Krasinski v. United Parcel Service, Inc.

• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: WARD
• Citation: Krasinski v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 124 Ill.2d 483, 530 N.E.2d 468, 125 Ill.Dec. 310 (Ill. 1988)
• Decision Date: 20 October 1988
• Docket Number: No. 65439,65439
• Parties: , 125 Ill.Dec. 310, 129 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2939, 115 Lab.Cas. P 10,108, 3 IER Cases 1674 Gerald KRASINSKI, Appellee, v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., et al., Appellants.

Page 468

530 N.E.2d 468

124 Ill.2d 483, 125 Ill.Dec. 310, 129

L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2939,

115 Lab.Cas. P 10,108, 3 IER Cases 1674

Gerald KRASINSKI, Appellee, v. UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, INC., et al., Appellants.

No. 65439.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 20, 1988.

Keith J. Braskich, Keck, Mahin & Cate, Peoria, John A. McDonald, Keck, Mahin & Cate, Chicago, for appellants.

Anthony C. Raccuglia & Associates, Peru, Cynthia M. Raccuglia, of counsel, for appellee.

Justice WARD delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff, Gerald Krasinski, filed suit in the circuit court of La Salle County against United Parcel Service, Inc. (UPS), and two of its employees, alleging unlawful discharge from employment and malicious defamation. The unlawful discharge count was dismissed in June 1982, and the defendants then moved for summary judgment on the defamation counts, claiming that the statements involved were privileged communications. The trial court denied the defendants' motion, finding that, though the defendants had a qualified privilege in making the statements, an issue of material fact existed as to whether the statements were made with actual malice. The defendants then successfully moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the claim was preempted by Federal law. The appellate court reversed (155 Ill.App.3d 831, 108 Ill.Dec. 528, 508 N.E.2d 1105) holding that the tort of malicious defamation is an independent State court cause of action not preempted by Federal law. We granted the defendants leave to appeal. 107 Ill.2d R. 315.

As this appeal is before the court on the defendants' motion to dismiss, all well-pleaded facts in the complaint will be regarded as true and all reasonable inferences from them will be considered as correct. (Kirk v. Michael Reese Hospital & Medical Center (1987), 117 Ill.2d 507, 514, 111 Ill.Dec. 944, 513 N.E.2d 387, cert. denied (1988), 485 U.S. 905, 108 S.Ct. 1077, 99 L.Ed.2d 236; Katz v. Belmont National Bank (1986), 112 Ill.2d 64, 67, 96 Ill.Dec. 697, 491 N.E.2d 1157.) The complaint is in four counts. The first alleges that while the plaintiff was employed as a package driver for UPS, the company, through its agents and employees, maliciously defamed him. The allegations of the complaint are that on October 7, 1981, Frank Wise, a loss-prevention supervisor for UPS, and Bill Fields, a loss-prevention manager for UPS, waited for the plaintiff to return to the UPS office from his route. Wise, in the presence of Fields and another UPS employee, said to the plaintiff:

"I have a signed statement from Gale Koehler that you sold him the saw and that you knew it was hot."

Wise's statement, the complaint sets out, was false and the intention was to charge that the plaintiff had stolen a chain saw from a company shipment. It alleges that Wise made the statement, although he knew he did not have a signed statement from Koehler to the effect that the plaintiff sold him the saw and that the plaintiff knew it was "hot." On the same day, the complaint alleges, Wise, in the presence of the plaintiff's supervisor and Fields, said:

"We're going to have to terminate him [the plaintiff] * * *, because this is a UPS shipment and Jerry stole the saw."

Fields, on the same date, in the presence of the plaintiff's supervisor and Wise, it was claimed, stated:

"He [the plaintiff] will have to be terminated for dishonesty."

All the above statements, it is charged, were made with knowledge that they were false and with reckless disregard of the truth. The plaintiff alleges the statements were made with the intent to destroy his good name and reputation in his employment and "to accuse the plaintiff of a crime to cause him to lose his employment." The statements were made allegedly because UPS and its employees "could not substantiate an earlier wrongdoing that the defendant, through its agents and employees, believed that [Krasinski] had committed and knowing that the plaintiff was an active spokesman of employee rights within the company."

