Kratochvil v. Motor Club Ins. Ass'n
| Decision Date | 22 January 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. S-97-865,S-97-865 |
| Citation | 255 Neb. 977,588 N.W.2d 565 |
| Parties | Neal J. KRATOCHVIL, appellant, v. MOTOR CLUB INSURANCE ASSOCIATION, also known as Motor Club Underwriters, Inc., also known as AAA of Nebraska, appellee. |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Summary Judgment. Summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, stipulations, and affidavits in the record disclose that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact or as to 2. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment is granted and gives such party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence.
the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
3. Summary Judgment: Appeal and Error. In reviewing an order granting a motion for summary judgment, the question is not how a factual issue is to be decided, but whether any real issue of material fact exists.
4. Limitations of Actions: Statutes. The determination of what constitutes a reasonable time following a legislative shortening of a statutory limitation period is a question of law.
5. Judgments: Appeal and Error. In connection with questions of law, an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the decision made by the court below.
6. Statutes: Legislature: Intent: Time. Legislative acts affecting substantive matters operate only prospectively unless the legislative intent of retrospective operation is clear.
7. Statutes: Time. Where a statute has been repealed and substantially reenacted with additions or changes, the additions or changes are treated as amendments effective from the time the new statute goes into effect.
8. Statutes: Time. Procedural amendments to statutes are ordinarily applicable to pending cases, while substantive amendments are not.
9. Words and Phrases. A substantive right is one which creates a right or remedy that did not previously exist and which, but for the creation of the right, would not entitle one to recover. A procedural right, on the other hand, is considered to simply be the method by which an already existing right is exercised.
10. Limitations of Actions: Statutes. Laws prescribing the time within which particular rights may be enforced generally relate to remedies only and not substantive rights.
11. Limitations of Actions: Legislature. Statutes of limitations are generally considered procedural, and legislative changes to limitation periods operate on all proceedings instituted after passage, whether the rights accrued before or after that date.
12. Insurance: Motor Vehicles: Time. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 44-6413(1)(e) (Reissue 1998) of the Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance Coverage Act operates on all proceedings instituted after its passage.
13. Limitations of Actions: Contracts. Generally, absent a more specific statute, actions on written contracts may be brought within 5 years, pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-205 (Reissue 1995).
14. Limitations of Actions: Legislature: Intent. A special statute of limitations controls and takes precedence over a general statute of limitations because the special statute is a specific expression of legislative will concerning a particular subject.
15. Limitations of Actions: Legislature. It is competent for the Legislature to change statutes prescribing limitations to actions, and the one in force at the time suit is brought is applicable to the cause of action.
16. Limitations of Actions: Legislature. The Legislature's power to change limitation periods is subject to two restrictions. First, the Legislature may not deprive a defendant of a bar which has already become complete. Second, the Legislature may not deprive a plaintiff of an already accrued cause of action without providing the plaintiff a reasonable time in which to file the action.
17. Limitations of Actions: Due Process. Statutes of limitations, being procedural, are normally retroactively applied to accrued causes of action; but the court must inquire whether, in a given case, that retrospective application may violate due process by, in effect, eliminating the plaintiff's right.
18. Limitations of Actions. A reasonable time for prosecution of a claim must be of sufficient duration to afford full opportunity L.J. Karel, of Karel & Seckman, Schuyler, for appellant.
to resort to the courts for enforcement of the rights on which the statute of limitations operates.
Michael A. England, of Wolfe, Snowden, Hurd, Luers & Ahl, Lincoln, for appellee.
Neal J. Kratochvil filed an action against his insurer, Motor Club Insurance Association (Motor Club), to recover uninsured motorist benefits provided for in his automobile liability insurance policy. The primary issue on review is whether an insured's claims against an insurer for uninsured motorist benefits are barred by Neb.Rev.Stat. § 44-6413(1)(e) (Reissue 1998) when the cause of action arose prior to passage of the 1994 Uninsured and Underinsured Motorist Insurance Coverage Act (UUMICA), Neb.Rev.Stat. § 44-6401 et seq. (Reissue 1993 & Cum.Supp.1994), but was not filed until after the legislation became operative.
