Kramer v. State, 74663
| Decision Date | 25 November 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 74663,74663 |
| Citation | 185 Ga.App. 254,363 S.E.2d 800 |
| Parties | KRAMER v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Charles A. Mullinax, Stone Mountain, for appellant.
Patrick H. Head, Sol., Melodie H. Clayton, Bruce D. Hornbuckle, Asst. Solicitors, for appellee.
Appellant was arrested and charged with the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol in violation of OCGA § 40-6-391. During the March 1986 term of the State Court of Cobb County, appellant filed in the clerk's office of that court a document, the body of which provided, in pertinent part, as follows: "[T]here being jurors impaneled and qualified to try this case at this time in the State Court of Cobb County, [appellant] specifically requests trial by jury and asks that the same be placed upon the minutes and that he be tried at this term or the next term of the State Court of Cobb County, or in default of such trial, that he be fully acquitted and discharged of said offense." However, this document was captioned, not as a demand for trial, but merely as a "JURY DEMAND." Rule 36.3 of the Uniform Rules for the Superior Courts (Rules) provides: "Every document or pleading presented for filing in a state court shall bear a caption which sets out the exact nature of the pleading or the type of complaint." (Emphasis in original.) When appellant was tried in neither the March term of court nor the next succeeding term, he moved for acquittal. Unlike his earlier document, appellant's motion for acquittal specified in both its caption and its body that he was relying upon OCGA § 17-7-170. The trial court conducted a hearing and denied appellant's motion for acquittal. Pursuant to Hubbard v. State, 254 Ga. 694, 333 S.E.2d 827 (1985), appellant appeals directly from the order of the trial court denying the motion for acquittal.
" '[H]enceforth a demand for trial will not be considered sufficient to invoke the extreme sanction of ... [OCGA § 17-7-170] unless it is presented for what it is--a demand to be tried within the next succeeding term of court.' " Ferris v. State, 172 Ga.App. 729, 731(1), 324 S.E.2d 762 (1984). Had appellant's "JURY DEMAND" been filed prior to July 1, 1985, the effective date of the Rules, the entire focus of the determination of its sufficiency as a proper invocation of the provisions of OCGA § 17-7-170 would be upon the text of the document. See generally Edwards v. State, 177 Ga.App. 557(1), 340 S.E.2d 229 (1986). However, pursuant to promulgation of the Rules, the sufficiency of appellant's document as a proper invocation of OCGA § 17-7-170 now involves the consideration of not merely the language employed in the body thereof, but a consideration of its caption as well.
If the Rules now mandate that the sufficiency of the caption of a purported demand for trial pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-170 must be judged by the same standard that was previously applicable only to the sufficiency of its text, it would follow that the caption "JURY DEMAND" fails to set out "the exact nature of the pleading" as a demand for trial and would also constitute a misleading caption for a demand for trial pursuant to OCGA § 17-7-170. (Emphasis supplied.) State v. Adamczyk, 162 Ga.App. 288, 289-290, 290 S.E.2d 149 (1982).
Those with whom documents are filed and those upon whom documents are served are entitled to rely upon the pleader's compliance with the applicable law and the applicable Rules. Since the decision in Adamczyk and the subsequent promulgation of the Rules, the recipient of a document captioned as a "JURY DEMAND" will not necessarily attribute to it the same "exact nature" as would be attributed to a...
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State v. Bell
...non-capital cases). The motion in this case was not misleadingly styled as simply a demand for a jury trial. Compare Kramer v. State, 185 Ga.App. 254, 363 S.E.2d 800 (1987). The caption identifies it as a request that the State "set" Bell's case for a jury trial, and correctly specifies the......
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State v. Allen
...compliance therewith, within the meaning of OCGA § 1-3-1(c). The appellant attempts to rely on the two-judge case of Kramer v. State, 185 Ga.App. 254, 363 S.E.2d 800, and assert that the demand was fatally flawed because it was not properly captioned. In Verscharen, supra 188 Ga.App. at 747......
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Price v. State, A00A1577.
...held that the caption of the demand should "set[ ] out the exact nature of the pleading." (Emphasis in original.) Kramer v. State, 185 Ga.App. 254, 255, 363 S.E.2d 800 (1987). Further, a change in Uniform State Court Rules made it mandatory that "[e]very document or pleading presented for f......
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Aranza v. State
...in the ... accusation." OCGA § 17-7-170(b). The State opposed Aranza's motion on two grounds. First, relying on Kramer v. State, 185 Ga.App. 254, 363 S.E.2d 800 (1987), it argued that the motion was fatally defective because the caption "demand for jury trial" failed to afford the State not......