Krispy Kreme Doughnut Co. v. Cornett, U--233
| Decision Date | 09 May 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. U--233,U--233 |
| Citation | 312 So.2d 771 |
| Parties | KRISPY KREME DOUGHNUT COMPANY, Appellant, v. Roy CORNETT, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
James W. Smith, Hoffman, Hendry, Parker & Smith, Daytona, Beach, for appellant.
Richard D. Bertone, and Maurice Wagner, Daytona Beach, for appellee.
This is an appeal from final judgment, denial of appellant's motion for a new trial and denial of appellant's motion for directed verdict.
On March 19, 1972, Ricky McVay (driver) and several friends were returning by automobile from Daytona Beach to their home in Winter Garden. On the way, they decided to stop at appellant's Krispy Kreme Doughnut Shop located in the City of Daytona Beach. Previously, on the way to Daytona Beach, they had trouble with the brakes of the automobile. As they approached the doughnut shop, McVay began pumping the brakes and slowed the car down to a speed of four or five miles per hour as it entered the parking area of the doughnut shop but it would not stop. The vehicle ran over a 2 1/2 inch curbing or wheel guard at the edge of a sidewalk approximately three feet wide which extended along the front of the shop. The car then crossed the sidewalk and ran into and partially through the wall and plate glass window comprising the front portion of the shop. At the time of the impact, appellee Roy Cornett was sitting on a stool at the counter in the shop with his back to the point of impact. He was struck by debris and knocked to the floor amidst a pile of bricks and glass sustaining injuries.
The Krispy Kreme Doughnut Shop consists of a building, a parking area and a sign. The parking area or lot is a ground-level area which vehicles enter immediately upon leaving the street. It has marked perpendicular parking spaces along the front of the building. The shop was constructed according to company specifications which are modified for different localities to meet each municipality's building codes and ordinances. In order to receive a certificate of occupancy in the City of Daytona Beach, the city's inspectors must certify that the building meets or exceeds all city ordinances and regulations pertaining to the particular type of structure. Such certification was made in this case.
During trial, at the close of plaintiff's (appellee's) case, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed defendants McVay, driver of car, and Donald Eagles, owner of the car, leaving appellant as the sole remaining defendant.
This case is governed by the law as set forth by this court in Schatz v. 7-Eleven, Inc., Fla.App. (1st), 128 So.2d 901, unless appellee is correct in its contention that appellant failed to comply with the building code of the City of Daytona Beach in the construction of its parking area. The facts in Schatz are remarkably similar to those in the case sub judice. There Schatz, a business invitee shopping in 7-Eleven Drive-in Food Store, was struck by an automobile which ran through the front of the store from a parking slot perpendicular to the front of the building. The suit was brought by Schatz against m-Eleven, Inc., to recover for her injuries. As in the case sub judice, the 7-Eleven Drive-in Food Store was located in Daytona Beach, but the municipal building code was not injected in that suit. This court's opinion specifically mentioned that the court was unaware of any ordinance, statute, or rule of law requiring that the owner of the store erect a barrier between the entrance to his establishment and the street, highway, or parking area, sufficient in height and strength to prevent motor vehicles negligently operated by others from entering the store where customers are usually present. In affirmance, a summary judgment for defendant 7-Eleven, Inc., Judge John Wigginton writing for the court, said:
'Plaintiff was a business invitee on defendant's premises at the time of her injury. The law imposes on defendant the duty of exercising ordinary care to maintain his premises in a reasonably safe condition for the purpose for which they are adapted. Defendant did not owe plaintiff a duty as insurer of her safety while on the premises in question, but is charged with the duty of guarding against subjecting plaintiff to dangers of which defendant is cognizant or might reasonably foresee.
In the Pope case this court discussed the law of proximate cause and the several tests to be applied in determining whether a given act is the proximate cause of damages sustained. It was there pointed out that the two essential elements of proximate cause are causation and the limitation to foreseeable consequence. Causation is that act which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. Even though the person charged may be guilty of a negligent act, there can be no recovery for an injury resulting therefrom which was not a reasonable foreseeable consequence of his negligence. For the consequence of a negligent act to be foreseeable, it must be such that a person by prudent human foresight can anticipate will likely result from the act, because it happens so frequently from the commission of such an act that in the field of human experience it may be expected to happen again.'
Daytona Beach Municipal Ordinance 67--79, § 507, commonly known as the Southern Standard Building Code, was admitted in evidence by the trial judge subject to further testimony being offered 'to tie in any particular section.' § 507 states as follows:
'507.1--Parking Lots
'Open sheds or canopies may be erected up to two-thirds (2/3) the area of a lot, provided such construction is not less than required for Type IV--Non-Combustible Construction, and that all such construction meets the approval of the Building Official.
(a) As defined in Section 201.2, Public Parking Decks may be constructed of Types, I, II, III, and IV Construction without exterior walls. When such structures are within six (6) feet of common property lines they shall be provided with an enclosure wall along the common property line of not less than two (2) hours fire resistance without openings therein, except that doors opening to buildings adjacent thereto may be permitted provided that such door openings meet the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Bell
...of harm resulting from a vehicle crashing into a restaurant was “too remote” to create duty); Krispy Kreme Doughnut Co. v. Cornett, 312 So.2d 771, 772, 775 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1975) (no liability for injuries sustained when a vehicle drove into a shop because the parking lot met city building ......
-
Marshall v. Burger King Corp.
...958, 521 N.Y.S.2d 956, 957 (1987); Hendricks v. Todora, 722 S.W.2d 458, 460-62 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1986); Krispy Kreme Doughnut Co. v. Cornett, 312 So.2d 771, 772-73 (Fla.App. 1st DCA 1975); Nicholson v. MGM Corp., 555 P.2d 39, 41 (Alaska 1976); Eckerd-Walton, Inc. v. Adams, 126 Ga.App. 210, 2......
-
Graham v. Langley
...owner-operator, because losing control of a car is not normal. Ergo, it is not foreseeable. See also Krispy Kreme Doughnut Co., v. Cornett, 312 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), cert. denied, 330 So.2d 16 (Fla.1976). Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Carn, 473 So.2d 742 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985), rev. deni......
-
Dalmo Sales of Wheaton, Inc. v. Steinberg
...judgment for the storeowner where the plaintiff was injured on the sidewalk rather than in the store. In Krispy Kreme Doughnut Company v. Cornett, 312 So.2d 771 (Fla.App.1975), however, it followed Schatz. Then, in Thompson v. Ward, 341 So.2d 837 (Fla.App.1977), the Court again declined to ......
-
Construction cases
...disputed facts which would determine the requirements of the Standard Building Code. See Krispy Kreme Doughnut Co. v. Cornett , 312 So.2d 771 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975), cert. denied , 330 So.2d 16 (Fla. 1976). They instead presented conflicting opinions as to how the code should be interpreted. T......