Kroger Co. v. Regional Airport Auth. of Louisville
| Decision Date | 11 April 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. 00-6552.,00-6552. |
| Citation | 286 F.3d 382 |
| Parties | The KROGER COMPANY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. REGIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY OF LOUISVILLE AND JEFFERSON COUNTY, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
Charles G. Middleton, III (argued and briefed), Jason P.K. Underwood, Middleton Reutlinger, Louisville, KY, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Robert W. Griffith (briefed), Michael D. Risley (argued and briefed), Stites & Harbison, Louisville, KY, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before: MOORE, COLE, and FARRIS, Circuit Judges.*
The Kroger Company appeals the district court's affirmance of the Regional Airport Authority of Louisville and Jefferson County's decision to partially reimburse Kroger for relocation expenses under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policy Act of 1970(URA), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4621-4638 (West 1995 & Supp.2001). Kroger contends (1) that the district court applied the incorrect standard of review, (2) that Kroger was inappropriately denied an evidentiary hearing, and (3) that the denial of certain expenses was unsupported by the record. We affirm.
In 1992, the Regional Airport Authority, a quasi-municipal entity implementing a relocation program pursuant to the URA, purchased Kroger's Crittenden Drive property for $9.1 million. As a result, Kroger moved its distribution center operations to a new facility and applied for over $4 million in relocation benefits. The RAA approved $727,692. This appeal involves an additional $325,626 to which Kroger alleges it is entitled.
Kroger continues to seek reimbursement for seven items: (1) Permits and Licenses ($51,275); (2) Management Wages ($16,074); (3) Dixie Costs and Product Move to Peyton ($122,379); (4) Trailer Rental ($13,593); (5) Forklift Expense and Equipment Rental ($5,190); (6) Telephone and Data Cabling ($13,115); and (7) Consulting Fees ($104,000). The RAA denied these expenditures either because they were ineligible expenses, in excess of the reasonable and necessary amount, or submitted without sufficient documentation.
Before making this determination, the RAA met with Kroger several times, permitted Kroger to amend its claim twice, and reviewed seventy-six volumes of material submitted in support of the application. The RAA determination contained two detailed tables: a cost comparison that illustrated where the RAA's evaluation differed from Kroger's; and a summary of the claim for relocation expenses, which listed the reasons why particular expenses were approved or denied.
Kroger administratively appealed this determination to the RAA's General Manager, Robert S. Michael. In addition to reviewing the existing documentation, Michael considered Kroger's oral presentation and a written position statement. He informed Kroger that it was free to supplement the record with additional materials or legal authorities, but Kroger did not do so. In June 1995, Michael affirmed the RAA's determination.
Kroger sought review of the RAA determination at the district court. As an initial matter, the court found that the RAA did not err in denying Kroger's request for an evidentiary hearing, and that the determination was subject to the arbitrary or capricious standard of review. Later, the district court granted RAA's motion for summary judgment on all categories of expenses except four.1 At the parties' request, those issues were remanded to the RAA for further development of the administrative record. When the matter returned, the district court affirmed the RAA's subsequent determination to deny relocation expenses for the remaining issues.
Kroger here contends that the district court erred by not reviewing the RAA's determination de novo or for substantial evidence, by affirming the RAA's denial of an evidentiary hearing, and by affirming the RAA's denial of full reimbursement for the challenged seven items.
Kroger contends that the district court erred when it declined to review the RAA's administrative determination de novo or for substantial evidence. Kroger is incorrect.
We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same standard to review the RAA's actions as the district court. See Clark v. Portage County, Ohio, 281 F.3d 602, 603 (6th Cir.2002). Agency actions involving relocation assistance under the URA are subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 701 et seq. (West 1996 & Supp.2001). See Nagi v. United States, 751 F.2d 826, 828 (6th Cir.1985); see also M/V Cape Ann v. United States, 199 F.3d 61, 63 (1st Cir.1999); Supreme Oil Co. v. Metro. Transp. Auth., 157 F.3d 148, 151 (2d Cir.1998); Ackerley Communications of Florida, Inc. v. Henderson, 881 F.2d 990, 993 (11th Cir.1989). Thus, review of the RAA's denial of relocation benefits is under the narrow standard set forth in the APA: we may set aside the RAA's findings, conclusions, or actions only if they were "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law." 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(A); see Supreme Oil Co., 157 F.3d at 151; Nagi, 751 F.2d at 828.
