Kroll v. City of Wilmington

Docket NumberC. A. 2019-0969-KSJM
Decision Date15 September 2023
PartiesNICHOLAS KROLL, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF WILMINGTON, CITY OF WILMINGTON POLICE DEPARTMENT, and MICHAEL PURZYCKI, Mayor of the City of Wilmington, Defendants.
CourtCourt of Chancery of Delaware

Date Submitted: June 30 2023

Robert C. McDonald, Adrienne M. McDonald, SILVERMAN McDONALD &FRIEDMAN, Wilmington, Delaware; Counsel for Plaintiff Nicholas Kroll.

Robert M. Goff, Jr., CITY OF WILMINGTON LAW DEPARTMENT, Wilmington Delaware; Counsel for Defendants City of Wilmington, City of Wilmington Police Department, and Michael Purzycki.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

McCORMICK, C.

This action involves a dispute between the City of Wilmington (the "City") and Nicholas Kroll, a police officer terminated by the Wilmington Police Department (the "WPD") for an alleged violation of the residency requirement that the City imposed as a condition of his employment. According to the plaintiff, he complied with the residency requirement as it was written when he started working for the City, and for many years, there was no issue. But in 2017, the City updated its definition of residency and retroactively applied it to him. The plaintiff was not in compliance with the revised definition, so the WPD terminated him through a series of administrative proceedings. In addition to charging the plaintiff with violating the residency requirement, the WPD charged him with dishonesty for stating in paperwork that he complied with the residency requirement.

After initially attempting to appeal the WPD's decision through the certiorari process in the Superior Court, the plaintiff voluntarily withdrew the Superior Court action and filed this action. Here, he challenges the basis for his termination and seeks damages, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief including reinstatement. While this case was pending, this court held in a separate action brought by the Wilmington Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 1, Inc. (the "FOP") that the City violated the collective bargaining agreement by altering the definition of residency. This holding had the indirect effect of eliminating one basis for the plaintiff's termination-noncompliance with the residency requirement.

The defendants moved to dismiss this action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, and the court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Delaware Supreme Court reversed and remanded on appeal, instructing the court to reconsider the subject matter jurisdiction arguments previously advanced by the parties. Message received. On remand, the court grappled with the parties' arguments by holding several telephonic hearings, requesting supplemental briefing, and conducting outside research to fill in the gaps.

Properly conceived, the defendants advance three arguments for why the plaintiff's requests for injunctive relief are insufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction here. First, the defendants contend that the plaintiff has failed to adequately allege a basis for injunctive relief in the form of reinstatement because the dishonesty charge was an adequate and independent basis on which to terminate him. Second, they maintain that the plaintiff has an adequate remedy at law available to him in the Superior Court through the certiorari process. Third, they argue that the plaintiff has waived any further arguments in support of his jurisdictional theory by failing to plead them in the complaint. The court rejects these arguments and finds that the plaintiff has pled a basis for injunctive relief. Namely, the plaintiff has adequately alleged his request for reinstatement, which renders alternative resolution mechanisms like certiorari inadequate.

The parties' briefing raises interesting issues on the fault lines between this court's jurisdiction and the Superior Court's exclusive powers to review certain administrative decisions through the writ of certiorari. After raising these issues, however, the briefing did not offer much in the way of a resolution. And the answer is messy-there seems to be no clear rule for deciding whether certiorari presents an adequate remedy relative to injunctive relief under circumstances like these. As such, the court has added independent research into its analysis, not to disregard the parties' arguments, but to do them full justice.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

On a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, parties may rely on documents outside of the complaint, which the court may look to in its discretion. The court draws upon those documents when noted. Otherwise, the facts are drawn from the Amended Verified Complaint for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief and the documents it incorporates by reference.[1]

