Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Medical Center, Civil No. 4-93-CV-10815.
Decision Date | 02 October 1995 |
Docket Number | Civil No. 4-93-CV-10815. |
Parties | Mary Jo KRAUEL, Plaintiff, v. IOWA METHODIST MEDICAL CENTER, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Iowa |
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Mark D. Sherinian (Hanson, Bjork & Russell, L.L.P.), Des Moines, Iowa, for plaintiff.
Mark A. Casciari (Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson), Chicago, Ill., and Thomas Finley (Finley, Alt, Smith, Scharnberg, May & Craig), Des Moines, Iowa, for defendant.
The Court has before it defendant's motion for summary judgment regarding plaintiff's allegations in Count I of her complaint of disability discrimination brought pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq and her allegations in Count II of her complaint of sex discrimination brought pursuant to the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Defendant moved for summary judgment on Count I of the complaint on May 15, 1995. Plaintiff resisted this motion on June 8, 1995. Defendant filed a reply brief on June 28, 1995. Plaintiff filed a reply brief on July 7, 1995, and Defendant filed a reply brief on August 1, 1995.
Defendant moved for summary judgment on Count II of the complaint on July 25, 1995. Plaintiff resisted this motion on August 15, 1995. Defendant filed a reply brief on August 24, 1995 and plaintiff filed a reply brief on September 11, 1995.
Plaintiff, Mary Jo Krauel, is a 41-year-old woman born on October 24, 1953. (Krauel Dep. 4). Krauel has been married since February 23, 1990 (Krauel Dep. 4) and is generally in excellent health. (Krauel Dep. 5).
Since June 1979 plaintiff has worked and continues to work for Iowa Methodist Medical Center ("Hospital"). (Krauel Dep. 7-8). Since at least February 1990, she has worked as a respiratory therapist at the Hospital. (Krauel Dep. 15).
On July 29, 1993, Plaintiff became pregnant through a fertility treatment known as the "Gift procedure" (Krauel Dep. 13) and gave birth to a daughter, her only child, on April 15, 1994. (Krauel Dep. 13). Plaintiff then unsuccessfully attempted to become pregnant without medical intervention for more than one year. (Krauel Dep. 10-11, 44-45).
Since 1987, the Hospital has maintained a written medical benefits plan for employees known as the Healthcare Preferred Plan ("Plan"). (Allyn Affid., ¶¶ 2, 7). The Plan is self-insured in that benefits are paid from Hospital general assets. The Plan has never been subject to any state laws that regulate insurance. (Allyn Affid., ¶ 5). Since 1990, Plan Exclusion No. 31 has excluded medical charges for the treatment of "fertility or infertility problems" and refused to pay benefits for such treatments. (Allyn Affid., ¶¶ 6, 7); (Krauel Dep. Ex. 2 at 105D.3 (1990 Plan)).
Plaintiff has been a participant in the Plan since 1990. (Allyn Affid., ¶ 3). Payment for most of Plaintiff's infertility treatments, including her visits to doctors, certain infertility drugs, and the GIFT procedures (excluding her laparoscopy) were denied under the Plan's exclusion for treatment of "fertility or infertility problems." (Krauel Dep. 87-91).
Krauel testified in her deposition that her inability to have children limits her ability to care for others by preventing her from being able to care for children of her own. (Krauel Dep. 72-73). However, she also stated that she has not experienced any difficulty caring for herself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning or working as a result of her alleged disability. (Krauel Dep. 14-17, 19-20). She also indicated that her infertility has not inhibited her working relationships or opportunities for promotions, pay increases, and other opportunities for advancement. (Krauel Dep. 17-18).
Summary judgment is properly granted when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Walsh v. United States, 31 F.3d 696, 698 (8th Cir.1994). The moving party must establish its right to judgment with such clarity that there is no room for controversy. Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405, 408 (8th Cir.1982). "The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). An issue is "genuine," if the evidence is sufficient to persuade a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. Id.
The ADA provides that "no covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Disability, under the ADA, is defined as follows:
ADA Section 501(c), 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c), is an insurance safe harbor provision that provides in pertinent part:
In support of its motion for summary judgment on Count I, defendant makes several arguments. First, defendant contends that plaintiff's condition did not substantially limit her ability to engage in a "major life activity." Second, defendant maintains that its medical plan exclusion is not disability-based and, therefore, is lawful. Finally, defendant argues that it is entitled to summary judgment because the infertility exclusion in its medical plan is immune from ADA challenge by virtue of ADA Section 501(c)(3).
In order for the plaintiff to state a claim under the ADA, she must have a disability. Disability is defined as a "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities...." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2). An ADA plaintiff must therefore satisfy two requirements: (1) plaintiff must have an impairment; and (2) the impairment must interfere with a major life activity.
For purposes of the summary judgment motion, the defendant concedes that the plaintiff has created an issue of material fact as to whether she had a "physical impairment" within the meaning of the ADA.
Plaintiff contends that she is significantly restricted in the major life activities of reproduction and "caring for others." (Krauel Dep. 10-11, 44-45, 72-73). The ADA does not explicitly define "major life activities" in its provisions. However, ADA regulations identify a list of major life activities. The ADA regulations, as promulgated by the EEOC, state that, "major life activities means functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working." 29 C.F.R. § 1630.1.
Although the use of the phrase "such as" indicates that the EEOC did not intend for the list to be exclusive, it is illustrative of the types of activities which the EEOC would consider to be "major life activities." The activities of reproduction and caring for others differ from the illustrative list of major life activities provided in the ADA regulations in at least 2 significant ways. First, the activities of reproduction and "caring for others," unlike the EEOC's list of activities, are lifestyle choices.1 Second, reproduction and "caring for others" are not activities which are engaged in with the same degree of frequency as the listed activities. Zatarain v. WDSU-Television, Inc., 881 F.Supp. 240, 243 (E.D.La.1995). As the court in Zatarain explained:
Finding "reproduction" to be a "major life activity" would be inconsistent with the illustrative list of major life activities provided in the ADA regulations. Reproduction is not an activity engaged in with the same degree of frequency as the listed activities of walking, seeing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working. (citations omitted). A person is required to walk, see, learn, speak, breath, and work throughout the day, day in and day out. However, a person is not called upon to reproduce throughout the day, every day. This Court cannot reasonably infer that reproduction is a "major life activity" based on an analysis of the illustrative list of activities in the regulation. Treating reproduction as a major life activity under the ADA would be a conscious expansion of the law, which is beyond the provision of this Court.
However, even though defining reproduction and "caring for others" as major life activities would be inconsistent with the EEOC regulations, the legislative history of the ADA arguably lends support to the plaintiff's position. In discussing whether the ADA would apply to persons with AIDS, the House of Representative's report on the ADA stated: "a person infected with HIV is covered under the first prong of the definition...
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