Krimmel v. Eielson

• Decision Date: 18 May 1950
• Docket Number: No. 31454,31454
• Citation: 406 Ill. 202,92 N.E.2d 767
• Parties: KRIMMEL et al. v. EIELSON, Mayor, et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 767

92 N.E.2d 767

406 Ill. 202

KRIMMEL et al. v. EIELSON, Mayor, et al.

No. 31454.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

May 18, 1950.

Londrigan & Londrigan, Springfield, for appellants.

Hugh J. Graham, City Attorney, and George P. Coutrakon, State's Attorney, Sprinfield, for appellees.

DAILY, Justice.

The plaintiffs, described as being residents, property owners, taxpayers and employees of the city of Springfield, started this action in the circuit court of Sangamon County against the defendants, the elected officials of the city and the clerk of the county, seeking a declaratory judgment in a controversy which had arisen over the construction of sections 39-1 and 39-2 of the Revised Cities and Villages Act (IllRev.Stat.1949, chap. 24, pars. 39-1 and 39-2), and section 162a of the Revenue Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1949, chap. 120, par. 643a), relative to the tax authorized in certain municipalities for fire protection purposes. The trial court held adversely to the contentions of the plaintiffs and, the revenue being involved, they appeal directly to this court for review.

The complaint sets forth that the city of Springfield first adopted the Fire Protection Act for cities with a population under 500,000 (Laws of 1929, p. 224) on February 8, 1937, following a successful referendum. The tax authorized by that act was not to exceed .20% of the full, fair cash value of the taxable property of the city. When the Revised Cities and Villages Act was adopted in 1941, the above-described Fire Protection Act was re-enacted therein as sections 39-1 and 39-2 (Ill.Rev.Stat.1941, chap. 24, pars. 39-1 and 39-2), and the .20% tax limitation retained. In 1945 the Fire Protection Act was amended to make it subject to the provisions of the General Revenue Act. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1945, chap. 120.) The same legislature amended the revenue law by the adoption of the acts known as the Butler bills, which required assessments for tax purposes to be at 100% of the full fair cash value; cut the tax rates for each local fund by one-half, and provided for certain limits on all tax rates until 1950. The application of these laws reduced the authorized tax rate for fire protection purposes to .10%. Following the decision of this court in Anderson v. City of Park Ridge, 396 Ill. 235, 72 N.E.2d 210, wherein the Butler bills were construed, the 1947 legislature further amended the revenue law. In section 162a of the amended law (Ill.Rev.Stat.1949, chap. 120, par. 643a) all local taxes were limited, until December 31, 1952, and a new formula for extending taxes in the interim was adopted. The effect of this legislation was to reduce the fire protection rate in Springfield to .058%, or slightly less than six cents on each $100 valuation.

Thereafter, the 1949 legislature, by House Bill No. 111 (Laws of 1949, p. 473), approved April 2, 1949, amended the Fire Protection Act, and in section 39-1 thereof authorized the levy of a tax not to exceed .20% of the full, fair cash value of the taxable property. The section as amended retained the language that it was subject to the provisions of the General Revenue Act. Plaintiffs interpret this amendment as presently authorizing a tax rate not in excess of .20% for fire protection purposes, free from the limitations of the General Revenue Act. Defendants contend that the fire act is still subject to the revenue law and that the formula therein still limits the city of Springfield to a rate of .058%. The trial court held with defendants.

The gist of plaintiff's contentions is that House Bill No. 111 is a new and specific enactment in regard to fire protection taxes, that it is inconsistent and repugnant to the provisions of the General Revenue Act, and therefore prevails as the last expression of the legislature on the subject. It is urged that the House bill has acted as a repeal of the provisions of the amended act which are repugnant to the amendatory act, and that the establishment of a maximum rate being the only new legislation enacted by the bill, such new legislation should prevail over the restatement of the previously existing provision making the fire tax act subject to the General Revenue Act.

A somewhat similar problem of statutory construction was presented in Klemme v. Drainage Dist. No. 5, 380 Ill. 221, 43 N.E.2d 966, where it was pointed out that repeals by implication are not favored and that it is only where two statutes are clearly repugnant to each other that the later one opeates as a repeal of the former. In addition, it is the general rule that where an act, or section of an act, is amended so as to read as it is repeated in the amendatory act, all such portions of the old act or section as are not repeated in the new act are repealed without any express words for that purpose, but all such portions of the old law as are retained, either literally or substantially, are regarded as the continuation of the old law and not as a new enactment. People ex rel. Martin, v. Village of Oak Park, 372 Ill. 488, 24 N.E.2d 571; Merlo v. Johnston City and Big Muddy Coal and Mining Co., 258 Ill. 328, 101 N.E. 525. It is equally well settled that amendments are to be construed together with the original act to which they relate as constituting one law and as part of a coherent system of legislation. Buchsbaum & Co. v. Gordon, 389 Ill. 493, 59 N.E.2d 832; City of Altamont v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 348 Ill. 339, 180 N.E. 809. The provisions of amendatory and amended acts are to be harmonized, if possible, so as to give effect to each and leave no clause of either inoperative. (59 C.J. par. 645, pp. 1094-1095.) Plaintiff's assertions here, if followed, would leave inoperative the portion of the amendment relating to the General Revenue Act.

Another canon of construction is that a later law which is merely a reenactment of a former law does not repeal an...