The WPD hired the plaintiff as a full-time police officer in March 2013.[2] As a condition of employment, the plaintiff was required to establish and maintain a residence within the City for a period of at least sixty months.[3] To satisfy this requirement, he purchased a home within the City in July 2013.[4] In November 2014, he purchased a second home in Middletown to serve as the primary residence of his wife and children, because one of his children sought to benefit from the specialized educational programs of the Appoquinimink School District.[5]

To ensure compliance with the residency requirement, the City mandates that its police officers fill out a declaration of residency form annually. In April 2017, the City's Human Resources department noticed inconsistencies in the plaintiff's 2015 and 2017 annual residency affidavits. According to the plaintiff, he transposed a house number on the 2015 affidavit and added a newly identified apartment number on the 2017 affidavit.[6]

In October 2017, the City's Administrative Board adopted a more restrictive definition of residence and altered its forms. Before October 2017, the form required officers to aver that their qualifying residence was where they "actually live."[7] After the October revision, however, the form required officers to prove that the qualifying residence was their "domicile," defined as their "true, fixed, and permanent home" and the place at which "[i]n the absence of a marital separation, . . . an employee's spouse and children, if any, reside."[8]

In November 2017, the plaintiff was notified by the WPD that his annual affidavits were the product of fraud and dishonesty in violation of the WPD's rules and regulations.[9]A disciplinary panel was convened, and the panel heard evidence on January 11, 2018.[10]During the disciplinary panel hearing, the City applied the residency definition adopted in October 2017, which required the plaintiff to live with his spouse and children to satisfy the residency requirement.[11] The panel recommended terminating the plaintiff's employment.[12] An internal appeal held on April 11, 2018 affirmed that decision.[13] The plaintiff was terminated effective that date.[14]

The plaintiff filed an action in the Superior Court on December 18, 2018, which he stylized as a Notice of Appeal.[15] The City moved to dismiss on the basis that the plaintiff's Superior Court action was effectively a certiorari proceeding and that the plaintiff missed the accompanying 30-day deadline.[16] Before the Superior Court could rule on the motion, however, on October 24, 2019, the parties stipulated to dismissal.[17]

Meanwhile, in early 2018, the City police officers' exclusive bargaining representative, the FOP, filed a grievance challenging the City's modification of the definition of "residence" under the Police Officers and Firefighters' Employment Relations Act (the "Act").[18] The FOP pursued the action through the complex grievance procedure established by the Act and the collective bargaining agreement, ultimately obtaining an arbitrator's award sustaining its grievance.[19] The City filed suit in this court to vacate the arbitration award (the "FOP Action").[20] On January 22, 2021, the court resolved the parties' cross-dispositive motions in favor of the FOP.[21]

Meanwhile, the plaintiff filed this suit against the City and the WPD on December 4, 2019, seeking the following relief: a declaration that the defendants breached the collective bargaining agreement and violated the plaintiff's due process rights when it misapplied the definition of "residence" to him, resulting in his termination; an order preliminarily and permanently enjoining the defendants from taking any action against the plaintiff based on the erroneous definition of "residence"; an order reinstating the plaintiff to his position with the WPD; and damages in the amount of back pay, lost wages, pension allotments, and benefits for the period of his termination.[22]

Given the overlap with the FOP Action, this suit was stayed pending resolution of that action.[23] This case ultimately resumed. The defendants moved to dismiss the Amended Complaint under Court of Chancery Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).[24] On August 16, 2021, the court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss.[25] On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the dismissal decision and remanded the action.[26] The Supreme Court further held that this court should have the opportunity to address the defendants' alternative arguments for dismissal in the first instance.[27]

On remand, this court prompted the parties to identify their remaining legal arguments, which the defendants did by a letter dated September 14, 2022.[28] After grappling with the parties' positions, the court held a status conference on December 16, 2022, identifying the remaining issues and requesting supplemental briefing on topics that the court viewed as both critical and underdeveloped.[29] Supplemental briefing concluded on May 1, 2023.[30]...

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