Kramer v. Logan County School District No. R-1, R-1

• Decision Date: 18 November 1998
• Docket Number: No. 97-3132,R-1,97-3132
• Citation: 157 F.3d 620
• Parties: 78 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 165, 74 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,625, 129 Ed. Law Rep. 952 Deborah KRAMER, Appellee, v. LOGAN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO., a/k/a Stapleton Public Schools, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 620

157 F.3d 620

78 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 165,

74 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 45,625, 129 Ed. Law Rep. 952

Deborah KRAMER, Appellee, v. LOGAN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. R-1, a/k/a Stapleton Public

Schools, Appellant.

No. 97-3132.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eighth Circuit.

Submitted Feb. 9, 1998.

Decided Oct. 14, 1998.

Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc Denied Nov.

18, 1998. ^*

Gregory H. Perry, Lincoln, Nebraska, argued (James B. Gessford, on the brief), for appellant.

Jerold V. Fennell, Omaha, Nebraska, argued (W. Craig Howell, on the brief), for Appellee.

Before Richard S. ARNOLD, ¹ Chief Judge, HANSEN, Circuit Judge, and LIMBAUGH, ² District Judge.

LIMBAUGH, District Judge

Logan County School District No. R-1, a/k/a Stapleton Public Schools ("the school district") appeals following a jury verdict entered in favor of one of its former employees, Deborah Kramer, on her discriminatory discharge claim arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the judgment of the district court. ³

I

Deborah Kramer began working for the school district as a substitute teacher during the 1987-88 school year. She was certified in mathematics and chemistry. While working for the school district, Kramer obtained further certification in middle school mathematics, middle school all subjects, general science and natural science.

During the 1990-91 school year, the school district's high school science teacher was placed on administrative leave and, ultimately, resigned. Kramer was named as his replacement and awarded a full-time teacher's contract. She was subsequently awarded annual full-time teacher's contracts for the 1991-92 and 1992-93 school years. At all times, Kramer remained a probationary teacher as defined by Nebraska law.

In February, 1993, the school district's high school principal, Mike Apple, and superintendent, John Broadbent, decided that they would recommend that Kramer's teaching contract not be renewed for the following school year. The school board approved the recommendation of non-renewal and, on March 18, 1993, sent Kramer a notice letter to that effect. ⁴ Kramer requested and was granted the right to an informal hearing before the school board to allow her the opportunity to discuss and explain her position with regard to continued employment, to present information and to ask questions of those appearing on behalf of the school district. See Neb.Rev.Stat. §§ 79-828(5) and (8).

The hearing was held on April 28, 1993. Kramer was represented by counsel, called several witnesses and cross-examined the witnesses against her. Although she challenged the recommendation regarding the non-renewal of her teaching contract, Kramer did not present any allegations or evidence of gender discrimination. In all, the hearing lasted nearly five hours.

After approximately one hour of deliberations, the school board unanimously adopted a resolution stating that Kramer's employment contract would not be renewed because she could not get along with the administration, received below average evaluations, failed to function as a team player in the everyday working environment of the school district, and that the school district would be better served by seeking a more cooperative teacher.

Kramer elected not to challenge the school board's decision in state court. She did, however, file a charge of discrimination with the Nebraska Equal Opportunity Commission. Upon receiving her right-to-sue letter, Kramer initiated the instant lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska. Her Complaint alleges that she was discriminatorily discharged because of her gender.

The case proceeded to trial on May 16, 1997. Kramer presented evidence that she had been disparately treated by the school district's high school principal, Mike Apple. Specifically, she presented testimony by her former co-workers and others, including herself, detailing how Apple had disciplined her more harshly and severely than male teachers for similar misconduct. Likewise, other female teachers testified that they too had been treated inappropriately or unfairly because of their gender. Kramer presented testimony of off-color and/or inappropriate remarks made by both Apple and the school district's superintendent, John Broadbent. She produced written reprimands by Apple from her personnel file which were neither signed nor given to her, in direct contravention of a written school policy.

