Krevet v. Meyer

Decision Date31 October 1856
Citation24 Mo. 107
PartiesKREVET, Respondent, v. MEYER et al., Appellants.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

1. A tenant may maintain an action of forcible entry and detainer against his landlord, although at the time of the said entry the tenant may have been holding over after the determination of his term.

Appeal from St. Louis Land Court.

This was an action of forcible entry and detainer. The evidence tended to show that the defendants entered certain rooms upon the third floor of a house in the city of St. Louis, which rooms were at the time in the possession of plaintiff, and removed a door belonging to said rooms, and the sash of the windows of said apartments, and thus forced plaintiff out of possession. Defendants offered to prove that the premises in dispute had been let to plaintiff for only one month (which term expired before the alleged forcible entry) by Bernard Meyer, one of the defendants, as agent of Joseph Meyer, the other defendant. The court excluded his testimony. The court, among other instructions asked by defendants, excluded the following: “1. The jury are instructed that if they believe from the evidence that before and at the time of the institution of this suit, plaintiff's right of possession to the premises sued for had ceased, they might find for defendants; and the jury are further instructed that a tenant's right of possession ceases with the expiration of the term of his lease, unless there be a renewal or a consent of the landlord to the tenant's holding over. 2. The jury are instructed that, to find for the plaintiff, they must believe from the evidence that at the time of the institution of this suit plaintiff was entitled to the lawful possession of the premises sued for, and that defendants unlawfully and forcibly entered thereon. 3. The jury are instructed that if a tenant is disturbed in his possession by a landlord, he has an action of trespass, and a verdict in this suit against plaintiff is no bar to his recovery in action of trespass against defendants for such disturbance of his possession. 4. If the jury believe from the evidence that plaintiff was tenant of defendants; that by the act of defendants the premises occupied were rendered uninhabitable, it was at defendants' option to abandon the possession; and if he so elected, and his abandonment of the possession was because the premises were uninhabitable, and not because of violence done, or fear of violence on the part of the defendants, the jury must find for the defendants.”

The jury rendered a verdict for plaintiff.

A. J. P. Garesché, for appellant.

1. The instruction asked by defendants should have been given; the first three as raising the question whether plaintiff was, at the time of the institution of this suit, lawfully entitled to the possession of the premises sued for. The fourth instruction should have been given, because it was a question whether it was a case of trespass or of forcible entry and detainer. (See 6 Mo. 346; 7 Mo. 167, 171, 289; 8 Mo. 281; 11 Mo 354, 605; 12 Mo. 306; 13 B. Mon. 184; 9 Mo. 301.)

II. Though title cannot be considered, the legality or illegality of possession may, and defendants, therefore, had the right to show that plaintiff's right of possession had ceased.

S. H. Gardner, for respondent.

SCOTT, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

By the common law, a person having a right of entry to lands in the possession of another might enter into the possession, and although he was subject to an indictment for any breach of the peace committed in making his entry, yet there was no remedy provided by which he could be compelled to make restitution of the possession thus forcibly taken. In order to correct the evils attending this state of the law, and to take away all inducement to persons to redress themselves at the expense of the peace of the community, several statutes were made which prohibited the forcible entry on the possession of another, and directed that, in the event force was...

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47 cases
  • Coleman v. Fletcher
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • July 19, 1945
    ...record the judgment is erroneous because an action of trespass will not lie against a party with title and right of possession. Krevet v. Myer, 24 Mo. 107; Bergman Vogt's Admr., 172 Mo.App. 61; Levy v. McClintock, 141 Mo.App. 593; Ivory v. Carlin, 30 Mo. 142, 144. Ward & Reeves for responde......
  • State ex rel. Fletcher v. Blair
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • February 7, 1944
    ... ... in so holding contravened the latest decisions of this court ... as announced in the following cases: Krevet v. Myer, ... 24 Mo. 107; Fuhr v. Dean, 26 Mo. 116; Bergman v ... Vogt's Admr., 172 Mo.App. 61; Chappee v. Lubrite ... Refining Co., 337 Mo. 791, ... ...
  • Hafner Manufacturing Company v. City of St. Louis
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • December 19, 1914
    ... ... possessed" are used in a restrictive sense, to-wit, in ... the sense of ... [172 S.W. 34] ... meaning peaceable possession. [ Krevet v ... Meyer, 24 Mo. 107 at 110; Beeler v. Cardwell, ... 29 Mo. 72; Michau v. Walsh, 6 Mo. 346.] But there is ... still left to be sharply ... ...
  • Coleman v. Fletcher, 6402.
    • United States
    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • July 19, 1945
    ...record the judgment is erroneous because an action of trespass will not lie against a party with title and right of possession. Krevet v. Myer, 24 Mo. 107; Bergman v. Vogt's Admr., 172 Mo. App. 61; Levy v. McClintock, 141 Mo. App. 593; Ivory v. Carlin, 30 Mo. 142, Ward & Reeves for responde......
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