"[T]he focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court." Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142, 93 S.Ct. 1241, 36 L.Ed.2d 106 (1973). Even were the RAA's determination unsupported by the record, the proper remedy would be to remand to the agency for additional investigation or explanation, because "[t]he reviewing court is not generally empowered to conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being reviewed and to reach its own conclusions based on such an inquiry." Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744, 105 S.Ct. 1598, 84 L.Ed.2d 643 (1985).
The district court properly applied the arbitrary or capricious standard of review, rejected de novo review, and remanded any issues for which the record was incompletely developed. "[D]e novo review is appropriate only where there are inadequate factfinding procedures in an adjudicatory proceeding, or where judicial proceedings are brought to enforce certain administrative actions." Camp, 411 U.S. at 142, 93 S.Ct. 1241. Neither situation applies here. The proceeding before the district court was not brought to enforce the RAA's determination, and the only reasonable deficiency suggested in the administrative proceedings is that the RAA inadequately supported its decision. Kroger was permitted to (1) submit enormous amounts of material, (2) meet multiple times with RAA officials, (3) amend its claim twice, and (4) supplement the record in any way it saw fit. There was no deficiency in the factfinding procedures that would warrant a de novo hearing in this matter.
For the first time on appeal, Kroger presents an issue of first impression in our circuit: whether an agency's denial of relocation benefits under the URA should also be examined for substantial evidence under 5 U.S.C.A. § 706(2)(E). Section § 706(2)(E) provides that a reviewing court shall set aside those agency determinations found to be "unsupported by substantial evidence in a case subject to sections 556 and 557 of this title or otherwise reviewed on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute." The Supreme Court has noted that the arbitrary or capricious provision in § 706(2)(A) and the substantial evidence standard in § 706(2)(E) are separate standards, and that it would be consistent to find one violated while the other is not. See Bowman Transp. v. Ark.-Best Freight Sys., 419 U.S. 281, 284, 95 S.Ct. 438, 42 L.Ed.2d 447 (1974); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 413, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971), abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d 192 (1977).
Because no hearing is provided by the URA for relocation benefit claims and 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 556 and 557 are inapplicable, neither the URA nor the APA require a court to apply the substantial evidence standard.2 See Starke v. Secretary, U.S Dep't of Housing, 454 F.Supp. 477, 483 n. 2 (W.D.Okla.1977); see also M/V Cape Ann, 199 F.3d at 63 (). Compare Camp, 411 U.S. at 140-41, 93 S.Ct. 1241 ( ) (citation omitted), with Bowman Transp., 419 U.S. at 284, 95 S.Ct. 438 (). The district court did not err by not examining the RAA determination under the substantial evidence test.
Kroger contends that the RAA and the district court violated the URA, the APA, and the Due Process Clause by not holding an evidentiary hearing. Kroger is incorrect.
The APA requires hearings only where an on-the-record adjudication is required by the appropriate substantive statute. See 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 551(13), 553-57, 704, 706; Florida Power & Light Co., 470 U.S. at 744, 105 S.Ct. 1598 (). The URA states only that the head of an agency must establish regulations to ensure that a person whose claim for benefits is not approved in full may have the denial ...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Frick v. City of Salina
... ... administrative actions.' [Citation omitted.]" Kroger Co. v. Regional Airport Auth. of Louisville, 286 F.3d 382, ... ...
- Kindhearts For Charitable Humanitarian Dev. Inc. v. Geithner
- Snyder Computer Sys., Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp.
-
Snyder Computer Sys., Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp.
...deficient and certainly does not warrant a de novo review. See e.g., Kroger Co. v. Reg'l Airport Auth. of Louisville & Jefferson Cnty., 286 F.3d 382, 387 (6th Cir.2002) (finding “no deficiency in the factfinding procedures that would warrant a de novo hearing ... [where] Kroger was permitte......