Additionally, Kramer presented evidence that Apple and Broadbent made material misrepresentations and omissions to the school board in presenting their recommendation that her teaching contract not be renewed. She presented evidence that they misrepresented that her performance evaluations were below average, when five out of six evaluations were average or better. She maintains that Broadbent specifically instructed the school board not to read the evaluations before the hearing and that the board members did not have an opportunity to read the evaluations during the hearing. Kramer adduced evidence that fifteen of the seventeen tenured teachers had signed a letter in support of her, but that Broadbent failed to give the letter to the school board. Finally, she presented evidence that Apple had decided to leave his position as high school principal and had informed Broadbent of his intentions prior to the hearing, but that they purposefully kept this information from the school board.

The school district moved for judgment as a matter of law at the end of Kramer's case and, again, at the close of all of the evidence. It argued that Kramer failed to introduce evidence sufficient to support a finding of intentional gender discrimination. The district court denied both motions.

At the initial jury instruction conference, the district court presented counsel with seventeen proposed jury instructions. No objections were made, though Kramer requested that Instruction No. 2 be amended to substitute the word "corporation" with "political subdivision" to more accurately describe the party-defendant. The school district did not object and the district court agreed to amend the instruction. As amended, Instruction No. 2 provides:

The parties to this action are the plaintiff, Deborah Kramer and the defendant, Stapleton Public Schools. Throughout these instructions, the plaintiff may be referred to as the plaintiff or by her name. The defendant may be referred to as the defendant or by its name.

In cases such as this, a political subdivision, including Stapleton Public Schools, acts through its agents and employees. An agent or employee of a political subdivision may bind the political subdivision by acts and statements made by the agent or employee while the agent or employee is acting with [sic] the scope of the authority delegated to the agent or employee by the political subdivision. Additionally, the agent or employee may bind the political subdivision by acts and statements made within the scope of the employee's duties as an employee of the political subdivision.

On May 22, 1997, the jury received the case. After several hours of deliberations, the jury submitted the following questions to the district court:

Under Instruction No. 10(a), does "Stapleton Public Schools" stand for the school board, or the school board and administration?

Under Instruction No. 10(a), the phrase "actions against the plaintiff"--does that include the hearing or all that happened during her period of employment?

Instruction 10(a) provides:

If you find in favor of the plaintiff under Instruction No. 10, then you must answer the following question in the verdict form: Has the defendant, Stapleton Public Schools, proved by the preponderance of the evidence that the defendant would have taken the same actions against the plaintiff regardless of the plaintiff's gender?

Following a conference with counsel, the district court answered the first question by drafting supplemental Instruction No. 20. Supplemental Instruction No. 20 provides:

As used in these instructions, Stapleton Public Schools means the defendant, Logan County School District No. R-1, which is a political subdivision governed by the district's school board. Please refer to Instruction No. 2.

Please reread all the instructions and continue your deliberations.

The school district specifically objected to the reference to Instruction No. 2. It also proposed that the district court answer the question by stating simply, "the school board."

The district court answered the second question by substituting a new instruction, Revised Instruction No. 10(a). Revised Instruction No. 10(a) provides:

If you find in favor of the plaintiff under Instruction No. 10, then you must answer the following question in the verdict form: Has the defendant, Stapleton Public Schools, proved by the preponderance of the evidence that the defendant would have made the same decision not to renew the plaintiff's contract of employment for another year regardless of the plaintiff's gender?

On May 23, 1997, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff, Deborah Kramer. The jury awarded her $110,000.00 for lost wages and benefits and $15,000.00 for emotional pain and suffering. The court clerk entered judgment on the jury's verdict in the amount of $125,000.00. Thereafter, Kramer filed a motion to amend the judgment to include an order of reinstatement or of front pay and prejudgment interest. Kramer also filed a motion for her attorneys' fees and costs.

The district court granted in part and denied in part Kramer's motion to amend the judgment. It denied her request for reinstatement, awarded her three years of front pay--reduced to its present value of $71, 288.06 and denied her request for prejudgment interest. The district court also granted in part and denied in part Kramer's motion for attorneys' fees....