Kretz v. Kretz

• Decision Date: 26 June 1907
• Citation: 67 A. 378,73 N.J.E. 246
• Parties: KRETZ v. KRETZ.
• Court: New Jersey Court of Chancery

67 A. 378

73 N.J.E. 246

KRETZ

v. KRETZ.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

June 26, 1907.

Bill by Julius Kretz against Sophie Kretz. Decree for defendant.

W. T. Boyle, for complainant. T. P. Curley, for defendant.

LEAMING, V. C. The bill is filed by complainant for the procurement of a decree of divorce against defendant on the ground of adultery. The answer of defendant denies the adultery charged. During the progress of the trial it became manifest that defendant was insane. A guardian ad litem was then appointed, who answered for the defendant, denying the commission of the adultery charged, and also averring that at the time of the alleged adultery defendant was insane. Complainant now admits that defendant is insane at this time, but insists that the insanity did not exist at the time the adultery is alleged to have been committed, and further insists that, even though the insanity of defendant in fact existed at the time of the alleged offense, that fact will not operate as a defense. As to the latter claim complainant relies upon the case of Matchin v. Matchin, 6 Pa. 332, 47 Am. Dec. 466. In that case it is held that, although insanity will operate as a defense to a criminal charge of adultery, principles of public-policy require that the insanity of a wife at the time of the commission of the offense shall not be permitted to defeat the right of a husband to a divorce based upon the offense. The theory of the decision appears to be that the paramount purposes of marriage are the procreation and protection of legitimate children, the institution of families, and the creation of natural relations among mankind, and that these public considerations so far outweigh the private interests of the immediate parties that the marriage relation will be dissolved for the offense named, when committed by the wife, notwithstanding her insanity at the time of the commission of the act. I am unable to accept the views expressed in the Matchin Case. For a husband to cast off a wife for an act committed by her while insane impresses me as scarcely less than barbarous, and as wholly inconsistent with the necessities arising from social conditions. If society has any demand to assert in such a case, it is a demand for the protecting care of the husband alike before and after the unfortunate act. The principles of the Matchin Case would require a court to grant a decree of divorce to a husband whose wife had been the victim of a rape. I am unable to conceive how any court can properly give sanction to the views expressed in the case under review, and I must decline to recognize it as a binding precedent. No other court, so far as I have been able to discover, has given sanction to the views expressed in the Matchin Case, while the very contrary has been established by the courts of several states. Nichols v. Nichols, 31 Vt. 328, 73 Am. Dec. 352; Broadstreet v. Broadstreet, 7 Mass. 474; Wray v. Wray, 19 Ala. 522; Mims v. Mims, 33 Ala. 98; Wray v. Wray Id. 187. See, also, Yarrow v. Yarrow, [1892] Prob. Div. 92, and Hill v. Hill, 27 N. J. Eq. 214. In 1 Bishop on Marriage & Divorce, § 712, it is stated that the doctrine of Matchin v. Matchin has found no support. I conclude, therefore, that, if defendant was insane at the time of the alleged adultery, that fact constitutes a complete defense to the bill.

It is probably impossible to determine with entire accuracy the condition of the mind of defendant at the date of the alleged offense. The offense is alleged to have been committed in January, 1906. For a number of years prior to that date the wife had indulged in alcoholic stimulants to such an extent that her mind has become enfeebled, and all the witnesses agree that her condition gradually grew worse, until she finally became insane as the result of alcoholism. The only dispute is as to exact time when she may be said to have reached that condition. About six months before the alleged offense her husband filed a petition for her commitment to an asylum for the insane, based upon an allegation of her insanity. Drs. Bray and Horning then examined her and certified that she was a proper person for commitment to the asylum. She was not committed, but the reason why the proceedings were discontinued does not fully appear. Dr. Bray now testifies that she was not then insane, but that he...