Anonymous v. Anonymous
| Decision Date | 18 December 1962 |
| Citation | 37 Misc.2d 773,236 N.Y.S.2d 288 |
| Parties | ANONYMOUS v. ANONYMOUS. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court |
Rothenberg & Atkins, New York City, for plaintiff, Charles Rothenberg, New York City, of counsel.
Kreutzer, Heller & Selman, New York City, for defendant, Benjamin Heller, New York City, of counsel.
Involved in this divorce action is the question under what circumstances does the mental condition of an erring spouse constitute a defense. Though New York defines by statute the standard governing responsibility for criminal conduct (Penal Law, § 1120) and establishes a wholly different measure for determining when a mentally ill person may be hospitalized (Mental Hygiene Law, § 2), it has enacted no statute fixing criteria for responsibility for conduct in violation of marital obligations. New York case law has recognized that an insane wife is incapable of abandoning her husband (Goodale v. Lawrence, 88 N.Y. 513, 520) and refused a divorce to a husband whose wife committed adultery while suffering from dementia praecox (Laudo v. Laudo, 188 App.Div. 699, 177 N.Y.S. 396; see also Horn v. Horn, 142 App.Div. 848, 127 N.Y.S. 448; Rathbun v. Rathbun, 40 How.Pr. 328, 330). Some of those cases emphasize the marital obligation to provide support, including medical assistance, to an afflicted spouse; in none was it necessary to consider the degree of affliction that would excuse infidelity.
Should the standard be that advanced in M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & F. 200, and now embodied in Penal Law, § 1120: ability to distinguish right from wrong or to understand the nature and quality of the act? The Laudo court, supra, had no need specifically to answer the question, for, on the facts it found, the criminal standard was met. In Pennsylvania (Manley v. Manley, 193 Pa.Super. 252, 264, 164 A.2d 113, 120) and some other states (Annotation: 19 A.L.R.2d 144, 147, 174) this is the standard used in matrimonial as well as criminal cases. Or should the criteria of responsibility be that suggested as a revision of the criminal rule in Durham v. United States, 94 U.S.App.D.C. 228, 214 F.2d 862, 45 A.L.R.2d 1430 and expanded upon in Carter v. United States, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 227, 252 F.2d 608 under which the defense is established by showing (a) a mental disease or defect, and (b) that the act in question was the product or result of the disease or defect; that is--that the defendant would not have committed the act if he had not been diseased as he was (cf. People v. Schmidt, 216 N.Y. 324, 340, 110 N.E. 945, 949, L.R.A.1916D, 519). New Jersey's test of ability to exercise a rational judgment at the time the adultery was committed (Kretz v. Kretz, 73 N.J.Eq. 246, 67 A. 378; Huster v. Huster, 64 N.J .Super. 29, 38, 165 A.2d 305, 310) appears to fit in the latter category, and the statement in the Laudo case, supra, that penalty should not be imposed 'upon one who is a victim of conditions beyond her control, and not a willing, rational actor' (188 App.Div. p. 704, 177 N.Y.S. p. 399, emphasis supplied) suggests the Durham-Carter rule. While at first blush the conclusion of the American Bar Foundation's study of 'The Mentally Disabled and the Law' appears contrary to use of Durham-Carter standards in matrimonial cases, its suggestion (at p. 203) that 'serious thought should be given to the use [in divorce cases] of standards defining civil hospitalization' of necessity refers only to the presence of a mental disease or defect and is not understood as excluding causal relationship in matrimonial cases, although causal connection has no bearing on civil hospitalization.
Perhaps the fairest manner to resolve the conflict between the obligation of support on one side and the obligation of fidelity on the other is by legislation similar to the Domestic Relations Law, § 7 in which criteria of responsibility will be spelled out and dissolution of the marriage allowed in less than five years when the mental illness afflicting a spouse involves sexual promiscuity. In the present case, however, it is not necessary for the court to choose between the possible standards, for whichever is applied, the Court's conclusion is that plaintiff is entitled to judgment of divorce.
The burden of proving mental condition relieving defendant of responsibility is on defendant (Laudo v. Laudo, supra, 188 App.Div. 699, 706, 177 N.Y.S. 396, 401; see also Matter of Jacobs' Estate, 2 A.D.2d 774, 154 N.Y.S.2d 536, aff'd 3 N.Y.2d 723, 163 N.Y.S.2d 965, 143 N.E.2d 514). Her sanity is presumed and the presumption must be overcome by a contrary showing (Matter of Jacobs' Estate, supra). To overcome the presumption defendant offered the testimony of her psychiatrist and the record of her hospitalization at Meadowbrook a few days after the incident which is the basis of this action. The psychiatrist testified that defendant had been under his care since September 1960; that she was even now highly unstable; that he had first diagnosed her as a character disorder, but later concluded that she was schizophrenic-affective type; that when hospitalized at Meadowbrook she was quite irrational and talking of destroying herself, but that he felt that committing her to Pilgrim State would destroy her ability for re-integration and, therefore, took her back as a private case; that in his opinion it was best for her to be working and that she, therefore, has been attending speedwriting classes since shortly after she left Meadowbrook Hospital; that after the incident he had asked her indirectly if she had committed adultery since and she had evaded the question; that prior to the incident she was aware that she was being followed since plaintiff had told her in the presence of the psychiatrist that as a result of prior infidelities he intended to have her followed; that defendant had discussed the rendezvous with the witness three days before it occurred and told him that she had sought to dissuade her paramour from going through with it and had told the...
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