Count I is directed against UPS, count III is against Wise, and count IV is against Fields, and each is based on the above statements. Count II, also directed against UPS, alleges that another defamatory statement was made through its agent and employee, James Dobbins, UPS' division manager, on October 9, 1981, when he sent a notice of termination from UPS employment to the plaintiff, and copies to the plaintiff's union and to other UPS employees. The letter to Krasinski states that he was being terminated because "after completing an investigation on October 7, 1981, it was determined that you were involved in a dishonest act," in violation of the labor agreement between UPS and the plaintiff's union. Dobbins' statement, the plaintiff alleges, was intended to charge him with stealing a chain saw from a company shipment and was made with reckless disregard of the truth.

The defendants' motion to dismiss contends the plaintiff's claims are preempted by Federal law. The motion set out that the plaintiff's employment was covered by a collective-bargaining agreement between UPS and Teamsters Union Local 710 which prohibited discharge other than for "just cause." The agreement provides that "dishonesty" by an employee is "just cause" for discharge and requires that UPS give written notice to any unionized employee who is discharged. The defendants attached, as an exhibit, an arbitrator's decision on Krasinski's discharge grievance. The arbitrator found in favor of Krasinski and ordered his reinstatement. The trial court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, ruling the claim was preempted by Federal law.

As stated, the appellate court reversed, holding that the plaintiff's complaint claiming defamation with actual malice was neither preempted by the primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) nor preempted by Federal common law under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA) (29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982)). It held, relying on Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck (1985), 471 U.S. 202, 105 S.Ct. 1904, 85 L.Ed.2d 206, and Gonzalez v. Prestress Engineering Corp. (1986), 115 Ill.2d 1, 104 Ill.Dec. 751, 503 N.E.2d 308, cert. denied (1987), 483 U.S. 1032, 107 S.Ct. 3248, 97 L.Ed.2d 779, that a cause of action for malicious defamation exists independently of the collective-bargaining agreement and, thus, was not preempted under section 301.

Section 301 of the LMRA provides:

"Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce * * * may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties * * *." 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1982).

The appellate court correctly held that the plaintiff's action is not preempted by section 301 of the LMRA. Allis-Chalmers, upon which the appellate court relied principally, held that certain State court tort causes of action are preempted by section 301. The basis for Federal preemption under section 301, the Court determined, is the congressional policy favoring uniformity and predictability in interpreting collective-bargaining agreements under a uniform body of Federal law. (Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills (1957), 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972.) This policy, it was held, requires the preemptive force of section 301 to extend beyond suits for breach of labor contracts and include certain suits claiming liability in tort.

The analysis to determine whether there has been preemption, the Court stated, must focus on "whether the [State tort claim] confers nonnegotiable state-law rights on employers or employees independent of any right established by contract or, instead, whether evaluation of the tort claim is inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract." (Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 213, 105 S.Ct. at 1912, 85 L.Ed.2d at 216.) The Court concluded that the plaintiff's claim in Allis-Chalmers for bad-faith delay in the handling of a disability plan was preempted, as its resolution was substantially dependent upon interpretation of the collective-bargaining agreement between the employer and union, which had incorporated the disability plan.

This court followed the Allis-Chalmers analysis in deciding Gonzalez v. Prestress Engineering Corp. (1986), 115 Ill.2d 1, 104 Ill.Dec. 751, 503 N.E.2d 308. The court held in Gonzalez that a State-law claim for retaliatory discharge fell outside the preemptive border of section 301. Resolution of the retaliatory discharge claim was held to be independent of the collective-bargaining agreement, as the "claim is based on a duty and right firmly rooted and fixed in an important and clearly defined public policy, [and] evaluation of the tort claim does not in any way depend upon an interpretation of the 'just cause' provision in a labor contract." 115 Ill. 2d at 10, 104 Ill.Dec. 751, 503 N.E.2d 308.

This court's conclusion in Gonzalez was recently approved by the Supreme Court in Lingle v. Norge Division of Magic Chef, Inc. (1988), 486 U.S. 399, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L. Ed.2d 410. The Court held that the resolution of a retaliatory discharge claim based on our State law is " 'independent' of the collective-bargaining agreement in the sense of 'independent' that matters for § 301 pre-emption purposes: resolution of the state-law claim does not require construing the collective-bargaining agreement." (486 U.S. at ----, 108 S.Ct. at 1882, 100 L.Ed.2d at 420.) Shortly after Lingle was decided, the Court also vacated the judgment of the supreme court of Alabama in a decision that considered allegations remarkably similar to those raised here. (Mays v. Reynolds Metals Co. (1988), 486 U.S. 1050, 108 S.Ct. 2814, 100 L.Ed.2d 915.) The Court vacated the Alabama court's judgment that held that a State-law defamation claim, which arose out of an employer's investigation of an employee's alleged...