeal filed by Lisa Kramer, F/K/A Lisa Kastleman, (Kramer) from the trial court's corrected final decree of divorce granted to her and Bryan Kastleman (Kastleman). In four issues, Kramer contends that the trial court erred in (1) denying her motion to set aside the parties' informal settlement agreement, (2) rendering a decree that contains terms not agreed to by the parties, (3) denying her motion for new trial, and (4) awarding attorney's fees to Kastleman as sanctions against Kramer for filing a motion to set aside the informal settlement agreement. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the trial court's final corrected decree of divorce.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Kramer filed for divorce in 2009. The parties attended mediation on August 12, 2011, but reached no agreement. They continued to negotiate informally and on August 15, 2011, reached an agreement concerning custody of their child. Further informal settlement discussions resulted in a property settlement agreement on August 18, 2011, which recited that the parties had reached an agreement on all issues; adopted the terms of the agreement concerning child issues, which was attached as an exhibit; and included releases of all claims by all parties.¹ The settlement agreement provided in large, bold print that it was not subject to revocation and was binding on all parties. The settlement agreement also provided that Kastleman would appear in court at the first available time to present evidence and secure rendition of judgment in accordance with the settlement agreement, which he did on August 19, 2011. At the hearing, he testified that the property division was fair and equitable and that the parenting plan was in the best interest of the child. The trial court granted the divorce.

In July 2012, prior to the trial court's signing a divorce decree, Kramer filed a motion to set aside the informal settlement agreement, and in September 2012, she filed a first amended motion to set aside, alleging in the motions that Kastleman had committed fraud by failing todisclose assets and by forging her name on documents. Kastleman filed a motion for sanctions against Kramer contending that all of the issues raised in Kramer's motion were known to her at the time she signed the settlement agreement and seeking attorney's fees under Rule 13 and chapter 10. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 13; Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 10.001-.006. On October 8, 2012, the trial court denied Kramer's first amended motion to set aside the informal settlement agreement and granted Kastleman's motion for sanctions, awarding attorney's fees as requested for the work performed on behalf of Kastleman and his two companies in the amount of $32,215.88, and conditional sanctions in the event of an unsuccessful appeal.² On October 11, 2012, the trial court heard Kastleman's Motion to Sign Decree of Divorce. After ruling on the parties' requests for various clarifications and modifications to the settlement agreement, the trial court signed the divorce decree. Kramer requested, and the trial court entered, findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of the divorce decree, the denial of Kramer's motion to set aside the settlement agreement, and the sanctions order. Kramer subsequently filed motions to set aside the sanctions order and the divorce decree; a motion for new trial; and a motion to modify, correct, and reform the judgment. After hearing the motions, the trial court signed a corrected divorce decree, denied the motions to set aside the decree and for new trial, and signed an amended order granting sanctions in the same amount as previously ordered. At Kramer's request, the trial court entered revised findings of fact and conclusions of law to include findings and conclusions in support of thecorrected divorce decree and amended sanctions order. In December 2012, Kramer filed a second motion for new trial, which the trial court denied.

Kramer filed an appeal with this Court. Kastleman filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that Kramer had accepted the benefits of the judgment she was appealing. We agreed and dismissed the appeal. Kramer appealed to the Texas Supreme Court, which reversed our judgment, holding that Kramer's acceptance of marital assets did not preclude her appeal, and remanded for further proceedings on the merits of Kramer's appeal. See Kramer v. Kastleman, 508 S.W.3d 211, 213, 232 (Tex. 2017). We turn, then, to Kramer's four issues on remand.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review most family law issues, including the issues raised in this appeal, for an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of C.A.S., 405 S.W.3d 373, 382 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.) (citing In re A.B.P., 291 S.W.3d 91, 95 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.)). A court abuses its discretion when it acts unreasonably, arbitrarily, or without reference to guiding rules and principles. See Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam). "A trial court does not abuse its discretion if there is some evidence of a substantive and probative character to support its decision." In re A.E.R., No. 05-15-00019-CV, 2016 Tex. App. LEXIS 8597, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 9, 2016, pet. filed) (mem. op.). In family law cases, legal and factual sufficiency challenges do not constitute independent grounds for asserting error but are relevant factors in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. In re Marriage of C.A.S., 405 S.W.3d at 383. To determine whether the trial court abused its discretion because the evidence is legally or factually insufficient to support the trial court's decision, we consider whether the trial court (1) hadsufficient evidence upon which to exercise its discretion and (2) erred in its application of that discretion. Id. A trial court's findings of fact are reviewable for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence under the same standards that are applied in reviewing evidence supporting a jury's answer. Ortiz v. Jones, 917 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam); Anderson v. City of Seven Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991); see City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827-28 (Tex. 2005) (describing legal sufficiency standard of review); Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (describing factual sufficiency standard of review). We review a trial court's conclusions of law de novo to determine their correctness and will uphold conclusions if the judgment can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence. BMC Software Belg., N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002). Further "we will not reverse an erroneous conclusion if the trial court rendered the proper judgment." City of Austin v. Whittington, 384 S.W.3d 766, 779 n.10 (Tex. 2012) (citing BMC Software, 83 S.W.3d at 794).

"The party attacking the property division bears the heavy burden of showing that the trial court's property division was not just and right." Pletcher v. Goetz, 9 S.W.3d 442, 446 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. denied). Thus, it was Kramer's burden to show not only that "an inequality in the division of the community property was manifestly unjust . . . but also that such inequality is of such substantial proportions that it constitutes an abuse of the trial court's discretion." See King v. King, 661 S.W.2d 252, 255 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, no writ). As for the custody issues, there is no bright-line rule for determining what is in a child's best interest, and each case must be determined on its unique set of facts. Lenz v. Lenz, 79 S.W.3d 10, 18-19 (Tex. 2002); Coburn v. Moreland, 433 S.W.3d 809, 827 (Tex. App.—Austin 2014, no pet.). Whenreviewing both the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence, we are mindful that the trier of fact is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. Helping Hands Home Care, Inc. v. Home Health of Tarrant Cty., Inc., 393 S.W.3d 492, 505 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied).

DISCUSSION

Trial Court's Denial of Motion to Set Aside Informal Settlement Agreement

In her first issue, Kramer contends that the trial court erred in denying her motion to set aside the informal settlement agreement. First, Kramer argues that, contrary to the trial court's "impression," the parties' agreement was not a "mediated settlement agreement" under sections 6.602(b) and 153.0071(d) of the Family Code. See Tex. Fam. Code §§ 6.602(b) (providing that mediated settlement agreement in dissolution of marriage is binding on parties if it provides in prominently displayed statement that is in boldface type, in capital letters, or underlined that agreement is not subject to revocation and is signed by each party and each party's attorney who is present), (c) (providing that if agreement meets requirements of subsection (b), party is entitled to judgment on mediated settlement agreement), 153.0071(d), (e) (providing same in context of suit affecting parent-child relationship). Rather, Kramer contends that the agreement was an informal settlement agreement and an agreed parenting plan under sections 6.604(b) and 153.007 of the Family Code. See id. §§ 6.604(b) (providing that informal settlement agreement in dissolution of marriage is binding on parties if it provides in prominently displayed statement that is in boldface type, in capital letters, or underlines that agreement is not subject to revocation and is signed by each party and each party's attorney who is present), (d) (providing that if court find terms of informalsettlement agreement just and right, terms are binding on court), 153....