On May 15, 1991, Kratochvil suffered personal injuries in an automobile accident with an uninsured motorist. Kratochvil was a passenger in the automobile which was driven by his mother. At the time of the accident, Kratochvil was insured by two automobile liability policies, both of which contained uninsured motorist coverage issued by Motor Club. Within 4 months of the accident, Kratochvil received a $500 payment from Motor Club for ambulance and transportation services rendered to him at the scene of the accident. Kratochvil was also given notice that Motor Club would be unable to pay anything further on his claim.
During this same time period, Kratochvil was also negotiating a settlement for uninsured motorist benefits with his father's insurer. In compliance with Motor Club's policy, Kratochvil contacted Motor Club on December 12, 1991, seeking their consent to a settlement offer from his father's insurer. The purpose of the consent was to avoid exclusion of any future claims Kratochvil may have had against Motor Club. On January 14, 1992, Motor Club informed Kratochvil that its consent was unnecessary to the settlement with his father's insurer. Motor Club explained that its policy only required consent to settlements paid directly under its own policies. Nothing in the record indicates that there was any further communication between the parties until Kratochvil filed this suit.
On May 14, 1996, Kratochvil filed suit in the Platte County District Court against Motor Club for uninsured motorist coverage benefits. Motor Club answered Kratochvil's petition and alleged that it was contractually bound to pay Kratochvil only those benefits that he would be " 'legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle.' " Motor Club also alleged that any claim Kratochvil would have against the uninsured driver was barred by Neb.Rev.Stat. § 25-207 (Reissue 1995).
Motor Club filed a motion for summary judgment and alleged that Kratochvil's claim against the uninsured motorist was barred by the statute of limitations pertaining to tort actions and that, therefore, the claim against Motor Club was barred pursuant to § 44-6413(1)(e). A hearing on the motion for summary judgment was held, and on June 30, 1997, the district court sustained Motor Club's motion for summary judgment. The court found that Kratochvil's claim was precluded by § 44-6413(1)(e) because the applicable statute of limitations for Kratochvil's claims against the uninsured driver had expired. The court reasoned that § 44-6413(1)(e) applied because it was the specific statute of limitations in effect at the time Kratochvil's claim was filed.
Kratochvil filed a motion for new trial and alleged that the district court's decision was contrary to law and that the UUMICA should not apply retrospectively to his claim.
The district court denied the motion, and Kratochvil thereafter appealed to the Nebraska Court of Appeals. We removed the case to our docket pursuant to our power to regulate the Court of Appeals' caseload and that of this court. See Neb.Rev.Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Reissue 1995).
Kratochvil contends, rephrased and summarized, that the district court erred in (1) determining that § 44-6413(1)(e) rather than Neb.Rev.Stat. § 60-509.01 (Reissue 1993) governed his claim for uninsured motorist benefits and (2) finding that § 44-6413(1)(e) governed without determining whether a "reasonable time" had been allowed in which to file his claim, as required by due process.
Summary judgment is proper only when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, stipulations, and affidavits in the record disclose that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact or as to the ultimate inferences that may be drawn from those facts and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. American Family Ins. Group v. Hemenway, 254 Neb. 134, 575 N.W.2d 143 (1998); Houghton v. Big Red Keno, 254 Neb. 81, 574 N.W.2d 494 (1998). In reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court views the evidence in a light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment is granted and gives such party the benefit of all reasonable inferences deducible from the evidence. Barnett v. Peters, 254 Neb. 74, 574 N.W.2d 487 (1998); Chalupa v. Chalupa, 254 Neb. 59, 574 N.W.2d 509 (1998). In reviewing an order granting a motion for summary judgment, the question is not how a factual issue is to be...
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